rest caused by war. Nothing but war, so far as can seen, would so dislocate society as to make Revolution ssible in this country.

There is, however, one point in our foreign policy hich in the near future may give rise to considerable scussion. Every one will agree that the great obstacle the restoration of peace and to the revival of prosperity Europe is the Franco-German difficulty or group of fficulties. With regard to the Reparations side of it, othing useful can be said till the expert committees ave reported. But whatever their report, it is very nlikely that a settlement will be reached unless the ven more important question of French security, or ather, French and German security, is also dealt with. 'he position is quite simple. Here are two nations who Lave been enemies for centuries. They have repeatedly nvaded one another, and the invading forces have ehaved as such forces usually do. Territory on their orders has changed hands more than once. National umiliation has been suffered and inflicted. At the resent time the one that is numerically the weakest is victorious, and with the assistance of her allies has mposed terms that are bitterly resented by the other. A large party in Germany makes no secret of the fact hat they hope for revenge, or, at the least, a forcible evision of the Treaty they have been forced to accept. Can anybody wonder that in those circumstances it is he chief preoccupation in public affairs of every Frenchnan and still more of every Frenchwoman how they can protect their children, if not themselves, from future Jerman attacks? If to some of us the French seem unreasonable over Reparations, if they appear to pursue a policy which makes their payment so insistently demanded lmost impossible, the explanation is to be found in the ame cause. In principle, most Frenchmen will admit that mless Germany recover her prosperity she cannot be xpected to make large foreign payments. But when uggestions are made which will in fact restore Germany's wealth, the vision of their enemy renewed in power and gain a menace to their safety makes the same Frenchnen hastily reject anything which might lead to such a esult. Meanwhile, the whole of Europe is kept anxious and unquiet until this great debate has been composed.

DA

amete

preser But F

If, then, European reconstruction is to proceed ar the foreign commerce on which our people so largedepend is to be revived, we must devise some means appeasing French anxiety. The obvious way is to off her an alliance against German aggression. That was t plan adopted in the tripartite pact between the Unit States, France, and ourselves, drawn up at Paris in 19 Upon its rejection by America that proposal fell to t ground. A similar treaty was suggested by Mr Llo George at Cannes, in 1922, confined to England a France. It was rather vague in its terms, and on thi ground was in substance refused by M. Poincaré unl it was made much more specific. British opinion an declared against this proposal on the ground that r would tend to perpetuate the division of Europe in two groups, an opinion intensified by the conclusion the Rapallo agreement a few months later betwe Russia and Germany. The result is that the Cand proposals must be regarded as also definitely at an er France, therefore, which abandoned her claim at Pa that the Rhine should be made her military frontier return for the tripartite pact, has got neither the physi security of a natural obstacle to invasion nor the co ventional security of a military alliance, and her anxie for the future remains one of the great disturbi elements of the international situation. Meanwhile, t League of Nations has been approaching the proble from another angle. It is part of the League's dut laid upon it by the treaties of peace, to try to devi some method for a general reduction of armament As the result of prolonged consideration, at the la meeting of the Assembly a draft treaty was forward to the Governments of the world whereby, in return f measures of general disarmament to be agreed upo the existing obligations laid upon members of th League to guarantee one another against aggressi were to be made more definite and precise for all tho who became parties to the suggested treaty. It unnecessary here to go into the details of this pla Its importance in this connexion is that French opinio seems inclined to accept as a satisfaction of their deman for security. It has further this advantage, that it offer to all who enter into the treaty an equal guarantee.

put

ential

be

e of in

res,

We

Our

aff

herefore, Germany adhered to it, and it would be open > her to do so, she would be as much protected against ossible French aggression as France would be against er. Along those lines a real solution seems possible. ny other plan must lead sooner or later to the recreaion of the group system in Europe, which was one of he main causes of the World War.

It is suggested that this scheme recognises the ealities of the situation. It gives to France the security er people demand without creating an international Josition which experience has shown to be dangerous; and it makes a general reduction of armaments possible, without which our national position may well become alarming. The recent Singapore incident shows the risk we run unless we have some coherent and well-thoughtout policy on the subject. Whatever may be thought of the actual merits of the Singapore controversy it is Burely most hazardous to defend the policy of the present Government on the ground that it is a 'moral gesture' towards disarmament. How far will that take us? Not apparently at present as far as refusing to replace the five cruisers. But it is difficult to see why not. Both measures were put forward by the highest technical opinion as essential to the mobility and efficiency of our Fleet. If it be sound policy to encourage general disarmament by abandoning one scheme, it is difficult to see the logical justification for maintaining the other. In the absence of international agreement on the subject, piecemeal disarmament by the most pacific of the great powers, ourselves, has no tendency towards permanent pacification. We have already gone very far in that irection, as our experience in air armaments shows. Some general policy is essential for our safety, and it will be thoroughly in accordance with Conservative radition if the Conservative party are the authors

of it

In Foreign affairs, then, no less than in domestic, there urgent need for a real Conservative policy neither eactionary nor revolutionary, not merely a reluctant and pelated adoption of the measures of our opponents, but One offering a genuine remedy for the distresses and diffiulties of the times along lines leading not to confusion out to ordered progress. Let us remember the words

written in this Review some forty years ago by th statesman who led the Conservative forces to twent years of victory:

'The object of our party is not and ought not to l simply to keep things as they are. In the first place t enterprise is impossible. In the next place there is much our present mode of thought and action which it is high undesirable to conserve. What we require is the administı tion of public affairs, whether in the executive or legislati department, in that spirit of the old constitution which he the nation together as a whole and levelled its united for at objects of national import instead of splitting it into bundle of unfriendly and distrustful fragments.'

That doctrine is at the root of the whole mode Conservative Creed, and upon it may well be founded vital and vigorous Conservative Policy.

CECIL

INDEX

TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST VOLUME OF THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW.