but occasionally stopping and looking up; but when his master had got over the parapet, and was looking down from what seemed a place of safety, he came and sat quietly at the foot of the ladder.

We observed another little dog run out furiously to bark at a horse that was trotting along the street with a coal porter on his back. The man had a long whip, with which he made a cut at the dog, which took effect very decisively on his nose. The dog emitted a very suppressed yelp, and stood in the middle of the street, looking after the man and horse till they were out of sight, when he turned to the side of the street, sat down, and rubbed his nose, whining and yelling most piteously. It is scarcely possible to deny to this dog very high sentiments of pride, and a mind that could ill brook disgrace.

One of the most eloquent appeals we have ever known was made by a cat. On the eve of her confinement she had selected a press in which clothes were kept, as a suitable place in which to meet so interesting a crisis. But the mistress of the house happening to have occasion to go to the press, found it open, with Mrs. Puss with one kitten snugly bedded in it. She turned them both out, locked the door of the press, leaving the poor mamma to find other accommodation where she might, and being busy with other matters, forgot the whole transaction. In the course of the day, however, Mrs. Puss appeared in the parlour with her kitten in her mouth, and went directly up to the lady who had so unceremoniously ejected her from her comfortable bed-room, laid down her kitten at her foot, and then looked up in her face and mewed. The appeal was irresistible, and suitable accommodation was provided for her and her little nursling.

Besides such acts as these, evidently the result of feelings which we can appreciate, many of the inferior animals have means of expressing their emotions by the sounds that they emit, or by their gestures, or by a

certain power over the muscles of their faces. They have their audible notes of pain, of fear, of anger, and of pleasure, their gestures indicating the same emotions; and some of them in their anger draw up their lips, so as to expose their teeth, as significant of their inclination to bite. The different species of animals seem distinctly to understand these indications of emotions in their congeners, and even in the animals of other species and genera; and, to some extent, these signs are like a natural language, intelligible to mankind, or very soon they become so by experience.

The intellectual operations of inferior animals.

Many of the laws of suggestion of which we are conscious we can detect in them. Many animals may be put in mind of pleasant or unpleasant sensations by being brought to the places where such sensations were experienced, or by the exhibition of an implement with which pain was inflicted, or by the presence of the person who inflicted it, or by the exhibition of the vessel in which they were accustomed to receive their food, or of one similar to it.

We can observe in them very exact discrimination of qualities in external objects, particularly in distinguishing such as are proper for food from others that may very closely resemble them. They are not infallible in their discriminations; but, when they make any mistake in that respect, it is usually under the influence or by the artifices of men.

Their intellectual faculties are employed chiefly in obtaining their food, constructing their habitations, and otherwise providing for the preservation of their species. In these particulars many of them, as the beaver, the ant, the bee, and many species of birds, manifest surprising skill and foresight.

But there are decisive evidences that that skill and

An

foresight have a different origin from skill and foresight in man. In the first place, their skill and foresight are exercised within a limited range, beyond which they are absolutely destitute of these qualities. Again, the apparent foresight of some in providing for their future progeny, is so far beyond their experience and means of knowledge as to indicate that it is not their own. insect laying her eggs on that precise species of plant which is fitted for the food of the grub that is after a long period to issue from her egg, and a plant of which she herself cannot eat, indicates a source of foresight very different from human intellect. Again, the skill and foresight of inferior animals are obtained without teaching or experience. Birds hatched by those of a different species adhere to the practice of their own species, of which they may never have seen a single example, without being in the slightest degree modified by the practice of the foster parent. Still further, no amount of teaching, or training, or example, can enable an individual of one species to imitate the habits of another. A sparrow can never be made to build a nest like a swallow, or a swallow a nest like a sparrow. Ducklings may be hatched and cared for by hens, or chickens by ducks, yet the young adhere in all respects to the practices of their own real parents. And, lastly, the practice of each species continues perfectly uniform in all ages and in all parts of the world. The sparrows among the Himalayan mountains are precisely the same in their habits with the sparrows in Britain, and the habits of sparrows from the earliest notice of them were the same as they are now.

From these and similar phenomena we infer, that the skill and foresight exhibited by many tribes of inferior animals flow from a different power of mind from that which gives rise to skill and foresight among men; and that different source we call instinct: but what instinct is, and how it operates, is a profound mystery. We

are shut up to the conclusion that their skill and foresight originate in the wisdom of the great universal spirit who constructed them; but how communicated by Him to them is a question above the range of our faculties.

The mental states and operations excited in us by the presence and acts of inferior animals, are similar to those which are excited by the presence and acts of our fellowmen. Our discriminating power is employed chiefly in discerning their character,—that is, their power of doing us good or evil, and, in regard to the higher classes, their disposition to do good or evil. Our emotions excited by them are such as fear, anger, revenge, hatred, on the one hand; or admiration, affection, gratitude, on the other. We do not mean to say that these emotions are always rationally or justly excited towards them, but merely state the fact that they are excited. Cowper expresses much gratitude and affection for his little dog in consequence of his exploit about the water-lily. On the other hand, we may be very angry with a cat for killing a favourite bird, while yet we bestow on her all manner of commendations for killing a mouse. Yet it is scarcely to be expected that puss should be able to comprehend why she should be pursued and beaten for the one act, and commended for the other.

Our inferences and reasonings about the inferior animals are akin to our moral inferences and reasonings respecting our own species, but partaking more of the precision and certainty of our inferences and reasonings about inanimate objects, in consequence of the more exact and constant uniformity of the instincts of each species, so that when the species is clearly ascertained we can reckon with more certainty on their acts, or our power of acting upon them.

CHAPTER X.

ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE DEITY.

FROM the platform to which we have brought up the soul, by means of its combined sensations, perceptions, and recognitions, and its intercourse with other minds, it reaches the highest attainment of which the mind is capable, and which, more than any other, distinguishes it from its fellow-inhabitants of this planet, namely, its recognition of the being and attributes of the Deity.

The mind has not indeed precisely the same means of recognising the presence and mental movements of the Deity, which it has of recognising the presence and mental movements of its fellow-men. He does not inhabit a body like its own, and manifest his mental movements by motions of such a body, similar to those movements of its subject body, and by which it manifests its movements; but it possesses that kind of evidence of the being, the power, and will of a mind or spirit pervading all nature, which it possesses of the existence and power and will of a fellow-man, when it examines any of his works in his absence; and it possesses that kind of evidence to an infinitely greater extent, and in infinitely greater perfection.

We have already had occasion to remark that, when we examine a collection of machines or of paintings, we instantly infer that they were formed by human skill and power, and that we examine them as if we were examining the design and skill and power of the former of them. Fénelon's reference to the marks of design and power in a watch, of which Paley has made so good use in his 66 Natural Theology," furnishes incontestable proof that no sane mind could see and examine such a work of art, and discover the use of it, without inferring