of the inferior animals, there is, as we have said, no moral depravity; yet they are images of the hatefulness of moral depravity, kept continually before our eyes. And these lessons are not altogether lost upon us for, on the one hand, there is a universal practice of comparing cunning, selfish, violent, cruel men, to such animals as the lion, the tiger, the fox, the wolf, the serpent, the shark-even the spider and the wasp; nor, on the other hand, are those images of such virtues as gentleness, faithfulness to trust, obedience to masters, gratitude to benefactors, care of offspring, bravery in their defence, unwearied labour for their sustenance, allsacrificing devotedness to the public weal, which are set before us in the instincts of such animals as the dove and many other birds, the lamb, the dog, the beaver, the ant, the bee, lost upon us, as is manifest from the admiration which these beautiful instincts excite, and from the readiness with which we contrast them with the opposite vices, which are prevalent among our own species.

IT has been a favourite notion with some, that the Deity, having imprinted certain powers or qualities, or, as they are sometimes called, laws, on matter, and having arranged masses of it in a certain order, leaves to these laws, or qualities, or principles, to maintain and develope the order of the universe. It would be laborious and irksome for us to be under the necessity of keeping any machine in order and in motion, by a constant muscular effort; and that notion of labour and irksomeness we are prone to ascribe to the Deity himself; and therefore for the purpose of relieving him, as they imagine, from such monotony and labour, they conceive of him as doing what we attempt to do, when we contrive machines that will perform their evolutions, and do their work, with as little attention and interference on our part as possible.

But, according to the views of these very philosophers, as they love to be called, we know of no such powers, or qualities, or laws in matter. We know of nothing but mere antecedents and consequents. We speak, for example, of the quality or law of the attraction of gravitation; by which we mean, that when two masses of matter are placed at a certain distance from one another and left free, they approach one another with a force bearing a certain ratio to the quantity of matter in both of the masses and to their distance from one another. But we know of no power in the masses of matter, or in the intervening space, to cause them to approach. We may as well ascribe the phenomenon to will and choice as to anything else. We call the phenomenon, attraction; but that is a mere word, which signifies nothing more than the fact of the approach of the masses to one another. We infer that there must be a cause, because we cannot conceive of any change, at least in matter, without a cause; but that the cause is in the matter, or where, or what it is, we are absolutely ignorant. We talk of the laws of motion; but what it is that keeps a body in motion in a straight course, unless it be deflected from it by an external force, or what keeps a body at rest, when it is at rest, we know not; so also the laws of light, electricity, magnetism, crystallisation, and others; they are, even in the estimate of these philosophers, mere names of phenomena; that is, of antecedents and consequents. We are, therefore, ignorant, not merely of the laws of nature, but we know not that there are such laws. All that we know is, that certain antecedents are always, so far as we have observed, followed by certain consequents; or rather, that similar antecedents are followed by similar consequents.

But we do know, by recognition, one efficient cause of the phenomena of the universe, and but one. We see in these phenomena similar evidences of design, and will, and power, that we see in the construction of a

watch or a steam-engine. The design, and will, and power indicated in the structure of the watch or the steam-engine, we recognise as the same as that of which we are conscious when we arrange any portion of matter so as to produce an intended effect. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion, that the power indicated by the evidences of design in the material universe, is the power of mind over matter; the power of that one designing, executing mind, which we have recognised as pervading the whole universe, so far as we have had opportunity of observing it.

Nor is there any conceivable cause that could account for the phenomena of creation, but the unceasing operation of an all-pervading, all-powerful will, conforming itself to certain laws,-a spirit or mind having perfect power over every molecule of matter in the universe, similar to that which we possess over those members of the body which are most under our control, but infinitely more perfect, a power to move each molecule wherever it chooses, and to arrange them all as it sees fit; and that power regulated by the most perfect knowledge of all things that are, or have been, or that are possible. To borrow an illustration from Scripture: Moses was commanded by God to cast down a rod which he held in his hand, and it instantly became a serpent; he was then commanded to take it by the tail, and it instantly became a rod in his hand. A rod is somewhat similar in form to a serpent, and therefore we are very ready to imagine that it would be more easy to convert a rod than any irregular lump of matter into a serpent. But let it be considered what was to be done, in forming the serpent. The materials for the skeleton had to be drawn together and instantly arranged into the beautifully constructed vertebræ and ribs of the serpent tribe. The viscera, the whole alimentary system,-stomach, liver, bowels, had to be modelled and introduced in an instant; the respiratory and circulating systems-the

heart, the arteries, the veins, the lungs, had to be formed; and simultaneously with all these, the nervous system—the head, the brain, with all the external organs of sense, the muscles, the skin, and the scales, must all be produced on the instant. Now, what power could effect all this but a mind having perfect power over every molecule of matter, to bring instantly every one to its proper place for producing the result? But we know, independently of Scripture, that animals have been created, at no very remote period; nor is there the slightest indication that any species of them has gradually advanced from a less perfect to a more perfect organisation. Whole tribes have, again and again, been annihilated, and others, of different genera and species, made to occupy their room. Acts of creation like that of the serpent of Moses, must have taken place in innumerable instances. Now, what power is there in the universe to account for this fact, but the perfect power of that mind which we recognise by the evidences of design and of other mental attributes, in the universe of matter, over every particle of matter, to arrange all or any portion of them with infinitely more ease and rapidity than we possess to turn the pupil of our eye from one side of its socket to the other?

Even if the universe were a system of mere inorganic matter, moving with perfect uniformity, according to a certain order, or certain laws, as that order is sometimes called, we have no knowledge of any power that could frame and sustain these laws, but the power of an allpervading mind. But that part of the universe which falls under our most exact observation, is not a mere system of inorganic matter, regulated by mechanical laws. It is full of life, full of disturbing causes to any mere material or mechanical system fulfilling its evolutions. Not only the will of man, but the instincts of innumerable animals implying will and intention, regulated, not by mere material impulse, but by thought and

choice, would necessarily disturb the progress of any mere material or mechanical system. And that fact renders it infinitely more difficult to conceive how such a system could be kept in order, except by the constant presence of an all-pervading mind, carrying into effect its designs in every place and at every moment.

Some philosophers, as they would be deemed, have thrown out the supposition that the different grades of organic nature may have been occasioned by the efforts of the animals and the plants themselves. They fancy that only organic forms of the lowest order may have been created,-nay, that even these may, by some fortuitous process, have arisen out of inorganic matter; that the organism being once formed, it might aim at some attainment, which, in the course of generations, its progeny might at length reach; that a plant attempting to move might at length be furnished with fins or feet, -that an animal aspiring to fly might at length wish and strive itself into the possession of a pair of wings,— that frogs attempting to climb trees, as some of them actually do, might, in course of time, become monkeys; and thus the transition seems not to be very greatfrom monkeys to become men.

But, in the first place, is there any evidence of plants or animals seeking to change their habits? Do snails ever indicate any desire to leap like frogs, or frogs to fly like birds? On the contrary, does not every species of animal seem to delight most in its own mode of life?— and does not every one manifest unequivocal indications of reluctance to vary its habits in the slightest degree? Many succeeding generations of cats have, under human control, been made to change their habits to a considerable extent. But no wild cat ever indicated a wish to become domesticated, or to adopt the more polished manners of the domestic cat: on the contrary, when the domestic cat is left to itself, its progeny indicate a disposition instantly to return to the natural habits of its kind.