any way put up with people whose sympathy takes the form of lamentation, as he is not fond of indulging in lamentation himself. It is only weak women and effeminate men who take delight in such people as display their sympathy by their groans, and who love them as friends and sympathizers in their sorrow. But it is evident that we ought always to imitate one who is better than ourselves.

The presence of friends in seasons of prosperity is a pleasant means of passing the time, and not only so, but it suggests the idea that they take pleasure in our own goods. It would seem a duty, then, to be forward in inviting friends to share our good fortune, as there is a nobleness in conferring benefactions, but to be slow in inviting them to share our ill fortune, as it is a duty to give them as small a share of our evils as possible, whence the saying "Enough that I am wretched."

But the time when we should be the most ready to call them to our side is the time when it is probable that at the cost of but slight personal inconvenience they will have a chance of doing us a great service.

On the other hand, it is, I think, proper for us to go to our friends when they are in trouble, even if they do not send for us, and to make a point of going, especially to those who are in need and have made no claim upon us; for this is the nobler and pleasanter course for both. It is proper, too, to be forward in helping them to enjoy themselves, as this again is a service that friends may render, but to be less forward in seeking to get enjoyment for ourselves, as there is nothing noble in being forward to receive benefits. Still we must, I think, be on our guard against seeming churlish, as sometimes happens, in rejecting their services.

It appears, then, that the presence of friends is universally desirable.

Notes on the Text

Book VIII. Chapter I. By the word here translated "friendship" (philia) Aristotle means not merely friend

ship in the ordinary sense of the term, but all forms of friendly feeling, friendliness towards an acquaintance, affection for the friend in the true sense of the word friend, and family affection in its various forms.

The word translated "noble" means literally beautiful, and is most nearly equivalent to the English "praiseworthy," or "admirable."

Chapter II. The good is here the "beautiful," or that which calls forth admiration; the pleasant means, of course, that which gives pleasure; the useful is that which is valued not for its own sake, but as a means to the attainment of the admirable or the pleasant, or of escape from the hateful or the painful.

Chapter IV. The language of this chapter may at first seem a little obscure, but the thought is entirely clear. The thesis which is maintained is that perfect friendship can exist only between perfectly good men. The reasons offered for this assertion are as follows: To be good is to be unselfish, and it is only the unselfish who are capable of that disinterested devotion which is the essence of friendship. Only the good man can love his friend for what he is in himself for, at bottom, it is only goodness that really admires goodness. Again, only between good men can friendship be permanent, for the tried virtue of many years standing upon which it is based becomes finally an ingrained habit, and so a permanent characteristic of the man; therefore something that can be depended upon. Such friendship, furthermore, is useful and pleasurable to the friends, too. For the goodness of one friend will exhibit itself in actions useful to the other; and his actions and manner of life will be pleasant to the other, because in them the latter sees reflected as in a mirror those modes of conduct which he has chosen for himself, and which are, therefore, pleasing to him. Thus the tact, the thoughtfulness, and the kindliness of the good man are a positive pleasure to watch, for one who loves these things, even when the spectator does not get any direct profit out of them himself.

These statements, however, do not exhaust Aristotle's thought. Perfect friendship, according to him, is possible only where there exists similarity of conduct and mind between the friends. And this similarity he finds in the friendships of good men. Each wishes for the other the same good that he wishes for himself, i. e., perfection of character and of the whole personality. Each is useful to the other in the same way, viz., in helping the other to make himself a perfect man. Each is pleasant to the other in the same way, in that perfect human beings will choose what at bottom is the same sort of life and the same modes of action, and each will, therefore, have the pleasure of finding his likes and choices duplicated by those of his friend. This last position rests for Aristotle upon the assumption that the highest type of man will devote his life to the discovery and contemplation of truth. It follows from what has preceded that the relationship between the two friends is one of perfect equality, since each gives to the other the same sort of thing that he receives from the other. And the humiliating feeling of inferiority is accordingly excluded.

Finally, in the friendship of good men, not merely is the relation an ideal one, but the related terms, namely: the friends, correspond to our ideal for humanity, because each is in himself good, This is brought out in the second paragraph. It is here declared that each of the friends is good in an absolute sense, i. e., he is worthy of admiration in himself, quite apart from his goodness in relation to his friend, that is to say, his usefulness. Furthermore the

good, Aristotle holds, are pleasant or agreeable to themselves (this is what is meant by the phrase, "in an absolute sense"), i. e., they have chosen the life which is not merely most worthy of admiration, but also that which affords the highest and best pleasures.

Thus friendship between men who are of the very highest character is an ideal one in every respect. "Everything is

there: unselfish desire for another's happiness, the pleasure which is derived from one's own good conduct and from observing the good conduct of others, a mutual help in good works, and not least, the fact that the relation is permanent." This ideal may never have been fully realized on earth, but in proportion as friendship approaches it, it is the crowning good of life.

Chapter VI. The brave man cannot be acting bravely every minute, and days and weeks may pass when not a single opportunity for a brave action occurs. He is all this time, however, a brave man, if his ability to meet the test when the test comes has not disappeared. The same is true of the relation between friends. They may be absent from each other and thus all those actions which made up their friendship may from the necessity of the case be omitted.

"Fortunate persons" (in paragraph 3) are such as do not need the assistance of their friends, e. g., the wealthy who are not in need of financial assistance or other help in their business. Such men seek each other's society for its own sake.

It is a favorite idea with Aristotle that the friendships of the old are based chiefly or solely on utility, and those of the young on pleasure. This position is based, not so much on observation, as upon certain assumptions derived from his general philosophy which lead him to conclude that the perfection of character upon which perfect friendship is based can exist only in middle life, the period when our physical and mental, and, as he assumed, our moral powers are at their height. In view of the way in which Aristotle reached this conclusion, it may be doubted whether his statements about the friendships of the old were any more applicable to the Greece of the fourth century B. C. than to the America of today.

Questions for the Class

1. Can you think of other reasons for valuing friendship than those here given? If you can, observe whether in the

Socini

text which follows they have been anticipated in principle or not.

2. It is easy enough to see why we should congratulate a man who has many friends, but why should we praise him?

3. What are the two grounds on which, in Chapter I, Aristotle declares friendship to be valuable? Cf. Bacon's discussion of this subject in his Essay on Friendship (No. 27).

4. State the definition of friendship given in Chap. II. 5.

Illustrate Aristotle's distinction (in Chap. III) between caring for a person because of his usefulness to you, because of the pleasure he may give you, and because you admire him. Does this throw any light upon the distinction between the acquaintance and the friend in the proper sense of the word friend?

6. Is this statement of the grounds for friendship complete, i. e., if the ground upon which the third kind of friendship is based is admiration, can we not admire a person for other qualities besides his character?

7. Is it true that only those who possess a moral quality can admire it in others, e. g., that only the brave admire courage?

8. Can you add anything to what Aristotle says about the importance of the moral element in friendship?

9. Is it true that admiration can by itself create friendship and keep it alive? Does Aristotle say it can?

10. Is it true that the good man is also useful to his friends and a pleasant companion?

11. Show that both parties to a genuine and permanent friendship must be good men.

12. If Aristotle's general account of the basis of friendship is true, and the best friendships are possible only among the most highly developed persons, can a business man who slaves night and day in order to become rich, or, on the other hand, a mere idler, have good friends and be a good friend?