"This time," said Massimo d'Azeglio, "this time, Your Majesty, we have made a fiasco-the next we will do better." And the King exclaimed: "Certainly, we will do better!"*

If, on the one hand, both King and Minister thus expressed themselves in their intimate conversations, on the other. political necessity required the hastening of the conclusion of the peace negotiations which were proceeding slowly and with difficulty, owing to the exorbitant demands of the Austrian Government. These negotiations took a more favorable turn towards the end of June, thanks to the Cabinets of London and of Paris, whose kindly interference put an end to the occupation of Alessandria by the Austrians. The treaty of peace was signed at Milan, on the 6th of August, 1849. But Cesare Balbo, who had reminded the King a few months earlier that Piedmont did not conclude peace with Austriaonly truces of ten years' duration, had been a true prophet. Less than ten years had passed, and the truce was already broken. The sacrifice which, in 1849, Victor Emmanuel had made out of love for Italy, whose real interests he divined, received its first recompense in 1859.

Even without entering into particulars, it were difficult to recall in narrow limits all that was achieved in this decade from 1849 to 1859 to affirm and to defend against all kinds of enemies liberal institutions in Piedmont, and to prepare the future of Italy. This short period represents the work of more than a century. They were years full of anxiety and bitterness for those who, deeply loving the great Italian cause, had reason to fear at every moment that it would be compromised by the ill-will of sects, or by the intolerance and excesses of parties. The young king had many an hour of deep anxiety. Never did he, however, lose the self-possession habitual to him, and that unerring coup d'ail which always made him see the best resolution to be taken in the true interest of the country. Even in the very darkest days he had a deep respect, almost a worship, for all the liberties guaranteed by the statute especially for the liberty of the press. He never allowed the slightest attempt against it, notwithstanding the *Massari, op. cit.

apparent dangers at home and the difficulties abroad which it caused him. He knew, however, how to be severe even at the cost of his popularity, when the good of the country required it. His proclamation of the 20th of November, 1849, known as the Proclamation of Moncalieri after the name of the village where it was signed, is one of many documents which prove that when silence would have been dangerous Victor Emmanuel feared not to speak the whole truth to the country without undue sparing of the extreme parties that compromised all generous and popular efforts.

Twenty days elapsed between the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the new elections, days of great emotion for the King and the country; but the country responded fully to the confidence placed in it by its sovereign. Public opinion was greatly divided as to this proclamation, a proclamation which even later called forth unfavorable sentiments. Now, however, opinion is unanimous in declaring with Count Cavour, who liked to repeat it many years later, that the Proclamation of Moncalieri saved Piedmont, and with Piedmont, Italy. On the other hand, court intrigues and the manœuvres of the diplomats required all the King's foresight and energy. What painful moments for him when it was feared, when it was said already, that France would unite with Austria against liberty!

After Napoleon's coup-d'état, reaction waxed stronger in Europe; the King of Prussia took immediate advantage of it to enjoin on the young Italian king the abolition of constitutional guarantees. But Victor Emmanuel did not belie his noble character; his only answer to these threats was a despatch of the 10th of December, 1851, signed by Massimo d'Azeglio. We shall content ourselves with quoting only the beginning and the end:

“By an indirect but very respectable medium the sovereigns of Austria and of Prussia have given to the King, our August Sovereign, the advice of adopting the same line of policy as that of the other Italian States, making him understand, under the apparent form of a threat, that he might otherwise have cause to repent of his persistence in following his present system of policy. His Majesty cannot refrain from remarking that the

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political state of the countries governed by the two sovereigns who address this kind of summons, seems to him to demand counsels far more than to give them the right to offer any themselves. The King added that, besides, he was master in his own States, that he did not interfere in what the other sovereigns thought fit to do, that he, on his side, wished to have perfect freedom of action; he again expressed his entire confidence in the efforts which he would continue to make for the wise and moderate course of his government."

At this time appeared the Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia, by the Abbé Gioberti. The Coup-d'Etat had just added importance to this book, which, deeply meditated in the great philosopher's melancholy solitude, was quite a political divination. The second volume was a prophecy. Speaking of the part played by Piedmont and its king, Gioberti sketched the plan and, relating beforehand what would happen, said:

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'The cry of Italian unity, rendered more powerful by a strong army capable of making it live and of ruling it, and a generous appeal to the people and communes, will give the King of Sardinia a power superior to that of Charles Albert in the happiest days of the year 1848. I should say that I utterly despair, were it not for the young prince who governs Piedmont. He vows that he loves liberty, and his fame for truthfulness gives value to his words. He loves glory, and what glory could be greater than that which would accrue to him who should give spirit and life to the first amongst nations?”

Victor Emmanuel, after reading these pages attentively, was several times heard to exclaim: "I am resolved on doing what Gioberti says. I am ready and decided. The future is in the hands of God!" Nearly a year later (on the 25th of October, 1852), died suddenly at Paris this man, whose encouragement and advice had always been so useful to the young king, and who, as a writer even more than as a minister, had done so much good to the Italian cause.

A week after Gioberti's death, Victor Emmanuel called Count Cavour to the head of the government. Two years before, on the 11th October, 1850, Cavour had for the first time entered the Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture and of Commerce. On that occasion the King said to d'Azeglio, who had proposed Cavour: "Take care what you are about;

Cavour will soon get the upperhand of you all. He will send you away, and he himself will be Prime-Minister."

By Cavour's nomination as Premier, a few days after Gioberti's death, the King intended proving to all Italy that the grand idea of the author of the Rinnovamento had not gone down into the grave with him. It was a bold and decisive step, but no less well-pondered than the others. Victor Emmanuel felt that all that had been done during the last four years by the other princes of Italy to stifle all patriotic feeling in the Peninsula, in the hope that Piedmont and its king would at last be swallowed up in the general reaction, had led principally to attracting towards the latter the eyes, the hearts and the aspirations of all Italian patriots. His fine intuition taught him that the time was come for giving up the policy of patient expectation, the prudent reserve which he had imposed upon himself, and for beginning the execution of Count de Cavour's bold plans.

From the first day that Cavour took the reins of government, his programme was Italy and Victor Emmanuel. The only means which he made use of to conceal the fact that he labored unceasingly for the realization of this programme was that of declaring it openly. He himself often exclaimed: "The more I speak the truth, the less is it believed:-this is the whole secret of my policy."

The formula "Italy and Victor Emmanuel" could easily be understood by the people, for it clearly defined what it contained: freedom from foreign intervention; the liberal constitution of the kingdom, and the sacrifice of municipal prejudices to the unity of the country. All this could be obtained only under the patronage of a king who, by his honesty and patriotism, had already known how to win the confidence of all Italians, and by the authority of his name and the ancient and respected escutcheon of his House was able to shield Italy against Europe, and induce the latter to keep silent when it was not inclined to approve.

Let us confess it: Victor Emmanuel was fortunate in being surrounded at the beginning of his reign, at his age and in such circumstances, by men such as Balbo, Pinelli, Gioberti,

d'Azeglio, Siccardi, Della Marmora, Cavour, to mention only the greatest; but these men, and more especially Cavour, had the still greater fortune to find a king of a type so rare, nay, unique in history, a king who greatly facilitated their task; who was ever ready to abide by all the consequences of the principle written on his banner, and who never refused to go where he was led by the logic of his preceding acts. The beacon which directed him amidst the heaving waves of the political ocean was the liberation of Italy. When the most prudent advised him to stop, his conscience bade him go forward with the boldest.

This is not the place for speaking of Count Cavour's home policy. It would lead us too far from the aim we have in view in these brief pages. Still, it is well to bear in mind that but for this wise and firm policy, which, by winning every day more and more the sympathies of all intelligent and liberal minds, inspired the enemies of liberal institutions with unwilling respect, never would Piedmont have attained the position which it was soon able to take in the face of Europe. The confidence secured from France and England, which was but the consequence of that far-sighted policy, induced those two powers to brave the ill-will of Austria and Germany by admitting, in 1855, small Piedmont into the alliance concluded with Turkey against Russia. On the fifteenth of the following month of August, the tricolored Italian flag with the Cross of Savoy waved on the same line with the French eagles and the British lions; and the Italian blood which reddened the waters of the Tchernaya signed the credentials with which Cavour presented himself at the Paris Congress in 1856 and pleaded the cause of Italy.

This was a master-stroke. Well could Cavour say in those very days before the Chamber of Deputies: "Now the cause of Italy is brought before the tribunal of public opinion, to which, according to a memorable saying of the French Emperor, belongs the passing of the final sentence. Perhaps the struggle will be long, but I feel confident that the final issue will be worthy of the justice of the cause."

History, when recalling the Congress of Paris, will