of adequate reports as to the condition of the various companies, the decisions of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade, which, after 1844, had to sanction every new railway project before it was authorized by Parliament, and the gambling spirit which was prevalent in the early years of the establishment of railways1.

In the third place, there were some phases of railway operation which were objectionable from the standpoint of the companies and of the public. In the internal organization of the companies, there was for more than twenty years an imperfect definition of the authority of the various officials, so that responsibility for errors could not be fixed; reports were not rendered to the higher officials frequently enough for their guidance; there was lack of discipline in carrying out regulations and orders; the desire for economy went so far that the road was under-manned, or else the repairs and alterations were deficient in amount or defective in the quality of materials used; and in cases of accident or irregularity there was a lack of individual responsibility, since the heads of departments did not know to whom to look for instructions2. Competition brought some of the railways almost to the verge of ruin and entailed much loss to those whose funds were invested in these enterprises; and even after different lines had entered into working agreements with one another, these agreements became so intricate and chaotic that constant disputes were inevitable. Nothing was more common than to see a company eagerly seeking authority to make a branch which could only bring it loss, but which, it was feared, would cause still greater loss if it fell into the hands of a rival1. In some cases the companies ran a greater number of trains than the traffic warranted, or carried traffic, for the time being, at unremunerative rates in order to take it away from their rivals. The time-tables show that, on the great routes, passenger trains moved about as regularly as the coaches had done formerly on the roads, the aim being to provide such conveniences of travel as would take the trade from the coaches. This excess of accommodation was neither warranted by public necessities nor remunerative to the railways, and through the

1 On the subject of price fluctuations of railway shares, see Marshall, Railway Legislation, pp. 10–12, 34–36; Brit. Mus. 1396. g. 21, 'Railways and the Board of Trade,' 3rd ed., pp. 24-40; The Times, Jan. 16, 1843, p. 5, giving a table of the fluctuations of railway shares during the year 1842, which showed wide variations of prices.

2 McDonnell, Railway Management, pp. 1-23.

* Cotterill, The Past, Present and Future Position of the London and North Western, and Great Western Railway Companies, p. 31; Civis (pseud.), The Railway Question, p. 11.

Ibid., p. 11.

formation of working agreements of one kind or another they gradually learned to reduce the unnecessary expenditure incurred in this way1. At first, too, there was the desire on the part of the companies to cater more carefully to the first-class passengers and to neglect to some extent the third-class passengers. The former were provided with good coaches; their trains were run at good speed, with as few delays as possible, and with the best connexions. On the other hand, the third-class passengers were poorly provided with coach accommodation; during the early years, the third-class coaches were open to all changes of weather; they were attached close to the engine, and the smoke and cinders from the engine were a source of great annoyance to the passengers; these cars were not run nearly as often as those of the higher classes along the same line and they were run at inconvenient hours; they were subjected to frequent and sometimes long delays, and it was aggravating for these passengers to lie on sidings while the first-class trains went speeding by. Not uncommonly the third and second-class passengers reached a junction point and then found that they would either have to stay there for some time or else pay the higher fares in order to proceed immediately in first-class coaches to their destination2. It would seem as if the object of the railway companies was to compel passengers to give up third-class and go first-class; for even second-class passengers received but meagre consideration on some lines. That the monopoly of the railway company was used to the detriment of the public is evident from the current testimony of the time3, and from the fact that Parliament was desirous of having working agreements, amalgamations, leases, etc., sanctioned by the authority of the legislature and subject to their jurisdiction and control. Many were in favour of giving up the principle of competition

1 Marshall, Railway Legislation, pp. 15, 50-51.

2 In addition to the references given on this subject when we were considering railway amalgamations and working agreements, see Galt, Railway Reform (1844), pp. 14-18; ibid. (1865), pp. xvii, 34–35; Brit. Mus. 8235.c. 72, 'Railway Management,' pp. 8–9; Young, Steam on Common Roads, pp. 71–84, showing the discomforts and indignities of third-class passengers; The Times, Nov. 3, 1837, p. 5, letter from "A Passenger;" ibid., Sept. 22, 1843, p. 6, letter from “A Second-class Traveller;" ibid., July 2, 1844, p. 6, letter from "A Commercial Man;" also other letters to the same effect in ibid., Aug. 22, 1844, p. 6; Aug. 27, 1844, p. 6; Aug. 28, 1844, p. 6; Sept. 26, 1844, p. 7. In ibid., Sept. 20, 1844, p. 6, a letter from J. L. Ramsden, F.R.S., who held a great number of shares in the London and South Western, showed how little attention was paid to second and third-class passengers on his line.

Galt, Railway Reform (1865), pp. 34-36. On the abuse of railway monopoly, see also Parl. Papers, 1857-8 (0.77), xv, 11, 'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire, and Great Northern Railway Companies.'

as applied to railways and of having agreements entered into wherever possible; but after seeing the early results of monopoly those who advocated working agreements did so because they wanted to see greater unity of action, greater economy and improved accommodation, under some parliamentary supervision which would guard the public interests1. These, and other accompaniments of the extension of the railways, together with the political effects in securing what was called a "Railroad Parliament," were certainly fraught with a power for evil2; and yet many of them were imputable to the newness of the system, to the universal ignorance of its tendencies, and to the wonderful suddenness of its growth. Looked at from the distant point of view which the present affords, we can see that these evils were but incidents in the rapid expansion that was taking place.

From the foregoing, it is not difficult to decide why many railways were unprofitable enterprises, so far as their owners were concerned. With the payment of very high charges in order to secure the act of incorporation, and often exorbitant prices for land and compensation, followed by the great extravagance in the management of the companies' funds; the costly construction and equipment which greatly exceeded the needs of traffic; the extraction of funds by dishonest officials, and the expenditures for ostentation rather than utilitythese, and the disastrous results of early competition, must have proved to be a burden, for some of the railways, that was hard to endure. For example, we learn that the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, during the first fourteen years of its activity, scarcely paid a fraction of a dividend on the amount of the original stock3. Even some of the main lines paid but low rates of interest upon the capital expended, for, in addition to the above-mentioned disabilities, they frequently had, in self defence, to link up with themselves certain branch lines of railway or canal, which, instead of being feeders to the

1 Marshall, Railway Legislation, pp. 52–60; Galt, Railway Reform (1865), p. 36, showing that, under existing conditions, occasionally one company paid another a large sum of money if the latter would refrain from competition. Civis (pseud.), The Railway Question, pp. 15–17, said that there was a feeling gaining ground that the roads of the country were properly the dominion of the state; and that to secure harmony of interests for the public good, the companies should admit a more regular and extensive exercise of state control.

2 Whitmore, Letter to Lord John Russell on Railways (1847), pp. 9-10. We have not given a full account of all the evils that accompanied this period of great advance, but have mentioned the most significant of them. Some others were almost entirely imaginary (P., Descant on Railroads); and others still were more or less unsubstantial (Jeans, op. cit., Ch. xII). See also Gordon, Observations on Railway Monopolies, pp. 1-55.

3 Handyside, Review of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, p. 4.

main lines, proved rather to be suckers, withdrawing funds from the treasury of the main lines in order to pay interest to the claimants upon the branch lines1. Among the early railways in the north of England, there seems to have been quite a number that paid either no dividend at all or else but a very small return, and many of these were in the very centre of the industrial and mining section, especially in the county of Durham2. A writer, with intimate knowledge of the railways, has given us in 1854 the dividends paid by the fifty-nine railway companies of England and Wales for the first half of that year; and working this out upon the annual basis, we find that, of this number, fifteen paid no dividend, thirty-four paid dividends from less than one per cent. to less than five per cent., five paid dividends of five to six per cent. inclusive, and five paid dividends of seven to ten per cent. inclusive3. There is no reason to suppose that the year 1854 was anything but an ordinary year, for by that time the country had recovered from the mania of 1844-6 and was again going on its normal way. With forty-nine out of fifty-nine railways, or eightythree per cent., paying less than five per cent. per annum, it would appear that the number of companies which secured reasonable remuneration on invested capital was small in comparison with the number of those which fell below the reasonable minimum. But although many of the railways were not profitable to their owners in yielding large financial returns they may still have been beneficial to the public in providing for the necessities and conveniences of traffic.

When considering the subject of roads, we noted the fact that, before 1830, the consolidation that had taken place in the turnpike trusts was not the consolidation of those which formed continuous lines of road, but of those that were found in particular counties, or parts of counties, such as those in the vicinity of London or Bristol. But in the case of canals, the small amount of consolidation that had taken place was the merging of those which were parts of a continuous line of navigation. The amalgamation of the railways followed closely the type of that of the canals, not of the roads, by the formation of

1 Young, Steam on Common Roads, p. 67; Galt, Railway Reform (1865), p. 36; Civis (pseud.), The Railway Question, p. 11.

2 Jeans, op. cit., p. 171, mentions some of them.

3 Chattaway, op. cit., p. 20. Here, also, he gives the average dividends that were paid during the period 1850-4.

4 Such as the consolidation of the Birmingham and Bilston Canal with the Birmingham and Tamworth, in 1783; the Trent and Mersey with the Oxford and Coventry canals, in 1785; the Chester and Ellesmere canals, in 1813; the Grand Junction and Regent's canals, in 1819; and the North Wilts Canal with the Beks and Wilts, in 1821.

adjoining railway lines into great through routes. Why should the roads have been different in this respect from the canals and railways? The answer would seem to lie in the fact that the control was different. The canals and railways were in the hands of private companies, which, under their several Acts, were given authority to construct and operate their transportation facilities in the several counties or districts through which they passed; but the turnpikes were under the authority of the Justices of the counties, and it would have been almost impossible to get several successive counties to work harmoniously in the proper maintenance of great through roads, such as that from London to Holyhead, or that from London to York.

From the foregoing outline of the railway systems of England we are impressed by the similarity of their position with that of the ancient. Roman roads, and also with that of the turnpike and canal systems which played so important a rôle. It was because of this juxtaposition of the turnpikes, canals and railways that the subject of competition between them assumed so conspicuous a place in the public mind, and to this we now turn.