Identity, Consciousness and ValueOxford University Press, 12 jul 1990 - 368 pagina's The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life. |
Inhoudsopgave
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SIX METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES | 36 |
3 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO OUR SURVIVAL | 66 |
4 THE PHYSICAL APPROACH TO OUR SURVIVAL | 102 |
5 A PHYSICALLY BASED APPROACH TO OUR SURVIVAL | 139 |
AGAINST THE SIX METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES | 170 |
DISTINCTIONS COMPROMISES AND LIMITS | 211 |
8 FISSION AND THE FOCUS OF ONES LIFE | 255 |
9 THE APPRECIATION OF OUR ACTUAL VALUES | 295 |
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