But let it be supposed that there ever exists in any animal a wish or aim to change its mode of life, is there any evidence that such a wish or aim would have any effect in changing the organisation of the animal? Men have, ever since their introduction upon the earth, been turning the opening of their ears in the direction of sounds, that they may hear them more distinctly. Here is a wish, and an effort, that have been made by generation after generation from the remotest antiquity. Has this wish and effort added anything to the length of our ears, or imparted to us any power to move them in the direction of sound, as the horse, the ass, the dog, and many other animals do? This question can be answered for at least some three or four thousand years. Statues and pictures, nay, mummies, yet remain from those remote ages, which indicate that the ears of men then were precisely what they are now. It may be said, that four thousand years is a very short period in which to expect any perceptible change. But if we go a little further back, we find ourselves at one of those great geological revolutions, before which no trace of the existence of the human species is to be found. These attempts to get rid of the real effective presence of God in his works, are more like the drivellings of insanity than the thinking and reasoning of rational men; and would be utterly unworthy of notice, but for the eager attention with which they are sometimes listened to. But God has not left his universe in circumstances which warrant us to entertain, even for a moment, the notion of its having been brought into its present state by the regular operation of any laws, or principles, or qualities impressed on matter or mind,—of his having once formed and arranged it in an imperfect state, and left it to develope the principles on which he constructed it. But he has constructed his universe, not only so as to evince his power and skill exerted in its first formation, and his special interposition from time to time, removing whole races of organised beings, and replacing them by others, but also so as to render it impossible for us to advance a single step towards understanding the nature and causes of the phenomena placed before us, but by the recognition of his constant pervading presence and power and will, working in and through all. THE recognition of the Deity in his works does not create any new emotions, but it excites, in a modified form, some of the emotions which are excited by the recognition of the minds, the characters, and acts of our fellow-men. His universal presence and infinite power and wisdom, are fitted to excite awe and veneration. His perfect power over us, and constant presence to us, are fitted to excite submission to his will, and obedience to his known commands. The tender concern manifested by Him for the well-being and happiness of his creatures, and the benefits which we daily receive from Him, and sources of delight which are daily opened to us, are fitted to inspire us with gratitude and love. The intellectual operations dependent on the recog nition of the Deity, consist chiefly of those operations by which that recognition is effected, and which have already been considered. Other emotions and intellectual operations are excited by the special revelation which God has made of himself, of the relation in which we stand to Him, and of his manner of dealing with us, and his ultimate purposes respecting us; but the consideration of these does not fall within the province of the present investigation. END OF BOOK III. BOOK IV. ON THE MEANS WHICH THE MIND POSSESSES OF AFFECTING OTHER MINDS. HAVING contemplated the mind in its capabilities of receiving influences from without by its sensations, by its perceptions of external material objects, and by its recognitions of the existence, and presence, and states of other minds, we have yet to consider what active power it possesses of affecting other minds. This opens a very wide field, in which we might expatiate to an almost unlimited extent. But we must restrain ourselves and do little more than indicate the nature and vastness of it. All the means that we possess of affecting the minds of others, may be resolved into two elements: namely, the first, calling pleasant or painful sensations in them; the second, communicating our own thoughts and feelings to them. The first of these elementary means of affecting other minds is seldom used alone. We seldom intentionally excite pleasant or painful sensations in others merely for the purpose of giving them pleasure or pain; at least, we seldom give pain merely for the sake of giving pain. The use of these means of affecting others is almost always connected with the expression of the state of our minds-our approbation, or love, or gratitude; or our disapprobation, our anger, our revenge, our contempt, our desires, our purposes; and is intended to strengthen the influence which we wish to exert on others by the expression of these various states of mind. A parent chastises his child; that is, he inflicts pain upon him, not for the mere sake of giving him pain, but for the purpose of strengthening the expression of his displeasure and his desires. One man inflicts a blow on another, not becauses he wishes merely to give him pain, but to strengthen the expression of his anger or his hatred. This circumstance requires us, in arranging the means which we possess of affecting other minds, to depart a little from the more obvious method of considering these elementary means separately, and to divide the cases in which we seek to influence the minds of others into-I. Those cases in which the infliction of pain, or the communication of pleasure (especially the former), is used as an auxiliary to add power to the expression of the state of our minds; and II. Those cases in which no attempt to excite pain or pleasure is used for that purpose. CHAPTER I. OF THOSE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE MINDS OF OTHERS IN WHICH WE INTENTIONALLY GIVE THEM PAIN OR 1. In regard to the means of causing pleasure or pain, the first and most natural of these is the infliction of blows. A parent is able, by his greater strength of body, to chastise his child by striking him. By the exercise of the same muscular power, one man inflicts blows on another. This power may be increased by employing mechanical aids, as rods, staves, whips, sharp instru ments; or by chemical aids, as fire applied to the person or property. This end may be effected also by inducing others to inflict the pain; as when a ruler employs officers of justice for that purpose. Or pain may, in effect, be inflicted, by depriving of the means of enjoyment; as by the destruction or seizure of property, robbery of wives and children or of other near and dear friends or relatives, or by the confinement of the person. Pleasant sensations are communicated chiefly by bestowing the means of procuring them, or by relieving from pain. 2. In regard to the purposes for which pain is inflicted, or pleasure communicated, these are very various. Pain, as we have said, is inflicted to strengthen the expression of hatred, anger, envy, or revenge; and pleasure communicated to strengthen the expression of approbation, or of love, or of gratitude for benefits received. Pains are inflicted by parents, and by rulers, on children for disobeying commands, on adult persons for transgressing the laws, for the purpose of deterring these children or adult persons from the repetition of their disobedience or transgression; and also of deterring others from similar disobedience and trangression. Rewards are seldom given for observance of the law; although sometimes they are given as bribes for violating it. Sometimes pains are inflicted for the purpose of upholding or diffusing opinions or principles. This, it is obvious, they never can truly effect. They can only restrain the outward expression of opinions or principles, and thus indirectly hinder the diffusion of them. But that effect is usually counteracted by the curiosity that is excited to become acquainted with prohibited opinions and principles, and the pleasure which men feel in resisting any attempt to control them. Forbidden opinions or principles become much more attractive by being forbidden. All persecutions for the sake of religion, belong to this absurd use of the infliction of pains. |