is only by acquaintance with the human mind that we can rise to the contemplation of the Deity, or form any conception of Him. In directing our attention, therefore, to the structure of the human mind, its various faculties, their connexion with one another, and the principles on which they are regulated, we enter on the contemplation of an object that belongs to the very highest order of created beings. Other departments of created beings are governed and kept in order by mechanical laws, or chemical laws, which are probably also mechanical, but more recondite and complex, or by laws of vegetable and animal life, or by instinct. But creatures so governed are under no responsibility-they are incapable of engaging the affection, or incurring the displeasure of the Creator; that is, they are incapable of virtue, and consequently of vice. Man is the only creature, with whom we are acquainted, who is capable of being governed by a law which he has power to obey or to disobey, a free agent-and so capable of drawing towards himself the approbation and love of his Creator, or of provoking His just indignation. That God could create such a free agent is the most incomprehensible of all His attributes, and would be incredible and inconceivable, but that every man has within himself the evidence of his own consciousness that he himself is such a being. This is the mystery of mysteries, including in it all those perplexing questions which have baffled the powers of thinking men, in all ages, to resolve :-such as, Whence came moral evil? Is man really free, or are his acts determined by necessity, so that he could not act otherwise than he does? If free, how can God foresee and control all events? If subjected to necessity, how can man be a moral and accountable creature? — and how can God be either pleased or displeased with him on account of his acts? All these questions would be solved if we could solve the preliminary one-"How could God create a moral and responsible being?" That He has done so we know

from our own consciousness; by what exercise of power or will He has done so, is a question that strikes us dumb. When it is presented to us, we can but wonder and adore.

Now, it is the nature of this first of created beings, within the range of our direct knowledge, that we are to contemplate, availing ourselves of the lights which have been thrown upon it by the researches of all past ages; and we shall find it to bear the evident traces of the workmanship of Him who created the heavens and the earth. Everywhere we shall find, as in the universe of matter, a small number of simple principles, producing in their combinations the most wonderful and beautiful results.


Mind is distinguished from matter by its qualities. The qualities of matter are such as extension, form, motion, rest, heat, cold, hardness, softness, attraction, repulsion, and others of similar nature, discovered by our senses. The qualities of mind are such as thought, pain, pleasure, memory, discrimination, love, hatred, and others, which our consciousness makes known to us. It is probable that mind and matter are distinct in their essence or substance that these two different kinds of qualities may each have a totally different substratum which combines their qualities respectively; but of the essence or substance of either mind or matter we are altogether ignorant. The atomic theory of chemistry renders it probable that all material things have a substratum of atoms, and that the various qualities of different material objects are caused by the different modes in which the atoms are combined, and also by diversities in the atoms themselves. That mind should be a mere aggregate of qualities, without a mental substratum or essence,

is thus rendered improbable; but of that mental substratum, or substance, or essence, we know absolutely nothing.


That the mind is destitute of all thoughts or feelings. that is, all actual operations, till it is awakened or set in motion (using that word figuratively) by external objects that affect the organs of sense, seems now to be the generally received opinion of all mental philosophers. It contains the qualities or aptitudes for its various operations before they are thus awakened, but they are lying dormant. Just as a piece of blue or yellow paper has no colour till the light shines upon it, but has such a contexture of its surface that when the light does shine, it is blue or yellow so the mind is ushered into the world with the qualities or aptitudes for its various operations, but dormant until they are called into action by the objects affecting the bodily organs of sense with which it is connected. In this the mind is in similar circumstances with the body, which, in the womb, possesses all its organs of sense, of motion, of digestion and assimilation of food, of respiration, but asleep and motionless till they are brought within the reach of those various qualities in external objects that are fitted to awaken them and set them in motion. Or it may be compared to a repeating watch, complete in all its mechanism, its moving and regulating powers, its dial, its indices, and its apparatus for striking the hours, but all motionless and silent till an external power winds it up, and immediately its latent energies begin to manifest themselves.



THE mind derives its capabilities of being affected by external objects, and then of operating upon these effects, comparing, combining, numbering, desiring, fearing, &c., from its original mechanism (if we may use that word in speaking of mind) as it comes from the hand of its maker; but it derives its actual life and movement from the external world. The effect produced on the mind by external objects through the organs of sense is called sensation. Sensation, therefore, in metaphysical language, means the state into which the mind is brought when it is affected by any material object acting on any of the organs of sense. The word is frequently extended beyond this proper meaning, sometimes figuratively and sometimes inaccurately; but in any attempt to explain mental operations it should be carefully confined to its own proper signification.



THE bodily organs of sense are five-namely, the organs of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight.

These organs consist of nerves or threads proceeding from the brain, formed of a substance so similar to that of the brain that they may be regarded as a prolongation of it, and ending, on the surface of the body, all of them, with the exception of the nerves of touch, at a particular spot, where an apparatus is provided for

bringing the material substance that is destined to act upon them into contact with them under the most advantageous circumstances. The whole organ of each sense, therefore, may be regarded as consisting of three parts-first, the external termination of the sensorial nerve, and the apparatus there provided for bringing it into contact with the substance fitted to act upon it; secondly, the continuation of the nerves from the surface to the brain; and thirdly, its junction with the brain. So far, sensation can be traced, but no further. How material objects affect the extremity of the nerves of sense; how these convey the effect produced upon them to the brain, or how the brain affects the mind, so as to produce sensation, is altogether unknown to us. All that is known is, that certain kinds or qualities of matter affect, in some unknown way, the outward extremity of the different nerves of sense by the aid of the apparatus provided for bringing the material substance and the nerve into contact or communication with one another, as the tongue, the nostril, the ear, the eye; that these nerves are connected with the brain; and that the brain, or the extremity of the nerves in the brain, in some inscrutable manner, affects the mind variously, according to the particular nerve affected from without, and the nature and intensity of the effect on that nerve. It is known that the sensorial nerve is essentially the organ of sensation; for if that be injured, or its communication with the brain cut off, there is no sensation.

From this account of sensation it is obvious that there can be no similarity between the material substance or quality causing sensation, or the effect which it produces on the nerve, and the mental sensation occasioned by it. The pain occasioned by a blow can bear no resemblance to the instrument with which the blow was inflicted. All that can be said of the connexion of these two things is, that the pain immediately follows the blow, but how, we know not. The hearing of the sound of a bell bears

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