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its neighbours-the Russians, the Germans, and the Poles-to great political as well as intellectual activity in the past? It is not for a foreigner, much less an Irishman, to furnish a satisfactory answer to this question. When Professor Meillet noted the fact that the Lithuanians had allowed the greater part of their linguistic heritage to be absorbed by other languages, he had in mind perhaps the same problem that confronted Réclus when he wrote in 1850:

The long-oppressed race dwelling among the forests of the Niemen has not exerted an influence (in creative ideas) comparable with that of the other civilised races of the Continent. Can we help wondering why a race almost wholly composed of beings sensitive, intelligent, full of imagination and poetry, so steadfast and strong in its sense of personal dignity, should yet have failed to produce a single great poet, a single outstanding genius ? Want of self-confidence is the answer suggested by Réclus to a somewhat misleading question. Might not the Lithuanian of to-day be justified in retorting: Is the intellectual effort of a nation to be judged chiefly by the criterion of language? Are there not other standards of judgment? Leaving aside the vexed question of Immanuel Kant's Lithuanian origin, might we not point to modern Prussia as a very living translation, however distorted, of a material force that was ours in the past? Did not Adam Mickiewicz, who has been styled the greatest epic poet of the nineteenth century, reveal his intensely Lithuanian soul in Pan Tadeusz, that unique achievement of Polish literature? Is it indeed an absurdity to suggest, more modern instances apart, that the Lithuanian ancestry of Dostoevski, a claim advanced by his daughter, may have had a certain significance in the moulding of a genius that was not merely Russian, but universal ?

Here is not the place to discuss the rights or wrongs of the lamentable Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilna. That the estrangement between Poland and Lithuania in this connexion is more artificial than real is becoming more and more evident day by day, in spite of the politicians on both sides hoarsely protesting their ' no surrender' views. One set inveighs against the naïve sentimentality of the Lithuanian, the other against the aggressive imperialism of the Pole. The 'imperialism' of the Pole in the Vilna district is far, however, from being of the quality attributed to it. In the present state of political relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, Poland, which, after all, has had considerably more political experience than Lithuania, can hardly afford to stand by meekly while she is exposed to attack through Vilna. What security can Lithuania offer Poland against Russian aggression should Poland relinquish her hold on Vilna?

The

strategic question is indeed as vital for Lithuania as it is for Poland: from Poland's danger Lithuania can derive no real advantage.

The Irish and the English have solved to mutual satisfaction a much more difficult problem. VALENTINE O'HARA.

THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF

AGRICULTURE

1

LAST October I tried to show that the Agricultural Problem, about which so much has been said and written since the war, is, in some degree, simplified, at least in its political aspect. I pointed out that three important issues on which political parties had been sharply divided have become, in principle, uncontentious. They are (1) protective duties and subsidies; (2) State aid to and regulation of agriculture; and (3) public ownership of agricultural land. I added:

No responsible person now advocates protection or subsidies for agriculture as a general policy. The interposition of the State either by legislation or administration now permeates agricultural affairs. The ownership of agricultural land, and its management as landlords, by elected public authorities is accepted by all parties.

On these three main issues there is no principle left to fight about. There is wide difference of opinion about the application of the principles of State regulation and public landlordism, but a reversion to laissez-faire and private land ownership as sacred and inviolate principles is outside the range of discussion.

The implications of this fact will appear in the future. No one believes that the relations of the State to agriculture have been finally settled or that Parliament will have no more to say on the subject. In what form and by what party the subject will next be raised in the House of Commons is a matter of political speculation.

In the meantime, however, it is justifiable to assume that no more agricultural legislation of any importance will be passed in the present Parliament. The Government claims to have honoured all its pledges and to have completed its agricultural policy. The Prime Minister, speaking at Welbeck on Whit Monday, summarised what the Government has done for agriculture and said: 'The record proves we have not only fulfilled our pledges, but we have performed far more than we promised.' So far as politics are concerned, therefore, agriculturists may 1. The Agricultural Problem and its Solution,' Nineteenth Century and After, October 1927.

' rest and be thankful '-or, at any rate, rest-for the duration of the present Parliament. They have reached, for the time being, a stage of political stability.

Farming has also, at last, emerged from the upheaval of the war. I was one of those who were inveterate optimists during the war, but became tainted with pessimism when it was over, and I remember hazarding the opinion that it would be at least a decade before the country would begin to settle down. The prediction has, at least, been verified in the case of agriculture. The position which farming attained during the war was set up as a standard, and ever since farmers have audibly lamented that it has not been maintained. But gradually year by year the effect of war conditions has worn off, and now, ten years afterwards, the pre-war position has been re-established. In other words, there has been a return to normality.

When the State took over the direction of agriculture under the provisions of ' Dora' its object was to increase the immediate production of food crops, particularly wheat and potatoes. The method employed was to order the breaking up of grass land and the extension of arable cultivation. The result was that in 1918 the proportion of arable land was raised to nearly 46 per cent., whereas in the year before the war it had been less than 41 (40·8) per cent. The proportion of arable land devoted to wheat, which in 1913 was 15'3 per cent., was raised in 1918 to 20.6 per cent., while potatoes, which accounted for 4 per cent. before the war, increased to 5 per cent.

The reversion to normality is indicated by reference to the comparative figures for 1913 and 1927. The proportion of arable land, which, as already mentioned, was 40-8 per cent. in 1913, was last year 40'3 per cent. The allocation of arable land to the chief crops in each of these years was as shown below: Percentage of arable land.

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Now that things have settled down, it will be seen that English farming is being carried on in much the same way and on much the same lines as before the war. Wheat has slightly increased in favour, while barley and oats are less popular. In both of these cases no doubt reduced demand is the explanation. The markets for drink-corn' and 'horse-corn' are shrinking. The increased proportion of land under temporary grass indicates a tendency to economise in cultivation, and means that less of the

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arable land is actually ploughed each year. Although, therefore, land nominally arable is relatively unchanged, there is rather less arable cultivation than before the war. In other words, a smaller acreage is actually ploughed each year.

These simple figures and the conclusion drawn from them may perhaps perplex the ordinary reader who takes a general interest in agricultural affairs. Much has been said and written about the decline of farming, and especially the disappearance of arable cultivation, and there is a widespread belief that the whole character of English agriculture has been changed.

Farming has declined, and arable land has diminished, but agriculture has not materially changed in character. A distorted view of the facts has been presented by the common practice of treating the year 1918 as a standard for comparison. In that year the area put under the plough in England and Wales was nearly 12,500,000 (12,398,640) acres, and wheat was grown on over 2,500,000 (2,556,661) acres. This represented an increase of 1,500,000 acres of arable land and nearly 1,000,000 acres of wheat as compared with the pre-war position.

This was a great achievement, but it was accomplished by the uncompromising use of compulsion under the Defence of the Realm Act, the incentive of prices for corn, which, although restricted, were higher than farmers had known for a century, and a very large expenditure of public money. An additional factor was the psychological influence of the war, which induced the large majority of farmers to accept willingly orders and regulations which ordinarily they would have resisted to the death, or at least to the police-court.

It is evident that, unless it is proposed to re-establish these conditions, it is futile to compare the present position with that then attained. Even if compulsion, prices and State expenditure were all restored, the same results would not be realised in the absence of the war-time spirit of patriotism.

The only standard, therefore, by which the present position of agriculture can fairly be measured is that of the period immediately preceding the war.

It was suggested above that on such a comparison no material change is apparent. But there has been a serious change. The use to which agricultural land is put is much the same, but the area of agricultural land has shrunk by 1,500,000 acres-from 27,129,000 to 25,589,000 acres. We have lost since 1913 about 750,000 acres of arable land, and about an equal area of grass land.

This contraction of the land devoted to agriculture goes on continually. The process was not interrupted by the war. The food production campaign did not add a single acre to the pro

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