with its laws of suggestion, is necessary to account for them. But are they the mere creation of the mind? or is there any real resemblance which the mind does not create, but only perceives? It would, we apprehend, be totally impossible to draw the line of distinction between those resemblances and differences which are supposed to be discerned without imagination, and those which should be ascribed to imagination. Does, for example, the similarity between a raging tempest and a raging man, belong to perception, or to imagination? There is a palpable resemblance between the noise and violence of the one and of the other, which gives rise to the same epithet (raging) being applied to both. To which power should the resemblance between a lake asleep and a man asleep be assigned? There is a resemblance applicable by discrimination exercised on perceptions, between the stillness of the one and of the other, that doubtless suggested the application of the word sleep to both. So in most, or all, of the comparisons thus made between mind and matter; they are founded on real traits of resemblance between them in some respect, their nature, their origin, or their sequences. One very general similarity will be found between qualities of matter and of mind thus brought into comparison; namely, their both affording pleasure, or causing pain, of some kind. Thus the weather is said to threaten, because it indicates the approach of thunder, or rain, or tempest, which will give pain; or, it is said to promise, because it indicates the approach of sunshine, which will afford pleasure; or, because it is favourable for the harvest, which will afford still greater, although more distant, pleasure.

Still another operation of mind, which falls under the word imagination, consists in what is sometimes called inventing or creating characters or incidents. We are inclined to think that there is much less of invention than of memory and discrimination and selection in this

phase of imagination. We do not mean to say that every character or incident thus depicted had a real existence, just as it is described by the writer of fiction; but that from among many remembered traits of character, some are selected which suit the author's purpose, and are combined by him in one person, distinguished by certain acts and a certain name; and the skill of drawing such characters consists chiefly in making a judicious selection of traits, such as will not appear inconsistent with one another, and such as bear upon the author's design. A similar explanation may be given of the invention of incidents. We daily hear or read of so many incidents, that any man who directs his mind to the describing of interesting incidents has ample stores to cull from, laid up in his memory, which, without any other power than that of suggestion and discrimination, may be made available for any purpose. A simple matter of fact is announced in the newspapers of the day, or is witnessed by us,-say that a boy fell into a river, and was in imminent danger of being drowned, when a person passing by sprang into the river and saved him. Now it surely requires no original power of mind beyond suggestion, directed by the desire of obtaining an incident such as may be sought, to convert the boy into a beautiful and interesting young female,-the man who sprang into the water into her lover, Nor is there any power of mind beyond suggestion required to imagine many interesting things that might be said and done by both parties, and by the relations of each in accordance with their several characters and the design of the author.

The highest exercise of what is usually called imagination, and the most difficult to account for, is the dramatic, in which an author not only draws a character, selecting such traits as favour his design, but so enters into the feelings and motives and manners of the imaginary person of his own construction, as to make

him act and speak in accordance with the character with which he has invested him. We are inclined to think that there is something approaching to a refined mimicry in this talent. There are some persons who can with surprising accuracy mimic the tones of the voice, the gait and manner of others, There are some who can add to this mimicry of the sentiments and expressions and actions of persons with whom they associate. They can suppose them to be placed in certain circumstances -for example, under some provocation to anger, or some excitement to fear, and successfully mimic their language and actions in the supposed circumstances. There are some who can achieve a still higher and more refined mimicry by imitating the style of thinking and writing of other persons. A remarkable example of that talent the public had some years ago in the well-known work entitled "The Rejected Addresses," in which the style of thought and expression of some of the most popular authors of the day, and these no ordinary men, is imitated with surprising success. It is but one step further for an author to form out of the stores of the elements of character and modes of thought and expression laid up in his memory, the conception of a character having certain attributes, and placed in certain circumstances, and so to realise the conception as to imitate, if we may use the expression, the style of thought and language of the kind of person of whom he has formed a vivid image in his own mind.

If this be a true account of the talent which we are considering, or if it have any approximation to truth, then the operations of the mind displayed in it consist in a very exact observance of character, and of the resemblances and differences between different characters, the mode of thinking, speaking, and acting exhibited by different individuals in similar or in different circumstances, and in the judicious selection of such traits of character as shall not merely not be inconsistent with

another, but as are suitable to the imaginary character to be portrayed. It is, in short, an exact discrimination of resemblances applied, not to material objects, but to different traits of character, the suggestion and selection of such traits of character with which the memory is stored, as suit the imaginary person to be introduced into the scenes of life, and the rejection of all others. And the mental qualities upon which the dramatic talent depends are the powers of minute and exact observation of character, of forming realising conceptions of the mental powers, feelings, and motives of different individuals, and a delicate perception of what language and style of thinking is exhibited by different individuals in different circumstances. We are inclined to think that there is much more of mimicry, and less of creation, in the dramatic talent, than is commonly supposed. We are inclined to think that the best drawn characters are portraits from nature, (as the best historical paintings are,) with a little modification. A really original character would fail to attract sympathy. To render a fictitious character intelligible and interesting, it must have thoughts, and feelings, and motives, and actions ascribed to it which can be appreciated by men generally, and therefore must be taken from the ordinary walks of human life.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON TASTE, OR THE APPRECIATION OF BEAUTY AND

SUBLIMITY.

WE have assigned to what has been called a sense of beauty, or taste, a chapter to itself in this division of our work, as being neither a mere emotion, nor a mere discernment, but a discernment of qualities or relations among external objects, which carries along with it a

certain pleasing emotion, for which we have no better name than taste. The qualities or relations among objects which excite this peculiar feeling, we express by such words as beautiful, elegant, tasteful, graceful, sublime, and others. We have, therefore, not called it an emotion, nor a discernment of beauty or sublimity, but an appreciation of beauty and sublimity. The phrase does not entirely satisfy us, but we cannot think of a better one. We have placed it under the division of mental phenomena, dependent on recognitions, because, in artificially exciting the appreciation of feeling of beauty or sublimity in the minds of others, the most frequent, and perhaps the most efficient, mode or procedure, is to suggest to them the remembrance of pleasant sensations, or of objects yielding pleasant sensations, or objects exciting awe and terror. We deem this, therefore, the most fit place in which to introduce our views on the subject.

Some recent writers, of great ability, have contended that the feeling of beauty or sublimity always arises from the suggestion of pleasing or terrific objects. We cannot, however, accede to the doctrine that all beauty or sublimity is referable ultimately to mind,— that the beauty, for example, of an evening sky is derived solely from its suggesting to us ideas of repose and peacefulness; for there are many objects which still more vividly call up thoughts of repose and peacefulness which yet excite no idea or feeling of beauty; as, for example, a bed or bed-room, a person or an inferior animal asleep. We apprehend that, so far from the association or suggestion of pleasant objects being the sole foundation of our appreciation of beauty or sublimity, it has nothing to do with the subject. We do not mean, of course, to say, that beautiful objects may not be called up to the mind by suggestion, or that the power of calling up scenes of pleasure and comfort in other minds may not, in the exercise of it, excite the feeling of beauty.