commit robbery or murder, but who from some other motive refrains from gratifying his desire, is surely in a state of mind infinitely inferior to that of a man who abhors robbery and murder, to whom the very thought of such deeds would be mental torture. God, therefore, may foresee, nay may determine the acts of every individual, without laying any necessity on them to do those acts; their doing or not doing those acts being determined by the state of their minds, combined with the outward circumstances in which they are placed. In regard to the Deity acting from necessity, whatever necessity lies upon Him it is necessity from within his own spirit, and not from without. It is the necessity resulting from his own infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness, necessarily determining Him, to do in all cases that which is most wise and good. The Deity cannot do wrong, because the perfectly holy state of his own spirit necessarily determines Him always to do that which is right. If it were otherwise, he would not be the Deity, and "He cannot (ov dvvarai) deny himself." But this subject belongs rather to ethics than to psychology. CHAPTER IV. THE ORIGIN OF OUR NOTION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. WE have seen that the mind, destitute of power to produce effects on anything external to itself, or even upon itself, could form no conception of cause and effect; that a succession of sensations, in any particular order, however long continued, would indeed beget the confident expectation that the same antecedent would be followed by the same consequent sensation, but would not suggest the idea that the one was the cause of the other. The regular sound of a drum before daylight would establish such a connection in the mind between the one event and the other, that the sound of the drum would suggest the sensation of daylight and excite the confident expectation of it; but it could never give rise to the notion that the sound of the drum was the cause of daylight. Some have supposed that when one event constantly and regularly follows another, we intuitively regard the first as the cause of the second. But in the case of daylight regularly following the sound of the drum, such an intuitive persuasion would be false, and it is surely very improbable, to use no stronger language, that any intuitive persuasion should be contrary to truth. Is it said that the expectation that the same consequents will follow the same antecedents, which we have regarded as intuitive, often deceives us? The reply is obvious, "Never, if the antecedents be truly the same." We may be disappointed in our expectation of consequents, but it will only be when we suppose antecedents to be the same which were in fact different; and the distinguishing of merely similar from identical antecedents is one of the great lessons of life and of all philosophy. When the antecedents are really the same, we are never disappointed in the consequents. We are firmly persuaded, therefore, that although a regular, constant succession of sensations or events would, by a law of our mind corresponding to the law of the universe without, excite a confident expectation that the same antecedents in the succession would be followed by the same consequents, yet that it would never suggest to us the notion of cause and effect. But when the mind has power given to it to move the muscles of the body, and, by these, the various members of the body which are placed under its control, it is then conscious that it is itself the cause of the voluntary movements of the body. My hand or my foot, or my eye moves simply because I will it to move. Now it is impossible to conceive of any notion of cause commit robbery acts; their by the st circumst In re necess own s resu1 goo the A or more in accordare regular succession. vement produced by it the mind's regard, that not be inserted between of being the cause of the conscious of any succession. then see the effect of its uind and the intended motion consciousness of the mind at is conscious that it is the cause s made in extraneous bodies by over the members of its own body. the ground, I am conscious that I stone rising from the ground, in law of gravitation which would have If I push anything from me, or draw s me, I am conscious that my will is the movements. Here again there is no the mind's consciousness. I will to lift o draw towards me or push from me the grasp, and it is instantaneously done. , if I intend and produce a movement by the Jou of media, I am conscious that I am the no movement. If I set up a number of blocks their end in a straight line away from me, so overturning the one next to me I should overhe whole to the last of the series; and if I then forth tarily put my hand and overturn the first, I conscious that I am the cause of overturning the Here is, indeed, a perceptible succession in the ocess by which the last block is overturned; but it is no from a regular succession that I derive my notion of Cause and effect in that case, but from my consciousness of my being the direct cause of overturning the first with the intention of also overturning the others. If a quantity of gunpowder be placed in a house, and a train laid from it, and if I voluntarily take hold of a lighted match and apply it to the end of the train, with the intention of blowing up the house, then I am conscious that I was the cause of the explosion that ensued. If the general of an army sign and deliver an order that a district of country be laid waste with fire and sword, then he is conscious that he was the cause of the conflagrations and bloodshed that ensued; while, at the same time, every inferior agent, in executing the order, is conscious of being the cause of the effects produced directly by the movements of his own body, or by the movements of others acting under his orders. This is the first and original class of phenomena from which we derive the notion of cause and effect. But there are other classes of phenomena to which this notion is extended when once we get possession of it. A second class of phenomena with which we connect the notion of cause and effect is that in which the mind is passively affected by external objects. Our acquaintance with the external world enables us to discover that certain objects produce certain sensations; or, at least, that certain sensations always accompany the presence of certain objects. The ringing of a bell, or the beating of a drum, produces certain sensations of sound; the appearance of the sun is always accompanied with certain sensations of sight and feeling, and we ascribe our sensations to these outward objects as the causes of them. This, however, we apprehend to be only an extension of our notion of cause and effect derived from that class of phenomena in which the mind is the active and conscious cause of the effects; and we greatly doubt whether, even after the mind had discovered the existence of outward objects, and their connection with our sensations, it could ever have formed from that discovery any other notion than that of a constant connection which it would intuitively expect to be uniformly and effect more pure, more perfect, or more in accordance with truth. This is not a mere regular succession. The act of the mind and the movement produced by it are so perfectly simultaneous in the mind's regard, that the finest analytical edge cannot be inserted between them. The mind is conscious of being the cause of the effect produced, without being conscious of any succession. It does not first will, and then see the effect of its 'willing, but the fiat of the mind and the intended motion produced by it are in the consciousness of the mind at the same instant. But again, the mind is conscious that it is the cause of whatever change is made in extraneous bodies by means of its power over the members of its own body. If I lift a stone from the ground, I am conscious that I am the cause of the stone rising from the ground, in opposition to the law of gravitation which would have kept it there. If I push anything from me, or draw anything towards me, I am conscious that my will is the cause of these movements. Here again there is no succession in the mind's consciousness. I will to lift the stone or to draw towards me or push from me the object which I grasp, and it is instantaneously done. Yet again, if I intend and produce a movement by the intervention of media, I am conscious that I am the cause of the movement. If I set up a number of blocks of wood on their end in a straight line away from me, so that by overturning the one next to me I should overturn the whole to the last of the series; and if I then voluntarily put forth my hand and overturn the first, I am conscious that I am the cause of overturning the rest. Here is, indeed, a perceptible succession in the process by which the last block is overturned; but it is not from a regular succession that I derive my notion of cause and effect in that case, but from my consciousness of my being the direct cause of overturning the first with the intention of also overturning the others. If a quantity |