that the greater economy of railways had been proved. Because the Liverpool and Manchester Railway was considered as a brilliant success was no reason to conclude that experience would confirm this result in every other instance; and, partly in support of this vague hope of being able to compete with the railways, and partly in the expectation that Parliament would protect them from ruin, the canals offered strenuous resistance to the authorization of the railway1.

The third class from which opposition was encountered by the railway included the coach proprietors, waggon masters and postmasters, the amount of whose business was likely to be seriously reduced by the new means of conveyance. Before the line had been put in operation between Liverpool and Manchester, there were about twenty-two regular coaches on that road; but, by the beginning of the year 1831, almost all these stage coaches had been laid aside, and soon the railway was carrying about three times as many passengers as had formerly patronized the coaches2. This apparently inevitable decline of road carriage of passengers and goods induced the proprietors engaged in this business to resist the establishment of the new enterprise which was destined to destroy their means of support; but, probably because they were not backed by the large amount of wealth that was available for the landowners and the canal proprietors, their claims seem to have commanded but little public attention. An interesting case of such opposition, in 1833, comes to us in the form of a petition to the House of Lords from those who were carrying on these undertakings on the lines of road between London, Worcester, Hereford and Gloucester; they requested the Lords to protect their interests by rejecting all applications for railroads in general, and particularly the Liverpool and Birmingham and Birmingham and London railways3. It would be but natural that the owners of these vehicles along the same or parallel lines of road should oppose the formation of a railway which would take away their business; but why those should oppose it whose line of activity was more or less in the opposite direction, is by no means so clear.

In addition to neutralizing the arguments of their enemies, the railway company put forward some other strong reasons in favour of their

1 Birmingham Journal, Mar. 5, 1831, p. 3, “On Railways."

2 Birmingham Journal, Feb. 5, 1831, p. 2, letter from "A Railway Subscriber," on the London and Birmingham Railway; 'London and Birmingham Railway Bill. Extracts from the Minutes of Evidence given before the Committee of the Lords on this Bill,' evidence of Henry Booth (treasurer of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company), pp. 54-55.

Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian, May 11, 1833, p. 2, "Coaches v.

Railway."

project. As the landowners had profited from the construction of the Liverpool and Manchester line, and some who formerly were very active against that enterprise were now as strongly in favour of it, so it would be to the advantage of estate owners in this other section to have the midland metropolis connected with London. The hostility of the landlords was, therefore, ill-advised. Not only would the railway add to the value of their property, but the proximity of larger and better markets for farm produce would give the tenants higher prices for what they had to sell, and thus render them more prosperous. A few hours at the most would suffice to carry fatted animals from their pastures to Smithfield, without their losing in weight or being injured, as at present, by drovers. The railway would supply the metropolis market better, and with more facility and regularity, from a distance of eighty miles, than at present from the neighbouring districts; and the steady market would be a boon for agriculture, while providing steadier employment for labour. The expenditure of millions upon this work would lighten the burden of poor rates and prove beneficial to the country through which the railway would be carried1. The passenger fares would be reduced from the coach fares of 4d. per mile inside and 24d. per mile outside, to 2d. and 11d. per mile respectively on the railway; and this would be the accompaniment of a rate of speed double that of the average speed of coaches. Corresponding reduction in the time and expense of the carriage of goods was anticipated. To placate the owners of coaching establishments, it was shown that, instead of there being less work for coaches, there would be more after the railway were put in operation. Doubtless, the construction of the railway would cause the coaches along that line to be set aside; but throughout a belt of many miles in width on each side of it, numerous cross coaches would be immediately established to meet the railway at important stations according to the convenience of passengers. For example, the many steamboats connecting London, Dover and Calais had increased, rather than diminished, the number of post-horses on the Dover road3; and evidence was given before a committee of the House of Commons to the effect that while, before the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the coaching business on the main

1 Birmingham Journal, Feb. 5, 1831, p. 3, letter from "A Subscriber to the London and Birmingham Railway."

2 Birmingham Journal, Jan. 22, 1831, p. 1, on the London and Birmingham Railway. According to this writer the carrying of goods by the fly vans was done at the rate of five miles per hour and at a cost of at least 9d. per ton per mile, while the railway would carry them at fifteen or more miles per hour.

3 Birmingham Journal, Feb. 5, 1881, p. 2, letter from "A Railway Subscriber," on the London and Birmingham Railway.

road between these two termini was carried on by 400 horses belonging to Liverpool proprietors and 400 to Manchester proprietors, after the opening of that line, although coaches soon ceased to run on the direct road, there was such a great increase on the cross roads that the proprietors at Manchester, by 1834, had 800 horses employed and the demand was still increasing1. The safety, certainty and rapidity of conveyance were of themselves sufficient to recommend the railway in preference to any other means of carriage2.

In 1830 a Bill was introduced into Parliament seeking authority to construct a railway between these two termini; but the strong opposition which was manifested against this measure, especially by several of the great landowners3 and the canal companies along the route, but also by proprietors of coaching establishments and turnpike trustees, caused the failure of the Bill to pass in the session of 1831-2. As was the case in the promotion of the railway from Birmingham to Liverpool, so also in this case, there was the existence of two separate companies which were later merged into one before the Act of Parliament was passed to sanction the undertaking. The defeat in 1832 was made the occasion of greater earnestness and the supporters of this scheme got together to inquire into the reasons for their failure and to devise more effective measures for securing their ends. In addition to foes without, the company had to meet and harmonize internal dissension. Some of the subscribers to the undertaking had made their subscriptions and signed the contract deed, in 1830, on the assumption that this line would connect with the projected

1 See summary of this evidence in Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian, Mar. 29, 1834, p. 2.

2 Birmingham Journal, Mar. 5, 1831, p. 3, “Public Meeting to Support Railways." 3 In addition to foregoing references, see also Brit. Mus. 1890. c. 9 (5). Stretton, History of the London and Birmingham Railway, shows the opposition of the Earl of Clarendon and the Earl of Essex.

4 In addition to previously-mentioned references, see Remarks upon Pamphlet by Investigator on the Proposed Birmingham and London Railway. “Investigator" evidently represented the canal interests and he had tried to show the evils that would be caused by the railway. See also Brit. Mus. T. 1371. (18), the writer of which was apparently a canal proprietor, since the pamphlet presents that side of the case. It was entitled, 'The Probable Effects of the London and Birmingham Railway.' Since it is impossible to get too clear a view of the way in which railways were regarded at the time of their introduction, the contents of this pamphlet are worthy of perusal.

5 Birmingham Journal, Feb. 12, 1831, p. 2, for example, shows the opposition of the trustees of the Dunchurch and Stonebridge road to the proposed railway. • Birmingham Journal, Sept. 21, 1833, p. 3, on "London and Birmingham Railway;" Manchester Guardian, April 7, 1832, p. 1, on “London and Birmingham Railway."

Liverpool and Birmingham Railway; but the latter had been abandoned, and, therefore, the whole situation was changed. It would seem, too, that the directors of the company that was formed by a union of the former two concerns had changed the plans for the railway and increased the estimated cost of the line without submitting these plans to a general meeting for approval. Many of the subscribers had requested the directors to publish a full and authentic report of the condition and prospects of the company, and afterward to convene a general meeting of the shareholders to take action as to what should be done; but all they had received was a circular giving a few loose details. Because of these conditions, those who were dissatisfied, including a number of the great landlords, sent a petition to the House of Commons requesting that they might be released from their obligations and not be considered as subscribers to the present undertaking1. Earlier in the year 1832 there had been a meeting of the owners and occupiers of land along the proposed course of the railway, at which there appeared to be agreement among those present that the railway as planned would depreciate the value of their property, and they, therefore, decided to protest against the granting of an Act of Parliament2. What was the outcome of this discord we need not trace; suffice it to say that by midsummer of that year the company issued its new prospectus, showing the public the advantages to be gained by this proposed railway, in opening up new sources of supplies of provisions for the metropolis, in facilitating and cheapening travel, in providing rapid and economical interchange of the great articles of consumption, and in connecting London with Liverpool and the great manufacturing sections of Lancashire and the Midlands. Once more application was made to Parliament and Lord Wharncliffe, the chairman of the parliamentary committee to which this measure was submitted for examination and report, asserted that in his long experience in Parliament he had never seen a measure passed by either House that was supported by evidence of a more decisive character. But,

1 This petition is given in full in Manchester Guardian, April 7, 1832, p. 1. It shows that the estimated expense of the railway was at first £1,500,000, but in 1832 it was £2,500,000.

2 Manchester Courier, Feb. 4, 1832, p. 3, on "London and Birmingham Railway." 3 This announcement or prospectus is given in full in Manchester Guardian, July 7, 1832, p. 1, and also in 'Collection of Prospectuses, etc.,' p. 61. It refers to the great success of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. This line would connect with that to be constructed from Birmingham to Liverpool, and through the port of Liverpool it would furnish rapid connexion between Ireland and London. See also Brit. Mus. 1890. c. 9 (5), and "Statement of the Case in support of the London and Birmingham Railway Bill," as given in 'Collection of Prospectuses, etc.,' p. 74.

notwithstanding this, the Bill was thrown out, owing chiefly to the opposition of the landowners, who feared that their estates would be prejudiced or injured by the railway. This failure had resulted after £32,000 had been expended on the application, but still the company was not deterred in their efforts. Subsequent changes were made in the line in order to avoid the properties of two of the nobility who had strongly opposed it and to keep at a considerable distance from the town of Northampton1. With these alterations, the line was regarded favourably at the company's third application and the Act was passed in 1833. In 1837, the first section of the line was opened between London and Tring2, but it was not until the following year that the whole line was opened3. By this railway and what were later its north-western connexions, there was established a complete communication from London to Birmingham and from Birmingham to Liverpool; but we must remember that, at this time, these were entirely separate roads, not working in harmony, and, therefore, there was no through rate nor through traffic.

A few facts regarding the finances of this railway may be appropriately given. In 1830, when the line was being agitated, it was computed that the amount paid by passengers and parcels conveyed by coaches between London and Birmingham exceeded £300,000 a year, and that paid for the carriage of goods between the same places exceeded £500,000 a year. The expense of building the railway upon the best possible plan was estimated not to exceed £1,500,000; so that one-fourth of the amount paid for the conveyance of passengers and goods would be ample remuneration on the capital to be spent on the construction of the railway. But soon the plans were changed and the estimated cost was augmented, so that in the company's original Act of incorporation the capital was stated at £2,500,000. By later Acts, the company was empowered to raise a capital in shares and on loans amounting to £4,500,000; but by 1839 even this sum had been

1 Stretton, History of the London and Birmingham Railway. The announcement of the directors of the railway in 1833 is given in 'Collection of Prospectuses, etc.,' p. 65. It showed the advantage of the railway in regard to safety, expedition and economy, and the benefits that would accrue to London and the public generally. The change of front of many landlords is apparent in the testimony that was given before the committee that had this Bill for consideration, and those who had formerly opposed railways were now favourable to them (see 'Great Western Railway. Evidence on the London and Birmingham Railway Bill,' especially the evidence of Mr Earle, Mr Joseph Pease, and Mr J. Moss).

2 The Times, Oct. 21, 1837, p. 2, on the London and Birmingham Railway Company.

3 Stretton, op. cit.

Brit. Mus. 1890. c. 9 (5).