which is estimated as children estimate the power of parents and teachers. That power in rude states of society is usually procured by the same means as military power, and accompanies it. In more advanced society it is regulated by law; and those who hold magistracies are deprived of much, if not of all, that was originally arbitrary in them. Still a man who

represents the law, and pronounces its awards, and has power to carry them into execution, is the instrument of inflicting painful sensations on some, and of protecting many from the painful sensations that would be experienced in a lawless state of society.

Property also confers power of occasioning pain or pleasure of various kinds; some more slight and transient, some more permanent and important. Property implies the power of directly bestowing the means of obtaining pleasant sensations, or of withholding such means; and it gives power to engage the services of others for the benefit of those whom the person pos sessing it may desire to favour or to injure.

Learning and other mental acquirements give power to communicate the pleasure that is connected with all new information. Poetical or oratorical genius gives power to communicate the pleasure arising from the perception of new unexpected similarities and analogies among various objects, and of calling up by suggestion pleasant trains of thought, or if mournful trains of thought, yet rendered pleasant by their being recalled in a mitigated form. For painful or mournful events, when recalled, afford pleasure; partly because much of the pain by which they were originally accompanied has passed away, and partly because the consciousness of being now freed from pain which we formerly endured, or of being exempt from pain which others have endured, is a pleasant consciousness. We never so much enjoy a snug room and comfortable fireside, as when we hear a storm of hail or snow battering the windows without.

We are never so thankful for health, or freedom from pain, as when a vivid picture is presented to us of the pains of a sick-bed, or the anguish of the wounded on a field of battle, or when we think of the pain or agony which we ourselves formerly suffered, but from which we have been delivered. Wit gives the power of presenting new and unexpected analogies and relations among objects not before observed, particularly strong and unexpected contrasts. It also gives the power of inflicting mental pain, by exposing a man to contempt and laughter, which he feels as depriving him of a portion of his own power and importance. Skill in singing, or in playing on musical instruments, gives power to communicate pleasant sensations, and, by the natural language of music, to awaken a great variety of emotions, some of them mournful, but pleasant from the causes above alluded to. Similar observations are applicable to skill in painting, skill in mimicry or acting, skill in dancing: all derive their value in the estimation of some class of men, and the importance which they confer in their eyes on the person who possesses them, from the power which they imply to communicate pleasant sensations, or to recal pleasant remembrances, to present or to suggest new, and therefore, for the time, pleasant perceptions of ralations among external objects.

Men, therefore, seek to possess themselves of some one or other, or of more than one, of these descriptions of power; because, unless they possess power of some kind to convey pleasure, or to inflict pain, whatever may be their dispositions, they are necessarily destitute of all importance in society, and will be either wholly neglected, or subjected to insult and injury. The most effective power, we have said, in a rude state of society, is bodily strength, accompanied with personal bravery; but even in the most polished or cultivated states of society, military prowess continues to be the most effective, and, therefore, to be the most eagerly coveted.

And some, when opportunity has offered, have recklessly caused a frightful amount of human suffering, merely to establish a reputation for great power, which they might afterwards use as they pleased, for causing pain or communicating pleasure. The itching which sovereigns have usually betrayed for obtaining despotic power, and the desperate and bloody efforts which they have made to obtain it, or to retain it, has its origin in this desire of importance. Other species of power, such as those which accompany property, official authority, learning, wit, talent for poetry, painting, music, mimicry, acting, dancing, and such like accomplishments, are all pursued by different individuals for the same purpose; namely, of obtaining importance in society, and thus giving value to their disposition towards others, either for good or for evil.

The other element of character which arrests attention, is the disposition of the person who possesses power to use it for good or for evil, or perhaps to make no use of it. In regard to this element, little needs to be added to what has already been said of it as estimated by children. If a man possessing power of any kind, strength of body, command of other men, riches, learning, and the rest, have a kind and bland manner of address, it is regarded as primâ facie evidence of a disposition to use his power for the purpose of communicating pleasure; if his aspect and address be rough and forbidding, men form their first judgment of him accordingly. This first judgment may be altered by experiencing or observing the use that he actually makes of his power. If, with his bland and pleasant manner, his acts generally occasion pain of some kind, or if he hold out expectations of good which are frequently disappointed, then the prepossession in favour of his goodness gives way to a persuasion of his malignity or hypocrisy. And so the man with the rough exterior may, if it be found that his acts generally communicate pleasure, come to be regarded as the kind

and benevolent man.

If a man, with the reputation of being rich, make no use of his riches, either to give pain or pleasure, he is regarded with indifference, or rather with dislike. For the pleasure which he has power to impart is contrasted with his barrenness in that respect, and he is regarded as, to some extent, the author of the pain that he might have relieved, or the want of comfort that he might have supplied. And here we have often occasion to observe a strange self-deception. A man covets and heaps up riches solely for the sake of the power which they impart to him. They are to render him important in society. And yet, by his not using them, he sinks into utter neglect and insignificance; and frequently such persons have been robbed and murdered, because no one was taking any interest in them. Ifa man use his riches to give annoyance to others, he is regarded as a person of malignant and mischievous character, whose presence is dreaded and avoided in proportion to his power. The power arising from wit or from poetical or oratorical genius may also render a man an object of dread and dislike, on the one hand, from the mental pain that he occasions by exposing men to contempt, and so lessening their power; or of admiration and love, on the other, from the mental pleasure that he communicates.

CHAPTER IV.

MEMORY, AS EXERCISED ON RECOGNITIONS.

ONE addition to the laws of suggestion or of memory that the mind acquires by its knowledge of other minds, is that the mental characters or qualities of men-ourselves or others, suggest the remembrance of persons possessing similar or contrary mental qualities or characters. One powerful man may suggest the remembrance of another

powerful man, or perhaps of a man without power. The idea or recognition of one rich man may suggest that of another rich man, or it may be of a very poor man; and so of all the attributes of character, the various kinds of power and diversity of disposition-learned men, brave men, skilful men, musicians, painters, wits, mimics, actors, dancers, and also benevolent men, malevolent men, humane and cruel men-suggesting the remembrance of one another or of their contraries.

But the most important addition to the laws of suggestion that is acquired by means of recognitions, is, that certain resemblances or analogies are discerned between mental qualities and qualities of matter which are incessantly suggesting one another, or suggesting their contraries. This is manifest from forms of speech current in all languages. Thus we speak of mental character as being cold, or hot, or warm, or lukewarm, or hard or soft, or rough or smooth, or high or low, or great or little, or sharp or blunt, or sweet or sour or bitter, even as having breadth or depth, as being dark or transparent, or splendid, as fair or foul, longheaded, soft-headed, clod-pated, heavy-headed, lightheaded, and innumerable others, that are often intelligible as rapidly as the words are pronounced; indicating that the mind naturally discerns and appreciates such resemblances or analogies. On the other hand, mental qualities are often ascribed to material objects, and movements among them. We speak of a raging tempest, a smiling landscape, a bold rock or precipice, a placid stream, of gay or grave colours, lively, deliberate, wild, capricious motions, melancholy or animated or cheerful sounds, and a thousand other similar expressions continually occurring. It is true that most or all of these words expressive of mental qualities are derived originally from material ideas, as perhaps all our words denoting mental qualities are. But in these cases they are not used with reference to the material reality which they