by frequently repeating these sounds along with the perception of the written marks, as that the written mark introduced to the notice or attention of the mind instantly recals the sound with which it is associated, and the sound as instantly recals the object of which it is used as the name. It is evident, therefore, that the effects of written language in directing the thoughts, must be much the same as those of spoken language. The written language of China, and the neighbouring countries, is said not to suggest sounds, but objects. How far this is practically the fact-that is, how far the reading of the Chinese written language can be understood without the medium of the spoken language, we have no data on which to form a judgment. It might be an interesting topic of philosophical inquiry, how far the nature of their written language distinguishes the current of their suggestions, and, consequently, the general character of their minds, from those nations which use written characters representative of sounds.

Written language gives to the mind much greater power over the current of its thoughts than spoken language. The effect of spoken language, if confined to the person himself who uses it, which is supposed to be the state of the mind as we are now contemplating it, in giving power to the will over the trains of thought, would be extremely limited; whereas, by means of the power which the mind possesses over the body, it can direct its thoughts into any train of which it possesses a record in written language. If it desires to have its thoughts directed to any particular subject, or led into any particular course, it has, in order to obtain its object, only to select a book, or other record of thoughts on the subject, and direct the eye to its pages. This may not always be effectual, for the thoughts may be carried off in some other direction, in despite of every such effort to control them, but in ordinary cases it will be found to be effectual.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OR OPERATIONS DEPENDING ON PERCEPTION.

THE discriminating faculty of the mind, or its power of noticing the resemblances and differences of its sensations, being now extended to the resemblances and differences of the objects which are the causes of its sensations, it is chiefly occupied, with these latter resemblances and differences.

One cause of its attention being drawn from the resemblances and differences among its sensations, to the resemblances and differences among the objects which are the causes of its sensations, is, that its acquaintance with the qualities of those objects by which its sensations are excited, aids it in obtaining some control over its sensations. For when it knows what objects cause agreeable, and what objects cause disagreeable sensations, it can employ that power which it possesses over the body in obtaining the one, and avoiding the other.

But another, and perhaps the chief cause of the mind's occupying itself more with the differences and resemblances among external objects when it becomes acquainted with them, than with the differences and resemblances among its own sensations, is, that the observation of the differences and resemblances among external objects opens a way for it to obtain much interesting knowledge respecting these objects. These various qualities and combinations of qualities in different objects, indicated by their resemblances and differences, such as the resemblances and differences in their production, structure, and composition (if they be organised bodies,) between their modes of life, growth, and the

relations in which they stand to one another, afford high gratification. And according to the law already explained, while the first pleasure derived from the observation of a similarity or difference soon fades away, the observation of every new similarity or difference, and every further discovery made by the means of such observations, affords a new pleasure. The power of discerning these resemblances and differences has sometimes been treated as a distinct power of the mind and termed abstraction. But it seems to be nothing more than the direction of the attention to one sensation, among many excited by the same external objects. An object on being presented to the senses, causes sensations that come by experience to indicate its form, size, hardness, softness, warmth, or cold, number of parts, colour, smell, taste, and such like. The attention of the mind may be directed to any one of these sensations, or to the qualities indicated by them, and may compare it with the memory of sensations which it has received from other external objects, or with their qualities, and may determine that it is similar to them, or different from them, in some more or fewer of these qualities. This process leads to

The classification of external material objects.

The discernment of resemblances and differences among external objects gives rise to classification. We naturally, for the purpose of rendering our knowledge of the qualities of objects, and of their mutual resemblances and differences more easily remembered, and more available for use, class those together, which we observe to resemble one another. From our early childhood we form such classes. We class all stones together from their hardness and weight, all green plants, all trees, all quadrupeds, all birds, all insects, all fishes. By and by, we become more minute in our classification, and class together all dogs, all sheep, all ducks, all geese, all

cocks and hens, all people, all men, all women-and so on to the utmost range of our knowledge. As our knowledge increases, our classification becomes still more minute, till we discriminate multitudes of kinds of stones, many thousands of different species of plants and of animals, the individuals of each species resembling one another in certain points, in which they differ from the individuals of other species. Natural history, in all its various branches, consists chiefly of classification, founded on the exact observation of resemblances and differences among the infinite multitude of external objects.

As the acquirements of knowledge increase, the thoughts themselves or operations of the mind, founded on perception, are classed. The knowledge of number, form, and measurement of material objects, is called mathematics. The knowledge of actually existing objects generally, forms the class of natural history, divided into the subordinate classes of mineralogy, botany, zoology, &c. The knowledge of the principles on which these various kinds of objects are governed forms the class of natural philosophy, subdivided into the subordinate classes of astronomy, geology, animal and vegetable physiology, and others. The knowledge of the mind itself forms the class of mental philosophy, including in it metaphysics, logic, ethics, &c.

Induction, as exercised on external material objects.

Induction, or inference, is founded on that confident expectation which we have found to be intuitive, or at least to manifest itself almost immediately after birth, namely, that the same antecedents will be followed by the same consequents. We observe, that when two particular substances are brought into contact, they become hot, and give out light, and smoke-they take fire; and we confidently infer or expect that the same two substances

brought together under the same circumstances, will always exhibit the same phenomena. If we observe two substances, when brought within a certain distance of one another, draw nearer, till, if they be not forcibly prevented, they come into contact, we infer that if the same two substances, or substances of precisely the same kind, be brought within the same distance, the same result will take place. We call this result attraction, and expect that the same substances will always attract one another under the same circumstances; and these phenomena are regarded as antecedents and consequents, that have stood so connected with one another in all times and places, and that will continue to be so as long as the present constitution of things endures, or, in other words, as long as substances exist having the same qualities.

Inductive philosophy adds to such inferences classification. Antecedents and consequents being observed are classified by observing their resemblances and differences. It had, for example, been observed by long and minute observation, that the planet, Mars, revolves round the sun in an elliptical orbit, of which the sun occupies one of the foci, and that his motion varies in velocity in different parts of his orbit, according to a certain law. It was then found by mathematical demonstration, that his revolution would be accounted for by supposing him to be drawn towards the sun with a certain force, and having at the same time a certain velocity given to him in a certain direction. It was thus rendered probable that Mars was drawn towards the sun with the supposed force. But it was found that the motions of all the planets, according to their several distances from the sun, could be accounted for on the same hypothesis, namely, that they were drawn towards the sun with forces varying with their distances, having, at the same time, a certain velocity communicated to them in another given direction. The same hypothesis was applied to the