desirable1. The carriers who used both railway and canal conveniences carried the more valuable articles on the railway, and the cheaper freight, i.e., the more bulky and heavy commodities, by the canals, for the latter class generally did not require rapid transport. The private carriers who did nothing else than that work, and who had wellestablished facilities for the economical collection and distribution of traffic, asserted that it was not possible for the railway company to perform these services as acceptably and cheaply as themselves; but, of course, the railway company could develop just as good facilities if it were thought best to put the performance of these duties in their hands. There was another advantage in employing private carriers, in that they were responsible for the goods from the time they left the consignor until they reached the consignee; but the railway assumed no such responsibility2.

As we have seen, it was the intention of Parliament that railways should be on the same footing as canals and that railway proprietors should have similar rights to those of canal proprietors, that is, receiving tolls, but not carrying at all3. When this matter was under public discussion many of the carriers said that the only thing to do was to carry out the intention of Parliament and preserve competition by excluding the railway companies from carrying on their own lines. Others were in favour of suppressing the private carriers and giving all the work into the hands of the railways. Out of the mass of

1 Brit. Doc. 1840 (437), XIII, 181, 'Fourth Report on Railways,' evidence of Messrs Tibbits, Derham and Harnett (p. 24). The London and Birmingham Railway carried only through traffic.

2 Brit. Doc. 1844 (318), x1, 17, 'Fifth Report on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' Q. 3941. The personal relations of the private carriers with their patrons were a valued element in the conduct of business. Carriers allowed their customers from three to six months' credit; and permitted them to warehouse their goods, without charge, till they could conveniently send them to their destination. If any inconvenience were suffered and a complaint made to the carrier, the latter was always amenable and an answer was obtained. Even though this redress was sometimes tardy and not entirely satisfactory to the shipper, it was better than to be treated with indifference. On the contrary, it seems to have been the policy of the railways to be more overbearing. They required monthly settlements of bills. They did not allow goods to be left in their warehouses without the payment of storage charges. When complaints were made, the responsible railway official was so far removed from the complainant, and the company was so unresponsive, that unless the complainant had enough influence to enforce attention to his claim he could not depend upon receiving justice. Boyle, Hope for the Canals, pp. 17-18.

3 Brit. Doc. 1840 (299), x, 167, 'Third Report of Select Committee on Railways;' also Brit. Doc. 1840 (474), XIII, 189, 'Fifth Report on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' p. 40, Q. 959; etc.

4 On this whole question, see Brit. Doc. 1840 (299), XIII, 167, ‘Report and Evidence,' which deals very fully with it; also Brit. Doc. 1844 (318), x1, 17, ‘Minutes of Evidence,' p. 106 et seq. See also Appendix 14.

conflicting testimony, the Parliamentary Committee of 1839 came to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature in this respect could not be carried into effect in the way contemplated; for it was obvious that the payment of legal tolls was only a very small part of the arrangements that were necessary to open railroads to public competition, and the rest of the arrangements were wholly disadvantageous to the private carriers on the line. They decided that, upon grounds of safety and economy, there should be upon every railway one system of management, under one superintending authority, which should have the power of making and enforcing all regulations necessary to the proper conduct and maintenance of the traffic. Because of this, it was essential that the railway company should possess a complete control over their line of road, even though they should thereby acquire an entire monopoly of the means of conveyance1.

We have entered thus fully into this subject because it is one of the pivotal points in the competition of railways and canals, and because it is interesting to see how early, after the introduction of railways, it was recognized and settled that they were unlike most other enterprises in being essentially monopolistic. Later reports from parliamentary and other public bodies reiterated and emphasized this characteristic feature, and also the need for some general supervision and control so that the public might derive the utmost benefit from this natural monopoly2; but into this latter phase, that of railway control, it is not our purpose

to enter.

By what means did this monopoly power actually realize its monopoly, or, in other words, how did it drive the private carriers off the railway? In many cases the railway company gave no better terms to the carriers than to the occasional shipper, and so the carrying

1 Brit. Doc. 1839 (517), x, 1, ‘Second Report of Select Committee on Railways,' pp. vi-vii, xiii.

Another factor which contributed to the taking over of the carrying trade by the railway company was the systematic efforts of the carriers to secure advantage over the railway company by making false declarations as to the weights and descriptions of the goods that they loaded for carriage on the company's waggons. The London and North Western had to appoint a detective to see that their interests with reference to this were protected. In 1847, the next year after that company was formed, the system of toll carrying was abolished, and the railway company gradually began to carry directly for the public (v. Stevenson, Fifty Years on the London and North Western Railway, p. 17 et seq.). On this subject, see also Railway Times, IV, pp. 208-9, the affidavit of John Moss, and ibid., vII, p. 217, on "Railway Companies and Railway Carriers." Refer also to Appendix 14.

2 See, for instance, Brit. Doc. 1840 (299), XIII, 167; ibid. 1844 (166), XI, 5; ibid. 1845 (279), xxxix, 153; ibid. 1846 (200), XIII, 85.

trade became unremunerative1. For example, the company charged the carriers for the mere transport of a certain weight of goods over the line, independently of the collection and distribution of these goods, the same rates as were charged the public for the carriage and the additional services of collection and distribution2. This was sometimes put into effect against all the carriers on the line at once, and in other cases the carriers, one at a time, were compelled to suspend operations on account of the imposition of these practically prohibitive rates. Sometimes lower rates were quoted to some carriers than to others3, and in at least one case the railway company absolutely refused the use of its carriages to a certain carrier. It appeared that the company had made arrangements to carry goods for another firm of carriers only, by which that firm obtained a monopoly of the conveyance of goods along that line of road. A few years later, when this railway company allied its interests with others in the formation of the London and North Western, the latter company adopted the policy of being themselves the exclusive carriers on their line; but they retained an arrangement with Chaplin and Horne, who were probably the largest carriers into and out of London, to collect and distribute in London the goods going from and coming to that city by this railway5. During the tentative stages of

1 Brit. Doc. 1840 (437), XIII, 181, 'Fourth Report on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' p. 37, Q. 918. This was done by the Grand Junction Railway Company, which was engaged in carrying on the London and Birmingham Railway, as well as on their own, and on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway.

Brit. Doc. 1844 (318), x1, 17, 'Fifth Report of Select Committee on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' pp. 138-9. Also Brit. Doc. 1852–3 (170), xxxviii, 5, ‘Second Report on Railway and Canal Bills, Minutes of Evidence,' pp. 35-38, shows the means by which Kenworthy & Co., carriers, were driven off the canals and railways by the railway companies that got control of these canals.

* Brit. Doc. 1844 (318), xi, 17, 'Fifth Report on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' pp. 384 ff.; ibid. 1852–3 (170), xxxviii, 5, 'Second Report of Select Committee on Railway and Canal Bills, Minutes of Evidence' of Mr Pixton.

4 Willmore, Wollaston and Hodges, Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Queen's Bench, and upon Writs of Error from that Court to the Exchequer Chamber, and in the Bail Court, 1, pp. 578 ff., ex parte Robins and others. Messrs Robins, general carriers, made application in 1838 for a mandamus to compel the London and Birmingham Railway Company to carry the goods of the applicants; but the Court decided that, under the Act of incorporation, the company could not be compelled to carry all goods sent for conveyance and the application was refused.

5 Parl. Papers, 1857-8 (0.77), xv, 11, 'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire, and Great Northern Railway Companies Bill,' Q. 4683–4, 4901–16. Chaplin and Horne would not state exactly what their relation was with the London and North Western Railway. They had also close business relations with the London and South Western, and finally invested a considerable sum in that railway. Fay, A Royal Road, p. 28. It would

the development of the carrying trade, sometimes the railway company bought out the business of respectable carriers by payments that were much in excess of the real value; but even after the purchase was made some railways did not exclusively collect goods for themselves, but gave discounts and allowances for the collection and delivery of goods to and from the stations, and allowed a certain percentage for loading, unloading and invoicing, until it was discovered that frauds were being practised which tended to destroy the company's own carrying trade1. Under these conditions the tendency was for the company to eliminate the carriers entirely. But amid the variety of causes tending to take traffic from the carriers and give it to the railways was the growing conviction among the commercial classes that, because the railway company did not have to pay tolls on its own line, and the cost of locomotive power to it would be no greater than if furnished to a private carrier, therefore the railway company could do the carrying cheaper than any private carrier; and if either were to be stopped they would prefer to see the company left as carrier2. The railway company had so many advantages over any other carrier fulfilling this office along their line, that gradually it became the universal practice for them to do all this work, including the collection and distribution of the goods at their startingpoint and destination3.

It must not be concluded from what we have said that railway companies (except as regards passengers) superseded the old carriers at

seem that Chaplin and Horne were retained for this service on condition that they would cease carrying on the canals. Boyle, Hope for the Canals, p. 5. See also Whitehead, Railway Management, p. 7.

1 Nash, Railway Carrying and Carriers' Law, p. 75; also Railway Times, IV, pp. 208-9, and ibid., vII, p. 217.

2 Brit. Doc. 1844 (318), x1, 17, 'Minutes of Evidence,' p. 527 et seq.; also Brit. Mus. 8235. b. 57 (1), 'The Carriers' Case considered,' pp. 8-9. This was especially the case with the Grand Junction Railway Company, whose highest rate for the lightest articles of merchandise, up to April 1844, had been 5s. a cwt., but after that was 4s. a cwt., from London to Liverpool. Other carriers charged up to 6s. and 78. a cwt. Note the two examples given in footnote 3, p. 631. See also Brit. Doc. 1840 (437), XIII, 181, 'Fourth Report on Railways, Minutes of Evidence,' p. 37.

This conviction, however, was long in being established, and we find strong opposition, up to the middle of the century, against the oppressive and unjust conduct of the railway companies toward the carriers. Petitions were sent in by large and influential bodies of traders against the monopolistic policy of the railways to defeat fair competition. See Herepath's Railway and Commercial Journal, x1, pp. 585, 599. Also Appendix 14.

3 In all probability it is because the railways at this early time took over all the work of the carriers that to-day the English railways, unlike those of the United States and some other countries, do the collecting and distributing of the goods carried on their lines. Because of this, there is no need for such secondary concerns as Express Companies which we find in the United States.

once. Few of the carriers tried the experiment of running their own trains along the railway, and these few, for reasons already given, were forced to give up; but for some years a considerable part of the carrying business remained in the hands of the old firms1, who continued to collect goods from the public and to arrange for their safe delivery, employing the railway companies, which would give them access, to convey them along their lines. On certain railways, as we have already shown, this practice prevailed for some years exclusively; on others, from the first, the companies seem to have undertaken the business of general carriers for the public, as well as conveying for the carriers2.

Now that we have considered the organization of the carrying trade on the canals and on the railways, we are able to appreciate more fully the effects of the competition which occurred between these two rivals. In an earlier chapter of this work it was shown that before the introduction of the railways many canals had put up their rates, until, with their monopoly, some of them were making enormous profits. This fact is attested by the high market value of some shares, and by the large dividends obtained by the shareholders of certain canals3. In some cases, as soon as a railway was threatened and action taken toward that end, the adjacent canal, which had been deaf to all complaints, found it desirable to reduce its tonnage rates and to think

1 Pickford, Parker, Robins, Chaplin and Horne, etc. See the advertisement of Chaplin and Horne in Railway Times, vII (1844), p. 1447, showing that they forwarded goods by the various railways, "on their own account or as Agents of the Companies." Then they mentioned the different railway lines they used and the places in England to which they shipped.

Brit. Doc. 1840 (299), XIII, 167, 'Third Report on Railways,' p. 3; ibid. 1844 (318), XI, 17, 'Fifth Report on Railways,' Appendix No. 2, p. 22; ibid. 1881 (374), XIII, 1, 'Report of Select Committee on Railway Rates and Fares, Minutes of Evidence,' p. 573.

These large profits are reflected in the prices of some of the canal companies' shares; for example, the Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal shares (of the 'par value of £100) sold in 1810 for £735-50, and in 1829 for £810; the Grand Junction Canal shares sold in 1810 for £260-86, in 1825 for £330, and in 1828 for £315; the Trent and Mersey shares sold in June 1825 for £2150, in June 1828 for £3280, and in June 1829 for £3160. See the quotations of the share market in the Gentleman's Magazine for these various dates.

The rates of dividend paid are also a good indication of the profits reaped by some canals. In addition to those we have formerly noted, we may mention that in 1833: The annual dividend of the Coventry Canal was

32%

(v. Martin, Railways—Past, Present, and Prospective, p. 27.)