age to age, in absurdity and impiety: And therefore no wonder, that virtue, whose specific bane it is, should proportionably sicken and decline.

Indeed, it stopped not till it became like the Tree in the Chaldean's vision, which reached to heaven, and extended over the whole earth; and received all the irrational and impure Creation, birds, beasts, and insects, to its shade and shelter.

To consider fate in its growth and progress, it divides itself into four principal branches.

The first and earliest is that which arose from the strange and prodigious events in the life of Man: Where the amazed beholder observing the ends of human wisdom so perpetually defeated, even when supported by the likeliest means, concluded that nothing less than an overruling fate had traversed his well-conducted designs. This early conclusion concerning God's government here, from observations on civil events, was again inferred in after ages, by another set of men, with regard to his government hereafter, from their contemplations on religious; while, from an utter inability to penetrate the designs of Providence in its partial Revelations to mankind, they concluded that fate or predestination had de terinined of our future, as well as present happiness." These, which are only different modifications of the same imaginary power, may be called the. POPULAR and KELIGIOUS fate.

The second kind arose from a supposed moral influence of the heavenly bodies: founded in an carly superstition that the hero-gods had migrated into stars. It was first understood to be confined to communities, as such were the more immediate care of these heroes while living: But the same considerations which produced the first species of fate, in a little time, extended it to particulars. And this is the CIVIL or ASTROLOGIC fate. Hitherto, free-will was only curbed, or rendered useless. To annihilate it quite, needed all the power of philosophy. So true is the observation, that without philosophy Man can hardly become either thoroughly absurd or miserable. The Sophist, in his profound inquiries into human nature, and on what it is we do, when we judge, deliberate, and resolve, came at length to this short conclusion,

That

That the mind is no more than a machine, and that its operations are determined in the same manner that a balance is inclined by its weights. This absolute necessity of man's actions is the third species of fate, called the

PHILOSOPHIC.

From this, to the last, that is to say, the necessity of GOD's, was an easy step. For when, from the very nature of mind and will, the philosopher had demonstrated the absurdity of freedom in man, the same conclusion would hold as to all other beings whatsoever. And this is the ATHEISTIC fate.

These, Sir, were the glorious effects of PRIDE: which our incomparable Friend, with so good reason, esteems the source of all our misery and impiety. The pride of accounting for the ways of Providence begot the two first species: and the pride of comprehending the essences of things, the two latter. Ah! misera mens hominum, quo te FATA sæpissimè trahunt! In the name of Paul, if one might be allowed to ask, What shall deliver us from the body of this fate? which hangs about the soul like that punishment of the ancient Tyrant, who bound dead bodies to the living. I answer, the Religion of JESUS: which hath instructed us as clearly in the Nature of Man, as in the Nature of God; in the subject, as well as in the object, of worship. A worship founded, as reason and conscience tell us it ought, on these two great principles, the FREEDOM and the WEAKNESS of Man. The first, making our approach to God a REASONABLE SERVICE; the latter, God's approach to us a COVENANT OF GRACE. And this, Sir, is that glorious Gospel, which you are not ashamed to adore, as able to put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.

And, in fact, the fashionable reasoner is now gone over to the cause of Liberty; but still true to his overweening pride, is gone over-in the other extreme. Let the Fatalist talk what he pleases of the mind's being a balance; if its operations be mechanical, I am sure it is more like a pendulum, which, when well leaded, is incessantly swinging from one side to the other. For the vain reasoner is now as much disposed to deny the weakness of the mind, as before to deny its freedom. Hence it is, we see the Christian Doctrine of GRACE despised VOL. XI.

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and

and laughed at; and the means instituted by its Founder for obtaining it, as impiously as sophistically, explained away. Yet without human freedom Religion in general is a farce; and but on the truth of human weakness, the Religion of Jesus, a falsehood.

With regard then to free-will, what need we more than the declaration of Religion? The simple-minded man naturally supposes it; the good man feels it; the thinking man understands it; and nothing but vain philosophy holds out both against Nature and Grace: Not so openly indeed as formerly; but still as obstinately. The ablest advocates of necessity now inveloping it in systems; and insinuating it in all the artful detours of what they call a sufficient reason.

None have gone farther, or with more success, into this contrivance, than the famous Leibnitz; who, with great parts and application of mind, had an immoderate ambition of becoming founder of a sect. He first attempted to raise a name, like the heroes of old, by the invasion of another's property: But being detected and repulsed, he turned himself to invention; and framed an hypothesis in direct opposition to that theory which he before seemed willing to have made his own. This hypothesis, founded in a refined Fatalism, he chose to deliver by hints only, and in piecemeal; which, at the same time that it gave his scheme an air of depth and mystery, kept its absurdities from being observed. So that it soon made its fortune amongst the German wits; who were not out of their way when they took the same deep and cloudy road with their master. It was no wonder then, that this should raise a jealousy in the advocates of Religion, and make the warmer sort of them (not the best at a charitable distinction, though great. logicians) to mistake their friends for their enemies.

Amongst other follies of this kind, it brought down a storm of calumny on the ESSAY ON MAN; and, in its turn, occasioned this vindication of our inimitable Poet. A short, and an easy task. For my point, you know, Sir, was not to expose the absurdity of fate; but to prove the Essay free from a doctrine, which my Adversary and I agreed to be an absurdity. But if any one, confiding in the tricks of sophistry under the cloudy conveyance of metaphysics,

metaphysics, would dispute this point with us; I shall give up my share of him to my Adversary, and leave him entirely to the mercy of his logic. All the answer he must expect from me, is of that kind with the Philosopher's, who, disputing with one who denied local motion, only used his legs, and walked out of his company: That is to say, I shall decline his challenge merely for the exercise of my freedom: And indeed, what other answer does he deserve, who refuses to acquiesce in that coNSCIOUSNESS of freedom which every plain man has, on reflecting upon what passes in his mind when he thinks and acts?

But yet, it may be worth while to remark the nature of this consciousness; from which alone (as I think, Sir, I have had the pleasure to observe to you in our conversation on these subjects) freedom of will may be demonstrated to all but the downright atheist. It will, I suppose, be allowed to be an impression on the mind, made by reflexion, as strong as any of those made by sensation. And sure he must be as blind as even blind. fate can make him, who does not see thus far at least. So that the only question is, whether it be, like them, subject to deception? I answer, No. And first, for a natural reason, As the organs of sense are not employed to convey the intelligence: But secondly and principally, for a moral one, As there would be nothing left to redress the wrong representation. For, reason, which performs this office in the false impressions of sense, is the very faculty employed in making the impressions of reflexion. Were these therefore liable to the same kind of deception, we should be unavoidably led into and kept in error by the natural frame and constitution of things. But as this would reflect on the Author of Nature, no Theist, I presume, will be inclined to admit the consequence. If the Fatalist should reply, that reason, when well exercised and refined, does here, as in the false impressions of sense, lay open the delusion; this, I must tell him, is the very folly we complain of: That, when things are submitted to the arbitrement of Reason, her award should be rejected while standing in the road of Nature, with all her powers and faculties entire; and not thought worthy to be heard, till made giddy in the

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airy

airy heights of metaphysics, and racked and tortured by all the engines of sophistry: In a word, when Reason is no more herself; but speaks as her keepers and tormentors dictate.

However, it is not the looking within only, that assures the Theist of his freedom. What he may observe abroad of the horrid mischiefs and absurdities arising from the Doctrine of Fate, will fully convince him of this truth. It subverts and annihilates all Religion: For the belief of rewards and punishments, without which no Religion can subsist, is founded on the principle of Man's being an accountable creature; but when freedom of will is wanting, Man is no more so than a Clock or Organ. It is likewise highly injurious to Society: For whoever thinks himself no longer in his own power, will be naturally inclined to give the reins to his passions, as it is submitting to that fate which must at last absolutely turn and direct them.

But, after all, the most powerful argument for Freedom, I confess, Sir, is such a life as yours. Of which, though I could say much, and with pleasure, I will only say that it has made me, in common with every one who knows you,

Your obliged,

your affectionate,

and your faithful servant,

W. WARBURTON.

May 18, 1742.