will take the place of the influence of the Prince of this world. That is just what Jesus desires. If for that His death is necessary, He accepts it" (p. 187.)

II. Historical Conception of Christianity. By this phrase is meant Christianity as interpreted by the original apostolical circle, but it is not made clear why that particular phrase should have been chosen. It suggests that Paul's Christianity was a less faithful exposition of the mind of Jesus than was that of Jamesa suggestion, however, which our author does not seem to wish to make.

Here as in the other sections our author seeks for the "central

experience" of the apostolical circle. "This central experience is not individual but collective," their sympathy with one another. A somewhat vague experience out of which to derive the religious thought of the apostolical circle.

We have a description of the character and religious thought of the early church based on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle of James, and the first Epistle of Peter. Hardly enough allowance is made for the influence of the universalism of Jesus upon his disciples. The Judaism of the early church stands out in strong relief-in too strong relief, especially in view of the fact that under "The Historical Conception of Christianity "we have an analysis of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

III. The Psychological Conception of Christianity (1. Preparation for the Pauline thought. 2. The Pauline Gospel. 3. The Postulates of the Pauline Gospel). This section is perhaps the most satisfactory in the book. At least the author seems to be more conversant with what has been written on the teaching of Paul than with what has been written on the teaching of Jesus or John. He begins with Paul's conversion, though much in Paul's thought has its explanation in the experience of his pre-christian years. Paul's experience is an experience of salvation, he finds himself saved by Jesus from an evil way, where hope had failed him. So his principal thought is that Jesus brings a necessary and sufficient salvation for every man. This is the gist of Paul's experience and of his system (p. 302.) Different stages in Paul's theological development are distinguished as by Weiss and Sabatier. But in the working out of this Pauline development there is no such freshness and ingenuity (arbitrariness it may be thought by some) as in Dr Matheson's Spiritual Development of St. Paul. Several of M. Fulliquet's positions call for consideration as e.g. that up to the writing of the four great Epistles salvation meant for Paul little more than deliverance from condemnation, and not deliverance from sin itself (p. 320). M. Fulliquet finds no support in Pauline texts for a juridical theory of the atonement.

The true substitution is the substitution of the influence of Christ in the heart in place of the influence of sin in our flesh (p. 342). His ethicizing tendency is pronounced: faith is itself righteousness (p. 349). A believer is not merely declared righteous, but is made righteous through faith (p. 351). Paul's doctrine of predestination is explained through his own experience of God's dealings with him, and it is argued that Paul has no thought of such a thing as a predestination to evil (p. 361).

Under The Postulates of the Pauline Gospel' (what is meant by postulates in this connection I am unable to conjecture) we have an account of the development of Paul's thought in conflict with Gnostic and other errors. As a way of getting over some difficulties in the prison Epistles, it is suggested that the accounts which Paul received from his messengers of the heresies that were creeping into the churches may not always have been accurate.

Paul in these Epistles becomes a metaphysician to answer the bad metaphysics of the heretics. But his metaphysical construction of the person of Christ does not belong to the essence of the Gospel. It may be put on one side by those who have no interest in metaphysics. "Those are in the line of apostolic tradition who restrain the exercise of the metaphysical faculty in the interest of morality, and give the chief importance to ethical doctrine" (p. 431). The pastoral Epistles are accepted as Pauline, and treated under the heading: A familiar talk of Paul with his disciples." IV. The Mystical Conception of Christianity (1. John the Apostle. 2. The Apocalypse. 3. The formation of the mystical 'thought.' 4. The mystical Gospel).

66

There is little in this section which calls for special comment. On the authorship of the fourth Gospel, M. Fulliquet says that it may have been written by another than John, but certainly under John's inspiration. Without John's reminiscences, one side of the teaching of Jesus would have been almost lost to us. John did not invent these thoughts of Jesus, he found them in his memory "underlined and illustrated by his own experience" (p. 478). "The historical framework rests upon personal reminiscences.

The discourses have been recomposed by the discovery in personal experience of the facts and conceptions with which Jesus was wont to familiarise His disciples" (p. 484).

D. M. Ross.

Das Evangelium des Lucas.

Erklärt von Dr G. L. Hahn, Professor zu Breslau. Zweiter Band. Breslau: Morgenstern. Edinburgh and London: Williams & Norgate. 8vo, pp. 715. 8vo, pp. 715. Price, M. 14. DR HAHN is to

be congratulated on the completion of what may be regarded as not only the bulkiest, but the most useful commentary on the Gospel of Luke. The characteristics of the first volume are equally found in the second. There is the same judicious reference to significant textual readings, the same full record of opinion, the same independent and accurate consideration of the language, the same skill in seizing upon and exhibiting the heart of the passage. Dr Hahn has furnished us with a commentary which it is a pleasure to read, and which is quite sure to find its way into general use. It goes without saying that many of his interpretations will be disputed. Frequently he dissents from every previous interpretation, and while it would be unfair to charge him with straining after novelty, certainly his suggestions, although often brilliant, sometimes fail to carry conviction. MARCUS DoDs.

Theologie du Nouveau Testament.

Tome Second. L'Enseignement des Apôtres par Jules Bovon. Lausanne: Bridel. Paris: Fischbacher. Edinburgh and London: Williams & Norgate. 8vo, pp. 604. Price, Fr. 12. In this volume, which completes Professor Jules Bovon's New Testament Theology, we have an elaborate treatment of Paulinism, as well as of the Johannine theology, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Catholic Epistles. As in the previous volume, so in this, Professor Bovon shows great independence. It is impossible to predict what view he will take of the authenticity of an epistle or what interpretation he will put upon a given passage. Indeed, the volume is full of surprises. Thus it will no doubt give quite a shock to many critics to find that so entirely free a writer as Professor Bovon, while admitting that there is room for hesitancy regarding the Pastoral Epistles, yet maintains that the hypothesis of their authenticity is, on the whole, the simplest, and best satisfies all the conditions of the problem. Similarly he accepts both Epistles to the Thessalonians as well as the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians. These positions he adopts with a perfect knowledge of what has been urged against them, and with brief but trenchant criticism of alternative suppositions.

To Professor Pfleiderer's derivation of Paulinism from an amal

gamation of the theology of Pharisaism with the ideas of Alexandrine thinkers, Professor Bovon firmly objects, and demands that some room should be left for the working of so powerful and original a mind as that of the apostle. He also sharply criticises Professor Pfleiderer's account of the conversion of St Paul. His views throughout are based upon a careful exegesis, and he rarely fails to throw fresh light on important doctrinal passages. Always one is struck by his fairness. He allows each passage to yield its full meaning, and makes no attempt to twist it into agreement with preconceived ideas of his own. Attention is paid to all opinions of any significance, whether they have been advocated by German, French, or English critics. Altogether, we have in Professor Bovon's work a valuable contribution to New Testament theology, which no student of the subject can afford to overlook.

MARCUS DODs.

Conscience: An Essay towards a New Analysis, Deduction and Development of Conscience.

By Rev. J. D. Robertson, M.A., D.Sc.

Vol. I.

Vol. I. New Analysis of Conscience. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Svo, pp. xvi. 175. Price, 78. 6d.

DR ROBERTSON starts from the general position that man is capable of various sensibilities, broadly distinguishable into conscious and unconscious-the latter more correctly designated sentiency or sensitivity; the former more exactly described as sensibility of relation. "Sensibilities are modifications, psychic or organic, which respond to fitting excitations." They may further be distinguished into those which are higher and those which are lower in rank. The lowest form of sensibility is not accompanied by consciousness: "the lowest conscious form yields sensations proper "-and into these enter natural qualities and relations. The highest in the rank of sensibilities is the moral, because " in addition to the natural qualities and relations of things (just referred to), the moral qualities and relations of persons enter into its composition."

The term "sensibility" in this connection is analysed into "moral susceptibility" and "moral impulse." The former answers to the minimum of sensational disturbance," i.e., to the element of pleasure or pain which accompanies or follows upon every excitation of sensibility; the latter is "the attraction to the good and right, and the aversion to evil and wrong, in act or motive," and is peculiar to the excitation of the moral sensibility, finding expression in injunction and prohibition; in "ought" and "shalt not."

Still further, "the pleasures and pains which are the products of the activity of the law in the moral susceptibility are termed emotions as distinguished from sensations," because they are "complex," "widely applicable," "contain many relations-many ideal elements," and are not connected with special seats of sensibility, nor with any part whatever of the bodily framework" (p. 13). On the other hand, "The aversion or attraction which is the product of the law in the moral impulse is a form of sentiment as distinguished from sensational force." "Sentiment goes with the preceptive as opposed to the perceptive side of conscience."

In conformity to the point of view taken up at the outset, Dr Robertson's position may otherwise be defined as follows :-The free actions of persons excite in men sensations which are accompanied by feelings, i.e., emotions; and by impulses, i.e., sentiments, which take the form of command and prohibition;-which emotions and sentiments are moral, and constitute the activities of conscience or conscience itself. The question then arises, Why do free actions give rise to these emotions and sentiments, with their preceptive and prohibitory concomitants? Why do we perceive them as either right or wrong? Why approve or disapprove them? Why feel impelled to do or avoid them? These crucial questions are treated in the second part of the work headed, "Constitution of the Activities of Conscience," which falls into two great sections designated respectively, "The Formal and the Material Constitution of the Moral Sense and Sense of Duty."

Activities of conscience are 66 equivalent to the sensibilities in which the moral law is active." Now taking "law" and "constitution" as convertible terms, the definition just adduced will run, "the activities of conscience are equivalent to the sensibilities in which the moral constitution is active." "Moral consciousness," he further says, "may also be employed for moral constitution." So that we are finally landed in a definition of "the activities of conscience as "the sensibilities in which the moral consciousness is active." What the moral consciousness is, every one knows—it is the sum of ideas or conceptions by means of which moral differences are apprehended and moral demands imposed upon the will."

As we previously saw, "the moral sense is that susceptibility of our nature which is the seat of emotional judgments as to moral differences in motive and action." Judging accordingly is its great function. But its judgments merely declare right or wrong, they do not constitute it. "The moral distinction, though made known through our susceptibilities and judgments, is independent of them." In fact it is grounded in the very nature of our conceptions of human action-they are the spring of the judgments in question, and they constitute the moral consciousness.