as of our sensations, namely, the distinctive characteristics, and the pleasure or pain excited by them separating immediately after the first perception, and taking different directions,-the one becoming more perfectly discerned, and occupying more of the current of thought; the other vanishing away. But here, again, we find a noble compensation for the loss of the pleasure of a first perception, in the pleasure which the extended power of discrimination affords. The pleasure derived from the perception of the isolated object is soon gone; but the observation of its resemblances to other objects, and differences from them, may afford a thousand pleasures, succeeding one another as one and another resemblance or difference is discovered, till its precise place in relation to other objects is determined.

This observation brings us to the great division of subsequent mental phenomena dependent on the perception of external objects, namely, the emotional and intellectual.

CHAPTER VII.

EMOTIONS DEPENDING ON PERCEPTION.

WE must request the reader to look back on what we have advanced on emotions as connected with sensations, and the memory of them :-as our first duty must be to mark the modifications of these emotions occasioned by the power of the mind over a body, its discovery of an external world, and of the relation of cause and effect, and then to consider what new emotions its altered circumstances may elicit.

The emotions excited by pleasant or painful sensations will now be generally directed to those external objects which the mind has discovered to be the causes of them. We naturally are pleased with the presence of that which causes pleasant sensations, and displeased

with that which causes painful ones, with an intensity proportioned to the pleasure imparted and the pain inflicted.

Any object, the presence of which causes unpleasant or painful sensations, is regarded with dislike or disgust, while objects which yield pleasant sensations are regarded with an emotion approaching to love; but love, and its opposite, hatred, can scarcely be used with propriety as having for their objects external things without mind. We shall, therefore, reserve the consideration of love and hatred, and their modifications, to a future stage of our investigations.

After receiving pleasure from the presence of any object of perception, the mind naturally desires the repetition of its presence, for the same reason that it desires the repetition of the pleasant sensation; and after experiencing pain from the presence of any object, it as naturally has an aversion to the renewal of its presence.

If a series of events among external objects repeatedly end in the presence of any object that affords pleasure, then the commencement of that series will excite hope more or less confident, as before, in proportion to the familiarity of the mind with the series, and more or less ardent in proportion to the amount of pleasure in which the series has on former occasions ended. And a series of events repeatedly ending in the presence of an object causing pain would, on its commencing again, excite fear.

If a series of events among external objects causing pain repeatedly end in pleasure, then the pain of the series will be greatly mitigated by the anticipation of the expected pleasure; and a series of events, pleasing while it lasts, but always ending in pain, will have the pleasure afforded by it poisoned by the vivid suggestion and anticipation of the pain in which the series is expected to end.

If a series of events or changes among external objects which, on former occasions, has ended in pleasure, should commence, but be broken off before it comes to the expected conclusion, the effect would be disappointment and sadness. If the series on former occasions ended in pain, its being broken off before the expected painful conclusion would excite agreeable disappointment and joy. If a series which had on former occasions ended in pain not only be broken off, but end in pleasure, or the series that had ended in pleasure end in pain, then the unexpected pleasure would be heightened by surprise as at a novelty, and the unexpected pain by wonder and painful perplexity.

Besides these modifications of those emotions of which a mind conversant only with sensations would be capable, occasioned by its possessing the perception of objects external to itself, it becomes capable of many new emotions. Most of these imply the recognition of other minds, similar to itself, and therefore few will come to be treated of afterwards. The following, however, belong to the present stage of our progress.

The power which the mind possesses over the body, by which it can avoid painful sensations, or obtain pleasant sensations, either by moving the body out of the presence or into the presence of other objects, or by moving them into its presence or out of its presence, gives rise to some important emotions. If, for example, the mind may have power to avoid the presence of an object which it knows would cause pain, and yet may have motives for rather bearing the pain, the emotion resulting from these conflicting motives may be patience, fortitude, resolution, determination, according to the amount of pain which it might avoid, but which it chooses to bear; or impatience, timidity, cowardice, according to the amount of pain and the motives which it has to bear it, but which it chooses to avoid.

From the notion which the mind has received of cause

and effect, combined with that of the external world, are derived such emotions as self-gratulation, on reflecting on pain that it has avoided and pleasure that it has obtained by its own efforts; and regret and selfupbraiding, in reflecting on pain that it has suffered, or pleasure that it has missed by its own want of effort.

The influence of language on emotions connected with perception.

Here seems to be the point at which to introduce some notice of the influence of language on the mind. The reader will please to notice that we are not tracing the influence of language historically, nor has any part of our investigation been conducted historically. We do not imagine that the mind was experienced in sensations and those emotions that are dependent on them, and the discrimination and inferences exercised on sensations, before it attained to the power of volition, and the knowledge of objects external to itself, and the various emotions thence arising; for we are aware that its knowledge derived from every source, and the experience of its emotions of every kind was proceeding from the hour of its introduction to the world simultaneously. But we have separated sensations, and the exercises of mind dependent on them, from perceptions and the exercises of mind dependent on them, and have examined them consecutively merely that we might the better discern their nature, their dependencies and influences on one another. So, were we to trace the origin and progress of language historically, we should probably commence with its use in communicating our thoughts to one another; but, in our order of demonstration, we find, at the point at which we have arrived, namely, our power over the voluntary motions of the body, the perception of objects external to ourselves, and the emotions that are connected with that

power and these perceptions,-that language exercises important influences.

Language has manifestly great power in regulating the succession of our suggestions, and consequently in directing the whole train of our thoughts. The names of objects or of events or relations are certain sounds voluntarily produced, arbitrarily connected with these objects, or events or relations, by the frequent repetition of the sound with the direct perception of that with which it is intended to be connected or with the remembrance of it. Now, by the laws of suggestion already explained, the hearing of the name of any object, or event, or relation, or the remembrance of the name, instantly recals that of which it is used as the name. And if that which is thus recalled by means of its name be one that has given pleasure or pain, or has awakened any emotion, then the mention or remembrance of the name recals the pleasure or pain, or the emotion originally occasioned by it. The use of language thus introduces a new application, and consequently a great extension of the laws of suggestion. For words suggest one another, on the same principles with other objects— by similarity or dissimilarity, by beginning alike or unlike, or ending alike or unlike-long words sometimes suggesting long words, or by contrast short words, and short words suggesting either short or long words; and all these words immediately suggesting the things of which they stand as the names, thus widening the power of suggestion, that is, of memory,-to an incalculable extent.

It scarcely needs to be added, that the use of written language produces these same effects with spoken language. Written language, at least in all countries that we are acquainted with, (except, perhaps, China, and its dependencies and the neighbouring countries under its influence) consists of arbitrary, visible, or tangible marks, on any substance capable of receiving them, so connected with the arbitrary sounds of spoken language,