the last coach was driven off this road1. Before the railways could cause the coaches to give up the struggle they had to reduce their charges to a point almost equal to the fares of the coaches; and any slight excess of railway fares above that point was sufficient to bring back the coaches on some of the roads. If railway companies had charged as much as the law allowed, their lines would have been comparatively deserted in most cases, for they would have been used almost exclusively by the opulent classes; but by putting down their charges to an approximate equality with those of the coaches they diverted to the rail all through traffic and most of the local coaching business along lines of road which were near to and parallel with the railways. The decrease in the amount of coaching was accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the amount of posting along these roads. Stage Coach Office (v. Proceedings of the Great Western Railway, evidence of Mr Sutherland, p. 39).

The number of coaches licensed and the number of journeys performed along the main western highway, in 1884, before the Great Western Railway was built, were as follows:

1 Galt, Railway Reform (1844), p. 7; Brit. Mus. 8235. ee. 4 (1), 'Oxford and Didcot Railway Bill,' pp. 5–6.

* Galt, Railway Reform (1844), p.7; Young, Steam on Common Roads, p. 84; The Times, Dec. 7, 1843, p. 6.

3 In Railway Times, v (1842), pp. 639-40, 711, 973, we find a comparison of travel by railways and coaches showing the vast change that had been effected by the

We must bear in mind that this was a period of transition, and like all other similar periods was fraught with disaster to those upon whom the burden rested most heavily. Perhaps the classes that suffered most were the proprietors of coaching establishments and the innkeepers along the great roads. The latter class found their inn and posting business rapidly declining1; and the papers of the time contained the advertisements of whole coaching and carrying establishments that were selling out. Through many years the coach-masters had endeavoured to provide facilities for a greatly increasing amount of travel and had, in some cases, many hundreds of horses; but when the railway came and took the passenger traffic from these great roads we can easily understand that ruin seemed to stare them in the face3. introduction of the railways. The last of the coaches between London and Cambridge made its final journey on Oct. 25, 1845 (The Times, Oct. 29, 1845, p. 5). The opening of the railway from Salisbury to Bishopstoke was the signal for the withdrawal of the coaches which went through Andover, which, but a few years before, numbered about forty daily (The Times, Mar. 12, 1847, p. 6).

1 The Times, Dec. 14, 1843, p. 5, "Turnpike v. Railway."

2 The Times, Sept. 28, 1837, p. 1, gives three such advertisements; ibid., Oct. 21, 1837, p. 1, gives two advertisements; etc.

3 Some idea of the great traffic that centred in London may be gathered from a table (v. 'Collection of Prospectuses, Maps, etc., of Railways and Canals,' p. 80) showing the number of coaches licensed in 1837 to run between London and many other places, the number of passengers carried, and the weekly receipts from these licenses. From the table we take the following data to show the extent of the coaching business between London and the north:

The traffic from London to the Eastern Counties is well represented by a diagram

This was particularly true, of course, concerning those in the great centres, notably London. It would be erroneous, however, to suppose that the decline or the disappearance of the country innkeepers on the important thoroughfares was due entirely to the advent of the railway; as a matter of fact, many of them were gradually eliminated before this time, on account of the necessity of the coaches making fewer stops as they developed greater and greater speed1. Nor was the picture of the disappearance of the coaches entirely unrelieved by a brighter aspect. It is, doubtless, true that along the main roads, where they were in competition with the railways, the coaches were soon taken off; yet the increase of business brought by the railroads, not only at their stations but also on the country roads leading to the stations, caused a greater demand for the labour of horses in the carriage of passengers and goods. We have ample proof of this from the increase in the number of such vehicles that were licensed3. We may, therefore, say that a decrease of coach traffic along roads that were adjacent and more or less parallel to the railway, which meant almost annihilation to some proprietors of coaches, was only the forerunner of greater business of this kind when once the readjustment in the Appendix to Vol. Ix of the Brit. Doc. for 1839, showing the gradual diminution of the amount of passenger travel from London to the towns farther east:

The number of stage coaches from London to West Ham and Stratford was 62. The number of stage coaches from West Ham and Stratford to Romford was 41 and 2 mails.

The number of stage coaches from Romford to Brentwood was 36 and 2 mails. The number of stage coaches from Brentwood to Chelmsford was 32 and 2 mails.

Bearing in mind that some coach proprietors conducted the traffic on several of the chief roads where the density of travel was fully as great as the aforementioned, it is not hard to see what the sweeping away of all this business would mean to such establishments.

1 Herepath's Railway Magazine, N.S., vi, p. 463, letter of Joseph Lockwood. 2 Brit. Doc. 1839 (295), Ix, 369, 'Report of Select Committee on Railroads ;' also ibid., Minutes of Evidence of Mr Macadam. Both of these references give us to understand that the increase on the lateral lines was not at all commensurate with the loss on the principal lines. This may have been the immediate effect in some cases, but it certainly was not the ulterior effect. On the increase in the number of horses and vehicles that were used on the cross roads tributary to the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, see Godwin, Appeal to the Public on Railways, p. 40; Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian, Mar. 29, 1834, p. 2, evidence of Mr Langston, of Manchester; Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, April 19, 1834, p. 4, Committee on the Great Western Railway Bill. See also Brit. Mus. 8235. ee. 4 (1), 'Oxford and Didcot Railway Bill,' evidence of Mr Sadler, p. 6, and Herepath's Railway Magazine, N.S., vi, p. 461.

3 Railway Times, vi (1843), p. 443, statement of the Earl of Hardwicke, on the "Effect of Railways." He gives accurate statistics to substantiate this fact.

was effected1. Mention must also be made of the fact that one of the largest coaching establishments in London, and we cannot say how many more, became an ally of the railway to act as collectors and distributors of goods at the terminus2.

As a result, it was said, of the competition between the railways and the turnpike roads for the traffic of the country, which, in many cases, was accompanied by a great decrease or total decline of traffic on the turnpikes parallel with the railways, we find constant complaints from the turnpike trusts that their tolls were diminishing because of the diminution of posting and stage coach business3. It must be borne in mind that the trusts depended mainly upon the passenger traffic for their revenues. On account of this decrease of revenues, the debts of the trusts were constantly increasing, for it was the prevailing practice to convert the unpaid interest into principal, by the trustees giving interest-bearing bonds to cover the full amount. That there was a great increase in the debts of the trusts is beyond dispute, as is also the fact that the debt was increased through the consolidation with it of interest that was in arrears5. The continuation of this practice, of 1 This is well exemplified in the Earl of Hardwicke's statement in the preceding reference.

2 Railway Times, Iv (1841), p. 209, showing that the Grand Junction Railway Co. had employed Chaplin and Horne for some time as their agents in London to unload and deliver goods. It is probable that few of the coaching firms were fortunate enough to attach themselves to the railways in this way.

3 Brit. Doc. 1837 (456), xx, 291, Minutes of Evidence of Mr Hall. Also 1839 (295), IX, 369, 'Report of Select Committee on Railroads,' and Minutes of Evidence of Messrs Bicknell, Levy and Macadam. On the reduction of traffic and tolls on particular roads, see Railway Times, v (1842), pp. 18, 21; but on the roads as a whole the tolls had apparently increased (ibid., vi, p. 448).

4 Brit. Doc. 1833 (24), xv, 409, 'Second Report of Select Committee on Turnpike Trusts.' The Committee "contemplate with alarm the results of the great and increasing debt on many roads." Statistics to prove this are given in ibid.,

'Minutes of Evidence,' pp. 174-5.

From Brit. Doc. 1886 (547), XIX, 335, 'Report of Select Committee on Turnpike Tolls and Trusts,' we learn that the trusts' debts at that time amounted to nearly £9,000,000, and that the probability was that they would constantly increase as in the past. See also 'Report of Select Committee of 1839' on the influence of railways on turnpike trusts, Brit. Doc. 1839 (295), Ix, 369, with evidence of Messrs Bicknell, Levy, and Macadam.

5 Brit. Doc. 1836 (547), XIX, 335, 'Report of Select Committee on Turnpike Tolls and Trusts,' states that several trusts were at that time insolvent because the amount of interest due annually was more than the amount of the annual income. Also Brit. Doc. 1839 (295), Ix, 369, 'Report of Select Committee on Railroads and Turnpike Trusts,' tells us that the debt then exceeded £9,000,000. Also ibid., evidence of Sir Jas. Macadam, who said that this policy prevailed very generally throughout the trusts of the kingdom, where interest payments could not be made. He said this was the chief cause for the increase of the bonded debt for some years

course, increased both the principal and the interest of the debt. But when we come to consider the additional reasons why the trusts' revenues were insufficient to keep up their interest payments we meet with a problem which involves several other factors than that of railroad competition.

In a former chapter we have seen that, in the management of many of these trusts, the funds were squandered by injudicious expenditures and keeping up official parasites who were incapable of accomplishing anything for the good of the roads from which they drew their salaries. The same thing was, doubtless, still prevalent, although the accounts of the trusts did not show it1. Then, too, the statute duty, or statute labour, was abolished in 18352, and also the composition in its place. This loss was estimated by Sir James Macadam, who had an intimate knowledge of the condition of the turnpikes, to amount to £200,000 a years. But, notwithstanding the abolition of the statute labour, in the administration of which there was much fraud, the financial condition of many trusts became worse and worse; and as a means toward obtaining economical and efficient management the consolidation of small trusts into larger trusts and of the larger trusts into unions of trusts was urged upon Parliament. This suggestion, of course, came

before that. This was very acceptable to creditors, in that it gave them additional security by a bond for the payment of their interest. His statement was that he knew some roads upon which there were sixty years' arrears of interest due.

1 Brit. Doc. 1836 (547), XIX, 335, ‘Report of Select Committee on Turnpike Tolls and Trusts.' The Committee put forth a plan that would be "useful in preventing any wasteful expenditure of funds in some trusts;" and although they do not expressly mention this form of extravagance, we are warranted, from what we have found hitherto, in saying that it still existed.

2 Act 5 & 6 William IV, c. 50.

Brit. Doc. 1839 (295), Ix, 369, 'Report of Select Committee on Railroads and Turnpikes ;' also ibid., evidence of Mr Macadam. See also Brit. Doc. 1837 (457), xx, 343, 'Minutes of Evidence,' p. 9 et seq.

Brit. Doc. 1839 (295), 1x, 369, 'Report of Committee on Railways and Turnpikes,' and evidence of Sir James Macadam.

5 The evidence was nearly unanimous that such consolidations would be desirable from many points of view: It would save the amounts now spent in salaries to officers of small trusts; it would give cheaper road materials by purchasing them in larger quantities; it would abolish the competition for such materials that was common among small trusts; and it would obtain an improved system of management by merging the small trusts into large trusts.

But there were also objections raised to the consolidation of such interests. Some trusts were in good circumstances, and were opposed to allying with those that were in debt. Then, the creditors of those trusts that had given good security were averse to the adoption of any measure likely to lessen their security, by uniting the solvent trust, to which they had advanced money, with one or more that were financially embarrassed. See Brit. Doc. 1836 (547), xix, 335, 'Report of Select