Calais, as food was rising to famine prices and sickness spreading amongst the men. Richelieu wrote to Argenson in his usual cynical mood. Although he was not a party to the original planning of the expedition and felt no enthusiasm for the Jacobite cause, still, as he had been entrusted with the supreme command, it was his special business to find an outlet of some kind. He therefore proposed to move his men to the West of France and attempt a landing on the Cornish coast, in South Wales or in Ireland, with the help of either the fleet which was getting ready at Brest or the St Malo privateers. The English and Irish Jacobites gave him to understand that there was a strong Jacobite sentiment in those parts. The British fleet was now concentrated in the Straits of Dover; they might therefore have some reasonable hopes of effecting a landing in the West. When once this had been done they would find themselves some three hundred miles from the nearest detachment of the regular army, and they would have ample time to enlist men on British soil before the regulars could get within reach. He therefore asked the King to allow him the use of the squadron which was fitting out at Brest, to escort his transports or to carry his men either to the West of England or to Ireland. He had given the enemy so much to do on the coast of Flanders that they were likely to remain there for some time to come, at all events so long as they remained in the dark about the change of plan. The troops he had collected at Boulogne and Calais could easily be moved without exciting undue suspicion, especially as he would necessarily have to leave his transports behind in harbour so long as Calais and Boulogne were blocked by the enemy.

This proposal was strongly opposed by the Count de Maurepas, Minister of Marine. He was determined that nothing should be done to divert the Brest squadron from its original destination, which was the Nova Scotia expedition under command of his cousin, the Duke de La Rochefoucauld d'Anville. Maurepas hoped that this would secure his cousin the Field-Marshal's bâton; but the unfortunate commander lost his life as well as the whole of his squadron, which was destroyed after costing the State some 15,000,000 livres. Had it not been for Maurepas' family feeling, this squadron could with the

greatest ease have landed Richelieu's force in the western parts of the United Kingdom, and at least have done something practical instead of wasting all its resources.

Richelieu's next proposal was to make use of the St Malo privateers, many of whom were commanded by Irishmen. They were to transport his 4000 men from Havre to either Torbay or Cornwall, where the coast had been left without any defence. The crossing to Ireland was rather longer, but it presented even greater advantages, owing to the friendly disposition of the people. He also thought of landing 4000 men at Maldon in Essex, which was within easy reach of London. He argued successively in favour of each one of these plans, which he adopted, advocated, criticised and abandoned with the greatest nonchalance as the spirit moved him. On the whole he was, perhaps, most in favour of moving his men to Normandy; but here he again had to argue with Maurepas, who maintained that it was impossible to collect enough St Malo privateers at Havre to protect the passage of the transports and the landing of the men either in Cornwall or in Ireland. Richelieu, not daunted by this opposition, replied that he had not asked for these privateers as an escort but as transports, believing that 3000 men would serve his purpose. He therefore again insisted on the necessity of adopting one of his suggestions, and was strongly supported in this view by the Duke of York. But his proposals, which were duly considered at Court, did not commend themselves to Argenson, who preferred to send small detachments to Scotland, since there at least the Prince had shown conclusively that he could rely upon considerable support. Richelieu then urged that, if any practical result was to be secured, it would be far better to send several regiments, especially as he had in Dunkirk and Ostend enough transports to carry 4300 men; but he again emphasised the presence of a hostile fleet in the Channel, which could stop them with the greatest ease when they left harbour. This, however, did not prevent him from taking the necessary steps to execute the King's orders; and he hoped to be ready to despatch the transports to Scotland by the end of January.

Once more the winds proved hostile. Everything was ready by February 5, but nothing could be done then, as

it was impossible to get out of harbour. The wind shifted a few days subsequently; and the Clare regiment of the Irish Brigade went on board with the object of taking advantage of the first favourable opportunity; but, just as they were ready to start, the wind set once more due north, and the departure had to be postponed. There was, however, a rift in the clouds-the safe arrival of a vessel which had left Montrose on January 25, and had crossed without meeting any of the hostile fleet. Richelieu had therefore some ground for the belief that his cruisers might be equally fortunate. This was also the view held at Court, where they were still strongly of opinion that these detachments ought to be sent to Scotland. This view was confirmed by the arrival of the Montrose boat, which brought the first definite news of the Battle of Falkirk. But every day the obstacles increased. Not only did the wind remain steadily in the north, but the hostile fleet in the Channel was now aided in its task by fresh ships which patrolled the eastern coast of Scotland. Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, the Court was so determined to send help at all risks that orders were given for the embarkation of the Berwick regiment at Calais and of the Rothe and Fitzjames regiments at Ostend under Count de Fitzjames. February 19, they made an attempt to leave in three transports, of which two were driven back, while the third was captured.

On

These misfortunes were beginning to tell upon Richelieu, who applied for leave to return to Paris on the ground of ill-health. He left Lord Clare in command during his absence, with the strictest injunctions to neglect no opportunity of using the first favourable change in the wind, and of endeavouring to send detachments to Scotland, no matter at what risk of capture. On reaching Paris, Richelieu spent most of his time in denouncing the Ministers of War and Marine for the way in which they had treated him. Nothing (he declared) was ready when it was required; the whole organisation was in confusion; everything had been done to thwart his proposals. He was, however, able to tell Clare that the King was more determined than ever to send as many men as possible to Scotland, and that he fully approved of Richelieu's instructions to face all risks of capture on

the way. This was enough to remove for the moment all hesitation on Clare's part; and he therefore gave Bart orders to take advantage of the first favourable wind, whatever obstacles might stand in the way.

The whole of the Clare regiment and some battalions of the Berwick regiment had remained all this time on board in Dunkirk harbour; and the men were so cramped for want of proper space that they could not all lie down at the same time. Notwithstanding this drawback, steps were taken to embark the rest of the Berwick regiment; and it was to set sail on the day next after the departure of the Clare regiment. These orders were given, although Clare had told the Minister of War that the wind was due north, and that the harbour of Dunkirk was more difficult of exit than that of Ostend. Not only were there several sandbanks between the two harbours, but both passages were so narrow that the exit could be blocked by the enemy with the greatest ease.

On February 27 the wind turned and blew for a short time with such force that even Bart himself thought it would be safe to send the first transports out. The signal was given at four o'clock; but at the last moment Bart and Charron changed their minds. The wind had gone down, and the enemy had appeared in the offing in such numbers that they considered capture a dead certainty. Clare gave a full account of this to Argenson, and asked for more precise orders, pointing out that Bart had been instructed not only to wait for a wind strong enough to carry the transports immediately out of danger, but to refrain from making any move if the enemy were in sight. It would be impossible, he said, to fulfil all these conditions, especially as every day the danger increased, and nothing could be done owing to the constant presence of the enemy.

Argenson replied that the King saw no reason to revoke the orders he had already given to Clare, or to modify the instructions which Richelieu had given when he left Boulogne. Consequently, on March 1, three men-of-war, the Emeraude,' the Maurepas,' and the 'Aventurier,' escorting three transports with the Clare regiment and some detachments of the Berwick and Dunkeld regiments on board, left harbour under M. de Fimarcon. They carried a very substantial amount of

treasure, which was sadly wanted by the Prince. Their successful exit justified all that Argenson had urged in favour of a bold move, as they were able to evade the enemy's ships without much difficulty. They were, however, less fortunate when they approached Scotland, for they found the east coast so strictly watched by Admiral Byng and his fleet that they were unable to effect a landing. They were compelled to return south, and eventually succeeded in re-entering Dunkirk harbour, but only with the greatest difficulty. They might certainly have done more, as the 'Prince de Nassau,' which had left Ostend on February 19, managed to land two companies of the Fitzjames regiment in Aberdeenshire on March 5, and was able to return to Ostend on The Prince Charles,' the 12th without any trouble. with a million 'livres tournois' on board, set sail for Scotland on March 26. She also carried a large quantity of arms and ammunition, which would have been invaluable at this critical moment. Other preparations were made, as the constant presence of the enemy's fleet in the straits had not proved an absolute impediment on these two occasions; and Clare's orders were so positive and precise that he was bound to do his best to convey men and arms to Scotland.

These reinforcements may not have been so numerous as was originally intended; but they would certainly have had a very important effect on the issues of the campaign if they had only arrived in time. They might have postponed and possibly have averted the final disaster at Culloden. When, however, the news of Charles Edward's overwhelming defeat reached France, all further preparations were abandoned; and the whole energy of the French Government was concentrated on saving his person from the Duke of Cumberland's revenge. This was eventually accomplished by Colonel Richard Warren, who succeeded in landing the Prince at Roscoff on the coast of Brittany on October 10, 1746.

V. HUSSEY-WALSH.