but on the 12th none were visible all the morning, any where in the horizon.

On the night of the 12th, signal was made to anchor in the prescribed order. We had Eupatoria point on our right; the coast-line in front was low, sandy, and perfectly open; a few white houses, with stacks close to them, were scattered along the plain. On the 13th we were not under way till long after sunrise, when the columns, wheeling to the right, stood along down the coast, and parallel to it, and the signal was made to prepare for landing. At half-past eleven we were nearly off Eupatoria point, and we anchored for the night, while the place was taken possession of without opposition.

On the 14th we were taken in tow, and moved off at half-past two in the morning. There was a splendid sunrise. We kept near the shore; and anchoring about twelve miles below Eupatoria, the disembarkation commenced at about 10 o'clock. Some French troops were already on shore, about two miles farther down the coast, when we began to land. The English disembarked on a narrow strip of sandy beach, having a lake on its other side. In front was a steep cliff, with only one path down, which led to the point of disembarkation. At the top of the cliff extensive plains spread all round to the horizon and the sea. Two or three Cossacks with long lances appeared on the cliff, who, as our skirmishers mounted the hill, galloped away, and the troops continued to land without molestation. During the morning some firing was heard down the coast, which proceeded from the Furious, Vesuvius, and some French steamers, who, seeing a Russian camp, with about two thousand soldiers drawn up before it, fired shells at long range, and struck and dispersed their columns, and afterward sent some others among the horses and tents.

In the afternoon it rained, and a swell arose along the coast,

which continued to increase. At night the rain came down in torrents, and the troops on the beach were drenched. Bad as their situation was, I envied it. At eight in the evening I had left the transport with another officer in a man-of-war's boat, which, assisted by two others, towed astern a large raft, formed of two clumsy boats boarded over, on which were two guns, with their detachments of artillerymen, and some horses-two of my own among them. The swell from the sea was now considerable, and made the towing of the raft a work of great labor. As we approached the shore, a horse swam past us, snorting, and surrounded by phosphorescent light, as he splashed rapidly by. He had gone overboard from a raft which had upset in attempting to land. The surf was dashing very heavily on the sand, though it was too dark to see it. Fires made of broken boats and rafts were lit along the beach, and a voice hailed us authoritatively to put back, and not attempt to land, or we should go to pieces. Unwillingly the weary oarsmen turned from the shore. The swell was increasing every moment, and the raft getting more and more unmanageable. Sometimes it seemed to pull us back, sometimes it made a plunge forward, and even struck our stern, while the rained poured down with extraordinary violence. It was a long time before we reached the nearest ships, which were tossing on the swell, and not easily to be approached. The first we hailed had already a horseboat alongside, with Lord Raglan's horses, and needed assistance, and two or three others which we passed were unable to help us. By this time the raft was fast filling with water, and the men on it much alarmed; and our progress was so slow that we took at least ten minutes' pulling from the stern to the stem of the Agamemnon. At length a rope was thrown us from a transport near, whose bows were rising on the swell like a rearing horse; and, getting the artillerymen who were on board her out of bed, we hoisted in our horses and guns;

but the gun-carriages, too heavy for our small number of hands, were lashed down to the raft, which was allowed to tow astern of the ship, and which presently sank till the water was up to the axles, when the Agamemnon sent a party and hoisted them on board, and the raft shortly went to pieces. A horse, which had been swimming about for two hours, was also got safely on board. It was a gray, said afterward to have been given by Omer Pasha to Lord Raglan.

The next morning the surf abated, and we were all landed without accident, as were a great many other guns and horses, under the superintendence of Captain Dacres of the Sanspareil, who was indefatigable in carrying out the arrangements of Sir Edmund Lyons, and who was warmly thanked by Lord Raglan for his exertions. Ascending from the beach to the level of the common, we saw the allied army spread along the plains in front, the French on the right. Plenty of country wagons full of forage, driven by peasants in fur caps, with their trowsers stuffed into their boots, were ranged alongside of the artillery camp; some drawn by oxen, some by large two-humped camels.

The army being thus landed, it will be well to describe shortly its composition and material.

A division of infantry, under Major-General Cathcart, had joined from England just before we sailed from Varna. The English army in the Crimea then consisted of four divisions of infantry, each division consisting of two brigades, each brigade of three regiments. To each division of infantry was attached a division of artillery, consisting of two field-batteries, each battery of four 9-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers. The brigade of light cavalry was also embarked, the heavy brigade remaining at Varna. With the cavalry was a 6-pounder troop of horse-artillery. In all, the British mustered twenty-six thousand men and fifty-four guns; the French twenty-four thousand

men, and, I believe, about seventy guns; the Turks four thousand five hundred men, with neither cavalry nor guns.

The food supplied to the English troops by the commissariat was of very good quality. A ration for an officer or soldier was 1 lb. of meat, 1 lb. of bread, 2 oz. of rice, 12 oz. of sugar, 1 oz. of coffee, and half a gill of rum, for which 44d. was paid. The ration of meat was at one time increased to 12 lb.; but when pro visions became scarcer this was discontinued. The ration for cavalry, artillery, or staff horse, was 10 lb. of corn and 12 lb. of hay or straw; for a baggage animal, 8 lb. of corn.

A number of carts of a peculiar construction had been provided at Woolwich, to contain small-arm ammunition in reserve for the infantry. These, being found too heavy, were left at Varna, and the cartridges, packed in boxes or barrels, were carried on pack-horses, a great number of which had been purchased for the British government in Tunis, Syria, and Turkey. An ambulance corps, provided with light spring-wagons, containing layers of stretchers and seats for the sick and wounded, was also left behind; and disabled men were either carried on stretchers by hand, or in arabas, the common carts of Turkey and the Crimea.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST OPERATIONS IN THE CRIMEA.

PECULIARITY OF THE CAMPAIGN-MILITARY MAXIMS-STEAM A NEW POWER IN WAR-ENCAMPMENT ON THE PLAINS-SUPPLIES FROM THE VILLAGES—THE AUTHOR'S SUCCESS IN FORAGING-FRESH MEAT-SKIRMISH WITH COSSACKS-COMMENCEMENT OF THE MARCH-ORDER OF MARCH-THE BAGANAK-ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY AND THE COSSACKS-BIVOUAC-NO TENTS—RAGLAN AND

ST. ARNAUD.

THE campaign thus begun differed from all campaigns with which the reader has hitherto made himself acquainted, in some essential particulars.

According to the practice of war up to the present time, it was necessary for an invading army, on first entering an enemy's territory, to secure one or more defensible posts as depots, from whence to draw supplies, to form hospitals, and as points to retreat upon in case of disaster. As the army advanced from these points, the lines of communication grew more assailable, and it became necessary either to leave a movable force to keep the road open, or to secure and garrison some other strong points on the line of march, from whence to oppose any attempt the enemy might make to throw himself on the line of communication. In advancing, it was also impossible to disregard any fortress or body of troops of the enemy stationed on the flank. The former must be besieged and taken, the latter attacked and routed; or a strong force must be detached to hold either in