those who on the whole approved of it in spite of defects was Benito Mussolini, as he had always attach importance to a settlement with Yugoslavia. The trea was ratified, and the ratifications were exchanged Feb. 2, 1921. But hardly was the ink dry on t signatures when the report was spread about that secret clause existed ceding Porto Barros, the south-es end of the port of Fiume, with the delta between t Fiumara river and the artificial canal-which did n exist when the corpus separatum was created-to Yug slavia. MM. Trumbich and Stoianovich, two of t Yugoslav delegates at Rapallo, hinted at the existen of this clause in order to calm the protests of the Cro extremists who objected to the treaty. The possession Porto Barros might or might not have the disastro effects on the conditions of Fiume which many Italia and Fiumani feared, but there was certainly no menti of it in the treaty. Questions were raised in Parli ment and in the foreign affairs committee, but Cou Sforza, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had com cluded the treaty, denied the existence of such a claus It eventually came out that a private letter of Cou Sforza to that effect had been sent to the Yugosl delegation, and he ended by admitting it, although 1 flippantly tried to pass it off as a joke, saying that Por Barros was merely four syllables.' This letter raised nice constitutional question; Parliament had ratified tl treaty which contained no mention of the cession Porto Barros, yet Porto Barros had been promised Yugoslavia by Count Sforza. The reason for Sforza action, which was also that of Giolitti, was that the both feared the reaction of Italian public opinion if were published that a part of the corpus separatum he been given to Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact mo Italians were so relieved, that they would have swallowe even the Porto Barros pill if it had been contained the treaty; while the Yugoslavs themselves would hav signed the treaty even without Porto Barros, so anxiou were they too for a settlement of some sort.

The next difficulty was to induce D'Annunzio to agre to the treaty and evacuate Fiume, in order that th Italian authorities could provide for the setting up o the local government. Conditions at Fiume had bee

betma

of the

rowing

THE FIUME-ADRIATIC SOLUTION

·

305

ever more extraordinary. On Sept. 8, 1920, Annunzio had promulgated the 'Statuto della Reggenza del Carnaro,' a strange medley of mediæval revivals and modern mysticism, and he began to think himself invested with a sort of divine mission. He seed daily bulletins of literary beauty, but full of extravagant ideas, and he tried to get into touch with the various peoples oppressed' by the enemies of Fiume, notably the Egyptian and Indian Nationalists, the Kemalist Turks, and even the Russian Bolsheviks; his diatribes against Britain, America, and France were incredibly violent. But in his hatred of Nitti and Giolitti, he had come to consider even the Italian State and army as his enemies. Gradually most of the best men who had joined him in the first moments of indignation and enthusiasm found it impossible to get on with him and quitted Fiume, so that he fell more and more under the influence of the undesirable elements. The economic situation was desperate as no trade flowed through Fiume, and in order to meet the expenses of government D'Annunzio had an Italian steamer the 'Cogne' seized, and its cargo, which belonged to shippers of various nationalities, sold.

The Comandante, as D'Annunzio was called, absolutely refused to recognise the Rapallo Treaty, because the 'Reggenza del Carnaro' had not been a party to it; on the contrary, he even seized the islands of Arbe and Veglia in the Quarnero, and tried to prevent the cession of Dalmatia by sending an expedition to Zara. On Nov. 19, General Caviglia, commanding the troops in the Venezia Giulia, sent D'Annunzio a summons to evacuate Fiume, promising amnesty to the regular troops who had joined him before the Rapallo Treaty and a demobilisation bonus to the 'legionaries,' and ordered him on the 28th to evacuate Arbe and Veglia. On his refusal, a blockade was again established round the town. After more fruitless negotiations, General Caviglia ordered his troops to attack Fiume on Christmas Eve; the operations proceeded slowly

to avoid bloodshed as far as possible. D'Annunzio had

as the Italian Government wished

See the 'Popolo d'Italia,' Nov. 13, 1920.

'Carnaro' is an old form of Quarnero, the gulf at the head of which

Fame lies.

declared that he would die amid the ruins of Fiume, t as a matter of fact on the 28th he handed over |powers to the town council, and on the 31st an agr ment between General Caviglia and the mayor Gigar was concluded at Abbazia. The Italian troops th entered Fiume and the 'legionaries' were disband those who were not Fiumani being evicted; order w maintained by the troops and a local police force, a D'Annunzio left shortly afterwards.

The execution of the Rapallo Treaty proved, howev no easy matter. Italy was to evacuate Dalmatia zones; the first two zones were soon evacuated, but t third remained occupied because the Yugoslavs had 1 carried out some of their undertakings-they failed re-establish railway communications with Fiume, the was persecution of the Italians of Dalmatia, and t commercial conference did not meet. At Fiume t situation was further complicated by the action Riccardo Zanella. Zanella was an honest man, but demagogue, and unfit for the responsibilities of gover ment; at one time he had been a friend of D'Annunz but had always favoured the autonomy of Fiur as an Italian city. The Fiumani, who at first had been in favour of union with Italy, in view of the vac lating policy of Italy, began to accept the idea of aut nomy, and many of them rallied round Zanella, w was also supported for a time by the Italian Gover ment. At the elections of October 1921 for the Co stituent Assembly the majority voted in favour Zanella; but his opponents -the ex-legionaries, t annexationists, etc. - claimed that the elections ha been vitiated as they were merely the result of temporary reaction against D'Annunzio's entourage ar did not represent the real wishes of the people. Zanel failed to summon the Assembly, concentrating all pow in himself and creating a numerous and expensiv bureaucracy and a police force consisting largely of Slav from outside. An agitation against this regime was se on foot, and riots occurred in which two members of th Italian party were killed. On March 3, 1922, there wa a demonstration against Zanella, the Government palac was besieged, and Zanella himself forced to surrender He signed a declaration abdicating from his office and

Fundertaking never to interfere with Fiume politics again. He then took refuge in Croatia, more or less under Yugoslav protection, but continued to regard himself as the sole legitimate' representative of Fiume, and even tried to obtain recognition from the League of Nations. The government of the town passed from one committee to another, until the Italian Government insisted on re-summoning the Constituent Assembly; but the majority of that body still supported Zanella and quitted Fiume to meet in Yugoslav territory, where it lapsed into obscurity. The minority formed a new administration under Signor Depoli. But he had constantly to apply to Italy for financial support, owing to the conditions of the town, and there was always an Italian garrison for the maintenance of order.

ed

The various difficulties connected with the execution of the Rapallo Treaty led to further negotiations at Santa Margherita in May 1922, and a new agreement was signed in October following. It provided that the arbitration clause should be extended to divergences concerning the mixed port committee and the operation of the port, that Yugoslavia should reopen railway communications with Fiume (the Yugoslav authorities had cut the railway at Sushak ever since the D'Annunzio adventure), for the creation of a mixed commission to settle the constitution of Fiume and of a neutral customs zone round Zara, and for guarantees for the Italian schools in Dalmatia. But even Santa Margherita did not solve the Adriatic problem, and the conditions of Fiume became worse every day.

In November 1922, the Fascista Government came into power in Italy. The Yugoslavs at first feared that this change would involve a less friendly attitude towards them, but events belied their alarm. Signor Mussolini, in fact, in one of his first speeches declared that the =Santa Margherita agreement must be ratified, but at the same time he realised the extreme difficulty of carrying out that convention and the Rapallo Treaty as they stood, and as early as November 1922, he suggested to M. Ninchich, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, then at solution such as the one now adopted. Feeling on both Lausanne for the Turkish Treaty, the possibility of a sides had distinctly improved, the Santa Margherita

agreement was ratified in February 1923, and Italy pr ceeded to evacuate the third Dalmatian zone. Port Barros and Sushak were not evacuated as they we closely connected with the still unsolved Fiume questio Yugoslavia had at one time expressed the intention registering the Rapallo Treaty with the League Nations, but refrained from doing so at the reque of Italy, pending further negotiations. As Sign Mussolini pointed out in his report to the Cabinet on th Yugoslav Treaty (Feb. 21, 1924), the chief obstacle 1 a definite agreement between the two peoples was th existence of the State of Fiume. In the town matte had reached a deadlock. Signor Depoli, President of th local Government, had resigned owing to his absolu inability to continue to administer the community, whic was threatened with starvation. For this reason Signo Mussolini in September last sent General Giardino 1 Fiume to take charge of the administration, providir him with adequate funds. Direct negotiations wit Yugoslavia were once more resumed. Both countri were genuinely anxious for a solution, but where Signor Mussolini wished to achieve it as quickly as po sible, the Belgrade Government, still obsessed by th opposition of the Croats and Slovenes, tended to dela matters.

The negotiations continued throughout the autum both in Rome and Belgrade. Of the progress of the discussions the public knew absolutely nothing, an their success is now quoted as a rehabilitation of th much maligned methods of the traditional 'secret dipl macy'; it is certain that without this secrecy success would have been very difficult. In January last it wa suddenly announced that Italy and Yugoslavia ha finally come to an agreement. M. Pashich, the Yugosla Prime Minister, and M. Ninchich reached Rome on th 25th of that month, and on the 27th the various agree ments were signed. The first of these is almost a treat alliance. Art. 1 in fact provides that the two Powers 'undertake to lend each other mutual support, and to col laborate cordially with the object of maintaining the orde of things established by the treaties of peace concluded at Trianon, St Germain, and Neuilly, and to respect and carry out the obligations stipulated in these treaties.'