not, as soon as he understood the words, assent to the truth of the proposition, but would make trial of it in particular instances, and would thus soon convince himself that, however frequently he made the trial, the result would be always the

same.

2. No part of such a system of philosophy or morals can be more certain than the arguments by which he seeks to prove that his pure cognitions are not empirical. Now these arguments, so far from being themselves self-evident, are complex, depending on exact and minute distinctions, in which he and we may be deceived. But, a chain of reasoning, like a material chain, is no stronger than the weakest link of it. Thus he holds that the existence of matter and space are intuitive forms of thought, and that the external world is perceived intuitively by the sense of sight. Why? Because the perception of it by the sense of sight is universal. Is every cognition by the sense of sight, which is universal, intuitive? That he dare not assert, because the perception of distance by the sense of sight, at least within certain limits, is as universal as the perception of the external world. Every man who has the use of his eyes can see that an object is within reach of his arm, or that it is at the other end of the room, as certainly as every man can perceive objects external to himself. But there is a wide difference, Kant argues, between these two universal perceptions, which he proceeds to explain. We do not here dispute the validity of the distinction; but we say that it is not self-evident, and that his whole theory is not stronger than the arguments by which he would establish that distinction. The attempt to establish intuitive perception by reasoning appears to bear absurdity on the face of it. If a perception were really intuitive, it would require no reasoning to establish it. But he relies much on the necessity, as well as universality, of certain cognitions. We have already seen that necessity would not prove them to be intuitive. We have seen that, as the universality of some cognitions does not arise from their being intuitive, but from an experience which must be common to all men, so their necessity is only a relative necessity, depending upon prior empirical cognitions. See note B.

3. Upon the system generally, we would remark, that as we are made to depend for our existence, for the preservation of our species, and for all our comforts on what Kant calls empirical knowledge, it is not probable that we can possess knowledge of really existing beings, more certain. Mathematical demonstration gives more certainty, but it is employed on the measurement of space, which is a mere negation of actual existence. From the moment that an attempt is made to apply it to any positive thing, it becomes as empirical and uncertain as any other branch of knowledge. The demonstrations, then, rest on an “if,” and that "if" ascertained by observation and testimony-nay, very often on testimony which would not be received in a court of

justice to decide a question of property to the amount of twenty shillings. Nevertheless we cast no doubt on these discoveries of philosophy, which we believe to be much more certain than many most satisfactorily proved decisions in courts of justice.

God has made us dependent for the salvation of the soul on what Kant would call empirical knowledge-knowledge not founded on what he denominates pure reason, but on human testimony, fortified, however, in a manner that renders it infinitely more certain to the great mass of human intellects than the reasonings by which he would establish his axioms of pure reason, and the demonstrations which he would found on them; and we apprehend that the seeking to establish a system of morals, which we presume includes religion or our duty to God, on any reasoning supposed to be more pure and certain than the evidence on which God has been pleased to rest the gospel of his grace, would tend only to weaken our faith, and perhaps betray us into infidelity.

NOTE D.

Another and an astounding example of the gross absurdities into which these hole-and-corner laws, the administration of which is confined within the legal profession, and the gross injustice to which the public may be subjected by them, we have had in the recent case of the Irish Presbyterian marriages.

Presbyterians from Scotland were introduced into Ireland under the sanction of Government, and their ministers were placed on the same footing with the Episcopal clergy. Wherever Presbyterians were settled, they received the tithes of the parishes from which the Roman Catholic clergy had been ejected, and marriages celebrated by them were accounted equally valid with the marriages celebrated by the Episcopal clergy. The Act of Uniformity, in the reign of Charles II., threw them out of the parish emoluments; and, as a sort of compensation for these, a grant, called the Royal Bounty, or "Regium Donum," was awarded to them. The law, however, with regard to marriages celebrated by them was untouched; and they continued to celebrate marriages, chiefly, of course, among their own people, but also in multitudes of instances in which one of the parties belonged to the Episcopal Church, unchallenged. The Episcopal clergy, however, sometimes disputed these marriages, not by appealing to the law, but simply by their own private assertions. At a later date (we have not the Act by us) a clause was introduced into an Act of Parliament authorising Presbyterian marriages under certain circumstances. This seems to have been

introduced clandestinely and artfully, for the purpose of casting doubt on the validity of these marriages under other circumstances.

This rendered the Presbyterian ministers anxious to know the law on the subject, that they might know their own duty. To our knowledge, the judge of the Prerogative Court was anxiously consulted by one of the Presbyterian ministers of Dublin; but no distinct statement of the law could be obtained. The minister particularly inquired by what rule or principle he was to determine whether any individual was a Presbyterian or not. Should he be a contributor to the expenses of the congregation? Should he be in attendance for any given time? Should he be a communicant? The answer was to the effect that there was no legal mode of entering the Presbyterian Church, as there was of entering the Establishment from the Church of Rome, namely, by the public ceremony of recantation. That, seeing the individual in his place of worship, or receiving an application from him to marry him, was primâ facie evidence of his being a Presbyterian. We have ourselves consulted lawyers on the subject, with no better success; and some of our ministers have offered publicly to marry persons belonging to the established Church openly, before any witnesses, that the case might be brought into the law courts, and the point decided; but the challenge was not accepted. Hundreds of marriages were accordingly celebrated every year. The legitimacy of the births of thousands of individuals depended on these marriages; the possession of a large proportion of the landed estates of Ulster depended on them. The courts of law had uniformly recognised them in deciding on inheritances, and all other rights depending on lawful marriage. All public offices, in paying pensions, annuities, &c., &c., recognised them.

After matters had proceeded thus for about two centuries, some lawyer, eminent for antiquarian lore, fished up, from no one knows what cesspool of mud, a document which had been unheard-of from the days of the Reformation, which seemed to be against marriages celebrated by any but Episcopal ministers. A case of Presbyterian marriage was brought to trial, and, after much learned discussion, it was found not good in law. This decision was confirmed in the House of Lords; and thus, some 500 ministers, men of education, who were fully capable of understanding any intelligible legal document, men honestly desiring to know their duty that they might do it, were to their utter astonishment, found, with their predecessors, for two centuries, to have been habitually acting in violation of the law without knowing it; that thousands of the people were illegiti mately born, many of them, and their fathers before them, in possession of landed and other property, to which they had no legal title. Many married people began to look somewhat oddly at one another, finding that, in the eye of the law, they were

living in concubinage; and one case came within our knowledge, of a man taking some initiatory steps in the direction of getting rid of his wife, on the ground of this decision. An Act of Parliament was immediately passed legalising all past marriages celebrated by Presbyterian ministers, which was followed by another, placing all Protestant marriages in Ireland under new regulations. But let it be supposed for a moment, that these subsequent Acts had not been passed-that some influential party in the state, bigotedly opposed to Presbyterians, and rejoicing in the opportunity of throwing the Presbyterian ministers and people of Ireland into distress and perplexity, had successfully resisted the passing of these Acts, what a source of indescribable mischief would not this state of the law have proved! That it did not produce that mischief, no thanks to the legal profession, but to the popular element of the constitution, which superseded and annulled the blunders of the hole-and-corner proceedings of the lawyers. But would it not be more wise to let in the popular element into the administration of the law, by the effective employment of juries, than to let the lawyers proceed with such laws unchecked till they threaten some prodigious mischief, and then to supersede by an act of authority the effects of their blunders, or, it may be, their artifices? If a popular assembly may beneficially supersede the laws, abrogate old laws, and enact new ones, surely popular assemblies, under the advice of lawyers, may be capable of administering the law. There is nothing in the nature of those rights or wrongs of which those laws take cognisance, from the administration of which all lay interference is excluded, that necessarily renders them unintelligible to educated men not lawyers. There is nothing in the tenure or transference of lands, apart from the antiquated theories with which the holding of land is connected, or with the transmission of inheritances, or with wills or testaments, so recondite as to place them beyond the intellect of men of common sense, yet ignorant of the antiquities and subtleties of law; and the only effectual check upon such a tissue of preposterous absurdities as the marriage law of Ireland has exhibited, is to subject the whole law to the check and control of the common sense of the nation by means of juries.

THE END.

BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.