or remembrances than another-some more attracted by the pleasures of sensation, and some by the pleasures of observing the resemblances and differences among sensations there might be room in different minds, circumstanced as we have supposed, for great variety of character. The thoughts of one might run more on sensual pleasures or pains; of another more on intellectual enjoyments. Of the sensualists, one might give more attention to sounds, another to sights, another to tastes, another to smells, another to feelings; while of the more intellectual minds, one might be more attracted by the differences and resemblances of visual sensations, another of sensations of hearing; and another, feelings, and so of the other sensations; another to differences of form; another to differences of number; another to differences of prolongation, or of time. But although these differences may originate in the state of the mind, they obviously are not under the power of the will.

CHAPTER VI.

INTELLECTUAL POWERS, OR PHENOMENA DEPENDENT ON SENSATION.

WE have regarded the faculty, or power, or phenomenon of sensation as forming the basis of all mental phenomena, and therefore having a common connection with all.

We have regarded memory also as being the recalling or reviving of sensations, with certain modifications, according to certain laws, called laws of suggestion; also as bearing a common relation to all mental phe

nomena.

To these we have added attention, regarding it not properly as a distinct faculty from sensation and memory, but as a limit set to the mind's powers of sensation and

memory, rendering it incapable of noticing more than one sensation, or recalled sensation, at the same instant; and so also with regard at least to those sensations, or remembrances of sensations, of which it is conscious, confining them to a single train of successive sensations or remembrances.

We have, further, regarded sensations and revivals of past sensations by memory, as consisting of two elements, or at least as capable of being contemplated in two points of view; namely, 1st, as being pleasant or painful : and, 2nd, as differing from or resembling one another. And we have regarded the element of pleasure or pain in sensations as the foundation of those powers or phenomena of the mind called emotions or passions; and the resemblances and differences among sensations, original or recalled, as the basis of the intellectual powers or phenomena of the mind; and the power of the mind to discern these resemblances or differences we have regarded as an element both of sensation and memory, and therefore as holding the same common relation to all mental phenomena with sensation and memory. Although, therefore, the act of the mind in observing the resemblances or differences of sensations, original or remembered, has in it more of the nature of intellect than of emotion, just as the experiencing of the pain or pleasure of sensations, original or remembered, has in it more of the nature of emotion than of intellect; nay, though the one may be regarded as a pure exercise of intellect, and the other as a pure emotion, yet, having regarded both of these classes of phenomena as elements of sensation and memory, we have treated them under these heads. We shall not, therefore, repeat what we have advanced respecting judgment, or discrimination, or discernment, under the heads of sensation and memory; nor add anything to it, but proceed to the consideration of other intellectual operations connected with sensation.

Would a human mind, circumstanced according to our hypothesis, make any progress in classing its sensations? We see no reason to doubt that it would. It might learn to class them according to the organs of sense through which it received them. It is probable, we conceive, that the accurate distinguishing of sounds from sights, or smells, or tastes, or feelings, and all of these from one another, would not be effected at once; but we conceive it might be learned by frequent observation.

Or it might adopt another classification, and, disregarding the organs of sense, arrange them as being pleasant, or painful, or indifferent, or by the nature and intensity of the pleasure or pain involved in them. That a mind conversant only with sensations might class them according to the pleasure or pain involved in them, irrespective of the particular organ through which the sensations are conveyed to it, seems probable from the facility with which we apply epithets to sensations of one sense properly applicable to sensations of other senses. Thus, we speak familiarly, and are clearly understood, when we speak of sweet sounds or perfumes, harmonious colouring, bitter cold, soft shades, splendid music, grating sounds, harsh tastes, hot, warm, cool, cold, freezing looks or language, and innumerable others. Many of the effects produced by the sensations of different senses are strikingly analogous. A pure, clear, musical sound, and a pure, clear, simple colour; the thrilling sensation produced by two sounds in harmony, especially thirds, and the mingling of any two of the primary colours (red, blue and yellow), the successive sounding of the three sounds of the triad, or common chord, and the successive displaying of the three primary colours; the sounding of the seven notes of the scale in regular succession, and the appearance of the seven prismatic colours; the discordant effect of the sounding of all the notes of the scale, and the disagreeable effect of the

artificial mixing of all the prismatic colours; the natural blending of all the sounds in the scale in the clear tone of a bell, or of a musical string, and the natural blending of all the prismatic colours forming white light, are so similar in their effects, that we suppose that the attention of the human mind might be as much attracted by these analogies as by the different organs of sense through which its sensations reach it. It might, perhaps, also class visual sensations, having in them distinct forms, according to these forms-lines straight or curved, long or short; lines returning into themselves without angles, as circles, or ellipses; or with angles, as triangles, squares, parallelograms; by which we mean the appearances which lines in these forms would have when held distinctly before the eye. Would the mind form any conception of number? Would it observe that three points of light, three successive sounds, and three impulses on the sense of touch, were similar in having the number three common to all? We see no reason to doubt that it would. Here, then, we have the germ of classification, and of reasoning so far as that operation is employed about classification.

Would a human mind, in the condition of our hypothesis, make any effort in the direction of drawing inferences? Would it form any idea of a whole constituted of two or more parts? Would it observe that a square, that is, the appearance which a square would have when presented directly before the eye, consists of four equal lines; or that three lines are required to make one triangle? If a circle were divided into three parts, coloured respectively red, blue, and yellow, would it discern that each of these pieces of breadths of colour were parts of one whole circle? If it were accustomed to hear three tolls of a bell before sunset, and if it heard two such tolls, would it regard them as parts of the whole signal by which night was ushered in, and expect the third toll? and if the third toll were not heard, would

it expect or not expect the sensation of darkness to follow? If a square were presented before it, divided into equal parallelograms by a line drawn within it parallel to two of the sides, and divided also into two equal triangles by a diagonal, would it ever discover that the triangles were equal to the parallelograms, as both occupying the whole square, and that each of the triangles was equal to each of the parallelograms, both being halves of the same square? We do not see on what grounds such a discovery should be regarded as beyond the powers of a human mind, although conversant only with sensations and the remembrance of them. And if the mind were capable, in these circumstances, of such operations and inferences, it would possess the embryo of all reasoning.

SUCH is the human mind in the elements of its noble faculties;-lying passively in its corporeal residence, but open to external influences through the apertures of the organs of sense, yet the fixed eye and immoveable features, conveying to it no intimation of the world without, it is a very interesting object of contemplation. Shut up in its lonely tenement, hid from every eye but the eye of him who can commune directly with the spirit, it is yet a little world within. itself. It has its own pleasures and pains, its desires and aversions, its hopes and its fears, its joys and its sorrows, its pleasant surprises and its disappointments, its admirations and wonderings, perhaps its melancholy and its cheerful moods. It has also its acute observations of resemblances and differences among the objects of its thoughts, perhaps its classifications and its inferences, with the pleasures which these intellectual operations yield. But we are now to introduce it to new scenes, and vest it with new powers, and observe how its faculties, which we have contemplated in their embryo or chrysalis state, develope themselves. The reader is not