general that it is right: For now entering upon his argument, he lays down this self-evident proposition as the foundation of his thesis, which he reasonably supposes will be allowed him: That of all possible systems, infinite Wisdom hath formed the best ; [Í. 43, 44.] From hence he draws two consequences: 1. The first [from 1. 44 to 51.] is, that as the best system cannot but be such a one as hath no inconnected void; such a one in which there is a perfect coherence and gradual subordination in all its parts; there must needs be, in some part or other of the scale of life and sense, such a creature as MAN; which reduces the dispute to this absurd question, Whether God has placed him wrong? It being shewn that MAN, the subject of his inquiry, has a necessary place in such a system as this is confessed to be: And it being evident that the abuse of freewill, from whence proceeds all moral evil, is the certain effect of such a creature's existence; the next question will be, how these evils can be accounted for, consistently with the idea we have of God's attributes? Therefore, 2. The second consequence he draws from his principle, That of all possible systems, infinite Wisdom has formed the best, is, that whatever is wrong in our private system, is right, as relative to the whole [1. 50 to 53.] Respecting Man, whatever wrong we call, May, must be right, as relative to ALL. That it may, he proves [from 1. 52 to 61.] by shewing in what consists the difference between the systematic works of God and those of Man, viz. that, in the latter, a thousand movements scarce gain one purpose; in the former, one movement gains many purposes. So that -Man, who here seems principal alone, Perhaps acts second to some sphere unknown. And acting thus, the appearances of wrong in the particular system may be right in the universal: For, 'Tis but a part we see, and not a whole. -That it must, the whole body of this Epistle is employed to illustrate and inforce. Thus partial evil is universal good, and thus Providence is fairly acquitted, From From all this he draws a general conclusion [from 1. 60 to 87.] that, as what had been said is sufficient to vindicate the ways of Providence, Man should rest submissive and content, and confess every thing to be disposed for the best; that to pretend to inquire into the manner how God conducts this wonderful scheme to its completion, is as absurd as to imagine that the horse and ox shall ever come to comprehend why they undergo such different manage and fortunes in the hand of Man; nay, that such knowledge, if communicated, would be even pernicious to Man, and make him neglect or desert his duty here. Heav'n from all creatures hides the Book of Fate, From brutes what men, from men what spirits know, This he illustrates by an instance in the lamb, which is happy in not knowing the fate that attends it from the hand of the butcher; and from thence takes occasion to observe, that God is the equal master of all his creatures, and provides for the proper happiness of each Being. Who sees with equal eye, as God of all, But now the objector is supposed to put in, and say; "You tell us indeed, that all things will turn out for "good; but we see ourselves surrounded with present " evil; and yet you forbid us all inquiry into the man(6 ner how we are to be extricated; and in a word, leave "us in a very disconsolate condition." Not so, replies the Poet [from 1. 86 to 95.] you may reasonably, if you so please, receive much comfort from the HOPE of a happy futurity; a hope given us by God himself for this very purpose, as an earnest of that bliss, which here indeed perpetually flies us, but is reserved for the good inan hereafter. What future bliss he gives not thee to know, * Matt. x. 29. The The soul uneasy, and confin'd from home, Now the reason why the Poet chuses to insist on this proof of a future state in preference to others, I conceive, is in order to give his system (which is founded in a sublime and improved Platonism) the utmost grace of uniformity. For we know this HOPE was Plato's pecuHar argument for a future state; and the words here employed, The soul uneasy, &c. his peculiar expression: We have seen the argument illustrated with great force of reasoning, by our most eminent modern divines: But no where stronger urged than by our Poet, in this Essay. He says here, in express terms, That God gave us Hope to supply that future bliss which he at present keeps hid from us. In his 2d Ep. 1. 264. he goes still farther, and says, this HOPE quits us not even at death, when every thing mortal drops from us. Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die. And, in the 4th Epistle he shews how the same HOPE is a certain proof of a future state, from the consideration of God's giving Man no appetite in vain, or what he did not intend should be satisfied; (which is Plato's great argument for a future state.) For, describing the condition of the good man, he breaks out into these rapturous strains: For him alone hope leads from goal to goal, And opens still, and opens on his soul; Hill, lengthen'd on to faith, and unconfin'd, It pours the bliss, that fills up all the mind. He sees, why Nature plants in Man alone Hope of known bliss, and faith in bliss unknown: Nature, whose dictates to no other kind Are giv'n in vain, but what they seek they find. 1. 331, et seq. It is only for the good man, he tells us, that hope leads from goal to goal, &c. It would be strange indeed then, if it should be a delusion. But it hath been objected, that the system of the best weakens the other natural arguments for a future state, because if the evils which good men suffer, promote the benefit of the whole, then every thing is here in order; and nothing amiss that wants to be set right: Nor has the good man any reason to expect a reparation, when the evils he suffered had such a tendency. To this we reply, that the system of the best is so far from weakening those natural arguments, that it strengthens and supports them. To consider it a little, if those evils to which good men are subject be mere disorders, without any tendency to the greater good of the whole, then, though we must indeed conclude that they will hereafter be set right, yet this view of things, representing God as suffering disorders for no other purpose than to set then right, gives us a very low idea of the Divine Wisdom. But if those evils (according to the system of the best) contribute to the greater perfection of the whole, a reason may be then given for their permission, and such a one as supports our idea of Divine Wisdom to the highest religious purposes. Then, as to the good man's hopes of a retribution, those still remain in their original force. For our idea of God's justice, and how far that justice is engaged to a retribution, is exactly and invariably the same on either hypothesis. For though the system of the best supposes that the evils themselves will be fully compensated by the good they produce to the whole, yet this is so far from supposing that particulars shall suffer for a general good, that it is essential to this system, to conclude that, at the completion of things, when the whole is arrived to the state of utmost perfection, particular and universal good shall coincide. Such is the WORLD'S great harmony, that springs Where small and great, where weak and mighty, mađe Ep. iii. 1. 296, et seq. Which coincidence can never be without a retribution to good men for the evils suffered here below. To return then to the Poet's argument, he, as we said, bids Man comfort himself with expectation of future happiness, and shews him that this HOPE is an earnest, of it: But first of all puts in one very necessary caution, Hope humbly then, with trembling pinions soar. And provoked at those miscreants, whom he afterwards [Ep. 3. [Ep. 3. 1. 262.] describes as building Hell on spite, and Heaven on pride, he upbraids them [from 1. 94 to 109.] with the example of the poor Indian, to whom also Nature hath given this common HOPE of mankind. But though his untutored mind had betrayed him into many childish fancies concerning the nature of that future state, yet he is so far from excluding any part of his own species (a vice which could proceed only from vain science, which puffeth up), that he humanely admits even his faithful dog to bear him company. And then [from I. 108 to 119.] shews them, that complaints against the established order of things, begin in the highest absurdity from nisapplied reason and power, and end in the highest impicty, in an attempt to degrade the God of Heaven, and assume his place. Go wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense That is, be made God, who only is perfect, and hath immortality: To which sense the lines immediately following confine us: Snatch from his hand the balance and the rod, From these men, the Poet turns to his Friend, and [from 1. 118 to 137.] remarks that the ground of all this extravagance is pride; which, more or less, infects the whole species:-shews the ill effects of it, in the case of the fallen angels; and observes, that even wishing to invert the laws of order is a lower species of their crime: then brings an instance of one of the effects of pride, which is the folly of thinking every thing made solely for the use of Man; without the least regard to any other of God's creatures. Ask for what end the heavenly Bodies shine, Annual |