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is usually transferred from its sensations to its perceptions of external objects. That intensity of a sensation, or its novelty, that drew the attention of the mind to the sensation itself, now draws it to the outward object which causes the sensation. When it experiences the sensation of light, it thinks of the sun, or of the lamp, that causes it. When it experiences the sensation of warmth, it thinks of the fire from which it receives it. When it hears the sound of the hnman voice, it thinks of the person who utters it: the same law governing the attention in regard to the external object as that which governed it in regard to the sensation itself, namely, the intensity of the sensation, the novelty of it, or of the object causing it, and the desire of examining it, or the cause of it.

The attention to the pleasure or pain, also, of a sensation is generally transferred to the object causing it. A child deriving pleasure from the taste of an apple, immediately concentrates its delight on the apple which was the cause of its pleasure; and the sting of a bee rivets the attention intensely on the little insect that caused the pain. When pain cannot be referred to any immediate cause, as in tooth-ache, the attention is fixed on the sensation itself.

CHAPTER VI.

MEMORY, AS CONNECTED WITH PERCEPTION.

MEMORY we found to be the aptitude of the mind for having past sensations recalled to it, under the regulation of certain laws called the laws of suggestion or association; and the sensations thus recalled we denominated, suggested or recalled or remembered sensations.

The new circumstances into which we have introduced the mind extend the range of those laws of suggestion

by which the remembrance of the past is regulated. Sensation, either original or suggested, besides suggesting former sensations original or suggested, suggests external objects the existence and qualities of which have been discovered by means of sensations. Those perceptions of external objects, especially, which are received by the sense of sight, being innumerable, extend the range of memory in regard to the multiplicity of its objects almost to infinity.

The principal laws of suggestion seem to be, resemblance, contrariety, contiguity of time or place, comprehension, and cause and effect. It is true that comprehension and cause and effect might be included in contiguity, but we believe that comprehension and cause and effect occasion suggestions which mere contiguity of time or place would not suggest.

Objects that are alike, or regarded as alike in any particular, may suggest one another. Objects that are observed to be dissimilar, or contrary to one another, may also suggest each other. A very tall man may either suggest the remembrance of another tall man, or of a very short man. And this law extends to analogical similarities or dissimilarities. Thus, the sight of one royal palace may suggest one that had formerly been seen, because they have both been the residence of kings. Or a palace may suggest, by contrast, a miserable hut; or the remembrance of a palace may suggest some of the objects that were in it, or near it, when it was seen; or it may suggest the friend that was with us when we saw it; or it may suggest the sensations of heat or of cold, of crowding and pressure which accompanied our seeing it; or, by analogy, it may suggest the noble mind of some individual richly furnished with princely dispositions and elegant accomplishments. Or, perhaps, more naturally, such a person's mind might suggest the remembrance of a royal palace.

Contiguity of time or place is another common cause

of suggestion. We meet a person whom we have formerly met in a particular city or house, and immediately the city or the house arises to the view of our remembrance. Many years ago, two individuals, whom we well knew, were drowned at a particular spot in the Frith of Clyde; and we have never passed that spot, nor thought of it, without remembering them. On the night of the illumination of London for the Peace of Amiens, there was a violent thunder-storm: we have never since thought of the illumination without thinking of the thunder-storm; and have seldom witnessed a thunderstorm without thinking of the storm in London, the illumination and the Peace of Amiens.

Comprehension, that is, any whole may suggest its parts, and vice versa. The thought of the class or order of mammalia will suggest some of the genera or species that belong to it; or any animal or plant may suggest the genus or class to which it belongs.

Cause and effect, also, almost always suggest one another. A sultry day suggests the sun and the calm state of the atmosphere as the causes of it; and a bright summer morning with a calm atmosphere, suggests a sultry day to follow. An explosion suggests the idea of the gunpowder that caused it; or the sight, or smell, or remembrance of gunpowder, suggests the idea of explosion that might be caused by it.

As it is with the suggestions of sensations, so it is with the suggestions of external objects, that some minds are more under the influence of one law of suggestion, and other minds more under the influence of another law. The thoughts of naturalists flow mostly in the channel of differences and resemblances; of poets, in that of analogical resemblances; of wits, in that of analogical differences or contrarieties; and of plain historical men, in the kindred channels of contiguity of time, and contiguity of place; and of philosophical men, in that of cause and effect. These different tendencies

may originate in differences of constitution in body or mind, as phrenologists teach, and may be indicated by the conformation of the skull; but they are influenced to a certain extent by such causes as health or sickness, circumstances tending to produce cheerfulness or sadness, education, and habit.

When objects are recalled, they are recalled, as we found sensations were, with the pain or the pleasure, of whatever kind, that originally accompanied the perception of them. A person who has been scalded with boiling water, will ever after shrink at the sight of boiling water in a position in which it might fall upon him. A burnt child dreads the fire, because the sight of fire recals to him the pain of burning. But that pain or pleasure follows also that law of the remembrance of sensations, by which it becomes more faint on every succeeding suggestion of the object that occasioned it.

As it is in recalling sensations, so it is in recalling perceptions, that the more frequently the perception of one object recals another, or the more frequently the remembrance of one object recals another, the more certainly and the more promptly will the suggestion take · place. A fine example of this law we have in learning languages. Certain sounds are connected with certain objects by contiguity of time; the sound is pronounced at the same time that the object is perceived; it may require several repetitions of the sound in connection with the object, to render the suggestion prompt and certain; but, by frequent repetition, the suggestion becomes so certain and so immediate, that we almost forget that it is a suggestion. When one language is learned by the immediate connection of its sounds with the objects intended to be suggested by them, other languages may be learned by connecting the sounds of the two languages. But a language thus learned can never be learned so perfectly, as that which is learned by directly connecting the sounds with the objects. It

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has two suggestions to traverse before it arrives at its end, namely, the sounds of the second language suggesting those of the first, and the sounds of the first suggesting the objects indicated by them. Hence a language can never be perfectly learned but by residing for a time in a country where it is vernacular.

Another law of suggestion is illustrated in the acquisition of languages, namely, that sensations or perceptions suggesting one another in a particular order, may suggest one another in that order certainly and promptly; but very imperfectly, or not at all, in any other order. One who has learned a foreign language by translating it into his own, but who has not equally practised translating from his own into the foreign language, may readily understand what he reads or hears in the foreign language, and yet may not be able to express a single sentence in it. The words which may be perfectly familiar to him when he reads or hears them, may not occur to him in the reverse order of the suggestion from his own language to the foreign language. This is but another form of the fact formerly noticed, that we may be familiar with a tune and yet not be able to sing or recognise any two notes of it backward.

Another beautiful example of the law of suggestion is to be found in the facility, attained by practice, of reading, and understanding, and also of writing written language: certain visible marks are connected with certain sounds, and these sounds with certain sensations or perceptions, or relations of sensations and perceptions. Yet this double order of suggestions is made by repetition with so much certainty and promptitude, that we collect the sense of what is written almost as rapidly as the eye can run along the lines of a page. Perhaps a still more striking example of this law is the certainty and rapidity with which musical notation is understood, and the sounds indicated by it produced; for here there is frequently, as in organ and piano-forte playing, a succession,

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