originally expressed, but to the mental state or quality which they were afterwards used to express. For example, the word repose originally conveyed the idea of a thing replaced in some former condition, or laid down, or laid aside, from which it came to express rest after weariness of body, thence extended to mental rest; but having thus obtained a fixed and generally known signification in regard to mind, and perhaps its original material application being forgotten, it is again, through mind, applied to matter, as when we speak of clouds reposing, a landscape lying in repose, as if in a state of pleasant rest, the repose of a picture. These suggestions are sometimes viewed as the operation of imagination, regarded as a distinct power of the mind from memory; but they seem to be nothing more than that discernment of resemblance or analogy between mental and material qualities upon which all language respecting mind is founded. The words understand, substance, suppose, hypothesis, all contain the same material meaning of standing or being placed under; but they take their different meanings from certain resemblances or analogies which were observed between those material significations and the mental ideas now expressed by them.

One very important operation of the laws of suggestion comes into view at this stage of our investigation; namely, that the presence or the remembrance of any work in which the mind of man has been employed, immediately brings up the remembrance of mind as having been employed in planning it, or executing the plan. If a machine of any kind be presented to any intelligent person, in the contriving and constructing of which the ingenuity of any man has been engaged, he instantly thinks of the constructor of it. We seek to discern the intention of the contriver of the machine,-for what use it was constructed; we examine its various parts, consider the purposes which they are intended to serve; we detect error in this part, or ingenuity in that; we detect deep

science in one contrivance, and great experience in another. In short, when we are examining the machine, and our attention seems to be intently fixed on the outward materials and forms of its various parts, we are conversing all the while with the mind of the man who constructed it; criticising him, admiring, censuring, applauding, drawing inferences from it, as to the extent of his ability and information or perseverance. When a

child looks at a picture, he thinks of nothing but the forms and shades and colours in it, and pronounces it to be the picture of a man, or a house, or a tree, or whatever else it may appear to be: but the thoughts of a man who has some acquaintance with the art of painting are carried beyond the picture to the artist; his intention in it, and the success with which he has carried his intention into effect; his drawing, his management of light and shade and of colour, so as to produce the effect that he intended to produce. In hearing a piece of music, those who are incapable of being affected by musical expression think only of the successions of sounds, or of the combinations of sounds, or, at farthest, on the skill and dexterity of the performer. But those who feel as the composer intended they should feel, immediately enter into communication with the composer's mind, while they listen to the sounds dictated by him, adverting from time to time to the performers, to notice their perfect or imperfect conveyance of the composer's intentions. But their thoughts are chiefly engaged in appreciating the conceptions of the composer, and participating in the feelings which he expresses in the language of music. They are conversing with the minds of Handel, or Corelli, or Haydn, or Mozart, or Beethoven, or Weber, accompanying them in their transitions of feeling from the gay to the grave, from the sublime and the terrible to the elegant, the tender, the pathetic, or the rapturous, as expressed in their wonderful compositions. In reading a poem, also, the

thoughts are but little employed on the language or versification, or even upon the imagery of the poem; but, if the poem fulfil its end, are irresistibly carried on to the mind of the poet, to accompany him also in his grave or gay moods, his lofty flights, or his elegant trifling, or his deep-toned pathos, or sensitive tenderness. If the poem was effective, we may look back upon it to observe how the effect was produced; or, if ineffective, to observe the causes of the failure; and may thus have our thoughts turned to the language, the versification, the rhyme, and the imagery, that we may judge of the poet's skill, and qualify ourselves to commend his excellences, or to censure his defects.

CHAPTER V.

THE EMOTIONS, AS CONNECTED WITH RECOGNITION.

WE have already considered those emotions which may be excited by mere sensations, and by the perception of external objects. We now come to those that are excited by our recognition of minds constituted as our own is, and therefore subjects of the same mental phenomena. As introductory to the explanation of these emotions, we make the following observations :—

1. Being ourselves conscious that we can be, and often are, the intentional causes of pleasure or pain to others, and having discovered other minds similar to our own, we infer that they also can be, and often are, causes of pain or pleasure to others, and it may be to ourselves.

2. Being conscious of certain emotions in ourselves towards others, such as love, hatred, gratitude, anger, admiration, contempt, and others, expressed by us in a certain way, by our countenance, our gestures, and also by our language, and prompting us to acts intended to

give pleasure or pain to others, when we observe similar expressions of emotions in others, excited by similar causes and similar acts done by them, in connection with these expressed emotions, giving pain or pleasure to others, perhaps to ourselves, we infer that the pain or pleasure are intentionally caused by them, under the influence of their expressed emotions. Even where there is no expression of the emotion, if we know that events had occurred that would have excited such emotions in us, and would have prompted us to acts similar to those which we witness in them, we infer that the emotion does exist in them, and that their acts are prompted by it.

3. Having discovered that not the individual acts, but the character of the person (that is, his power to do good and evil, and his disposition to do good or evil to others and to us), is that in them which is of most importance to us, many of our emotions towards others are excited, not so much by their individual acts, as by the estimate that we form of their habitual character. And that estimate may be formed by witnessing the expression which they give of their emotions or their acts, or by learning from others their sayings and doings, and the estimate which others have formed of them. We may be grateful to a man who bestows a favour on us; but unless we can regard it as the indication of a kind and benevolent disposition, or a particular regard to us, we shall not love him. We may be angry with another for injuring us; but unless we regard the injury as the indication of a malignant disposition, or of ill-will to ourselves, we shall not hate him.

We now proceed to notice those emotions that are founded on recognition.

A man who has power to do good, or to do evil, commands, as we have seen, attention and deference in proportion to his power.

If, with his power to do good or to do evil-to promote happiness, or to cause misery-he manifests a disposition to do good, we respect and esteem him.

If, with such power, he manifest a disposition to give pain to others, he is regarded with dread and aversion. Contempt is the emotion with which we regard a person who has little or no power to cause pain or pleasure, especially if he pretend to such power.

Anger is the emotion with which we regard a man who carelessly or intentionally gives us pain, or deprives us of what gives us pleasure, or of what would give us pleasure if we possessed it; and our anger is proportioned to the amount of pain that he inflicts, or of pleasure of which he deprives us, modified also by the degree of carelessness or of malignant feeling manifested by him.

Gratitude is the emotion with which we regard a person who has intentionally given us pleasure; and it is proportioned, like anger, to the amount of the pleasure received, combined with the degree of kindly feeling towards us with which we believe him to be influenced.

Hatred is the emotion with which we regard a man, who, with power to give pleasure or pain to others, chooses to give pain; heightened, if he has manifested that malignant disposition towards ourselves, and modified by the degree of good withheld or of pain occasioned, and the degree of malignant disposition by which we believe him to be actuated.

Hatred is often excited in the breast of a person who has injured another towards the person whom he has injured. That seemingly unnatural feeling originates in several causes. The remembrance of the pain inflicted is painful, rendered much more so by the consciousness that we were the cause of it; and from our own self-love, we perversely lay the blame of the pain of that consciousness on the person who suffered