or the amount of injury that we inflict on them; that is, the smaller the pleasure that we desire for ourselves, and the greater the injury, the greater the number, duration, and intensity of painful sensations or emotions, which the gratifying of our desires may cause to others. One who, to gratify the desire of any pleasure, deprives his neighbour of a greater pleasure, is selfish. One who, to gratify the desire of any pleasure, will put his neighbour to pain, is more selfish, and still more selfish in proportion to the pain or injury that he inflicts. One who, for a trifling momentary pleasure, inflicts on him the greatest possible injury, deprives him of his character, or of his life, is intensely selfish. Generosity has its foundation in the pleasure which the witnessing of gladness in others excites in our own minds. If we take so much pleasure in witnessing the gladness of others that we deprive ourselves of pleasures, or of the means of obtaining them, that we may gladden the hearts of others, we are generous. If we make great sacrifices of the means of enjoyment to give enjoyment to others we are very generous. The measure of generosity, therefore, seems to be the greatness of the enjoyment which we sacrifice as compared with the smallness of another's enjoyment for which the sacrifice was made. It is possible that a man might carry his generosity to a foolish or even a culpable extent, as if he were to hazard or sacrifice his life to relieve another person from a temporary pain, or produce for him a temporary pleasure. Still, although he might be foolish and even culpable in doing so, we could hardly refuse to pronounce him intensely generous. This emotion also is modified by the character and circumstances of the person who is the object of it. To be generous, for example, to one who has gained our affection by contributing much to our happiness, is an inferior exhibition of generosity to that which has for its object one who has given us reason to dislike him by intentionally some would ever jazz srt8÷ love towards as AD "Lat (that is, enemie 28 e died for us Fue enantul us, requires ut overome to t the injury tua 18 123 tone. can take pleasure in messin Lə means of procuring #rowne shed Covetousness is the emono *: of enjoyment which we do me possess them, more market f the hands of others. Envy is the emotion with which whom we hate, in possession of ment that we love and desire. of his possessing the means of em-1997), 1995/ augmented person whom ain dread of not obtaining it or of losing it, hatred of the person who seeks to deprive us of it, and envy in anticipation of seeing him in possession of it. There are various causes of modification of this compound emotion -such as whether the means of enjoyment in question have ever been in our possession, or whether we are only desiring what we never possessed; whether we previously had any dislike to the person of whom we are jealous ; the estimate that we form of the enjoyment that we desire. When a man is agitated by such a combination of emotions all directed against one object; when such passions as love and hatred, desire and fear, are all intensely at work at the same time, and all made to bear against one object; when love itself—the love of the enjoyment is made to add new bitterness to hatred, and desire is made to add new urgency to fear, and that fear still more embittering our hatred of the person who threatens to deprive us of what we love, and whom we dread to see in possession of it, an intensity of malignity is the result, that often produces terrific effects. From the notion that we have received of cause and effect, combined with our perceptions of an external material world, and our recognitions of an external mental world, are derived some important compound emotions. Self-approbation or self-gratulation is excited by remembering means of enjoyment which we are conscious we bestowed on others. Remorse is excited by our remembrance of pains endured by others of which we are conscious that we were the intentional cause. This is natural conscience with respect to other persons,—that is, conscience irrespective of education or religious principle. It is the remembrance of the pleasure or pain, the benefit or the injury of others, accompanied with the consciousness that we were the inten tional cause, mediately or immediately, of that pleasure or pain, benefit or injury. The emotion is capable of being modified by many circumstances-such as the amount of the pain or pleasure which it contemplates ; the extent to which our will or intention was the cause of the pain or pleasure, and the aspect in which we viewed the persons who were the subjects of the pain or the pleasure on which our conscience is exercised. In regard to this last modification, if, on the one hand, the pain inflicted by us was the gratification of revenge, the gratification of that passion may counteract the pair which the remembrance of the pain wilfully inflicted or a fellow man would otherwise occasion. If, on the other hand, the person to whom we occasioned pain was o whom we loved, that remembrance will increase the par with which we look back on the pain that we intention inflicted upon him. كلمة Conscience, in this view of it, includes not our 1 remembrance of the actual suffering or happines we may have occasioned to others, but the remem also that we were the intentional causes of tua: or happiness. If then, on the one hand, goo have resulted from our evil intentions, that m the regret with which we remember the inte will not absolve us from the consciousne that we intended. If, on the other r resulted from our good intentions. W pained at the suffering that we have otsanes shall be in some degree relieveć írez → painful remembrance by the conscionsen not in fault. It is scarcely necessary, we true. it's that we have not entered on 1 d. moral good or evil evolved i CL simply so combin it ple his f to investigue the emora g). EL -P 11 11 T . 1 CHAPTER VI. SYMPATHY. SYMPATHY is the pain or pleasure that we feel on witnessing the pain or pleasure of others. This phenomenon has been regarded by some writers as originating in an innate peculiar faculty of the mind. It seems, however, to be merely a particular exercise of memory guided by the laws of suggestion, frequently modified, however, by the intermingling of other emotions. When we see anything affecting another which we are conscious would give us pain if it were to affect ourselves, it forcibly brings into the mind the pain which we should suffer from it, but modified, as in all cases of the sug gestion of pain. No one has ever, we believe, seen a surgical operation performed on another for the first time without shrinking, as if the incisions were inflicted on himself, and many have fainted at the sight. The suggestion of pain is rendered more vivid by the contortions of the patient's countenance or the cries of anguish uttered by him. If a man, who cannot bear to look from a precipice, see another person approaching one, he recoils and trembles, and perhaps perspires with terror, as if it were himself that was approaching the precipice. That this suffering with others is merely the operation of the laws of suggestion, and not a distinct power or faculty of the mind, is, we conceive, proved by its exhibiting the ordinary phenomena of suggestion. For example, we sympathise most deeply with a pain or sorrow which we have ourselves experienced. A person who has suffered from toothache sympathises most with those who are suffering under that torture-others frequently make light of it. So with gout and other pains which are not regarded as dangerous to life. Parents who have experienced the loss of children sympathise |