Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition
Herbert Kitschelt, Steven I. Wilkinson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Steven I Wilkinson
Cambridge University Press, 29 mrt. 2007 - 377 pagina's
Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies.
Wat mensen zeggen - Een review schrijven
We hebben geen reviews gevonden op de gebruikelijke plaatsen.
2 Meet the new boss same as the old boss?
an approach to
a theory of voter and elite
5 Explaining changing patterns of partyvoter
Village panchayats but
Sports infrastructure infraestructura deportiva
9 From populism to clientelism? The
11 Political institutions and linkage strategies
the importance and
13 The demise of clientelism in afﬂuent
14 A research agenda for the study
Overige edities - Alles weergeven
allocation Andhra Pradesh Austria behavior Belgium beneﬁciaries beneﬁts candidates caste citizen-politician citizens clien clientelism clientelistic exchange clientelistic linkages clientelistic politics clientelistic practices clientelistic system clients coalition conﬁgurations constituencies countries deﬁned deliver democratic deprivation index difﬁcult direct exchange distribution district dominance economic development effective elections electoral system elites ethnic categories ethnic favoritism ethnocultural expect factors favor ﬁnancial ﬁnd ﬁrms ﬁrst funds governors groups identiﬁed incentive increase incumbent individual industrial inﬂuence institutions intra-party Italy Japan Kitschelt labor-based parties leaders legislative linkage mechanisms machine politics Madhya Pradesh mobilization monitoring municipalities naya netas ofﬁce ofﬁcials organization Panchayat partisan party competition party’s patron patronage democracies percent Peronist political machines political parties politicians preference votes principal–agent programs Rajasthan reform regime regional rent-seeking risk rural sector signiﬁcant SNTV/MMD social speciﬁc sufﬁcient targeted telism tion Udaipur district urban variable village voters winning