Dr Douglas is a competent and sympathetic critic, as well as a patient and careful expositor. He seems to have studied all that Mill has written, to have compared one writing with another with a view to find the central thought of Mill, or to find whether there is a central thought, or whether Mill had not changed his view and had not brought elements into his system which were inconsistent with the presuppositions from which he started. In short, this book may be described as "an attempt to discover the distinctive ways of thinking to which his philosophy owes its special interest." Mill starts with what may be called the common inheritance of British thinkers-a tendency to think of things as isolated from one another, and to treat the relations in which we think them as fictions, which do not belong to them as they really are. The tendency to see in the relation of cause and effect only a succession of subjective states, and to make knowledge only a series of mental changes, led him inevitably to a fictitious isolation of the subject from the object of knowledge, which has important consequences in every department of his philosophic work. This, however, is not the whole of his philosophy. Perhaps the most interesting and important part of Dr Douglas' book is that part in which he traces the appearance of elements in Mill's philosophy which belong to himself. These elements are in his system, and they form a source of perplexity to the critic and expositor of Mill. For Mill never seemed to have revised the fundamental assumptions he had taken over from his predecessors, even when he had supplemented them by other views which were really inconsistent with them. The first chapter of the book deals with what Dr Douglas calls "isolation." In it we have a lucid description of Mill's theory of knowledge. The derivation of his individualistic theory of knowledge is traced back to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; its significance in the development of English philosophy is shown; its influence on Mill is depicted; and its effect on his view of man's relation to the world and on his conception of logic is briefly yet vividly set forth. Then we pass to Mill's theory of experience. Mill is not consistently individualistic. His theories of definition and inference are influenced by his limitation of knowledge to states of consciousness, but he seems to forget this limitation when he sets forth logic as the science of evidence and truth, and consequently departs from the view which limits logic to the science dealing with mere mental states, and makes it a science of reality. If logic is a science that can deal with reality, clearly there must be some way of passing from mere mental states to the reality of an objective world. The difficulty is, how on Mill's system are we to reach objective reality? How are we to think of causality? Are we to think of it, with Hume, as the result of custom, as merely subjective, or are we to think of it as objectively real, as working real changes in a real world, changes which may be known by us as real? Mill seems to hold both views. Indeed, this seems to be the view held in common by all the disciples of Hume. It is interesting to find Professor Huxley, for example, at one moment insisting on universality and reality of causation as the one article of the creed of a scientific man, and at the next moment insisting with equal vehemence on Hume's maxim that belief in causation is the outcome of mere habit. Now they cannot have it both ways. If the reality of causation is to be vindicated, some way of transcending Hume must be found. Dr Douglas, with characteristic generosity, seeks to reduce the inconsistency of Mill to a minimum, but not with much success. After all his endeavour, the two fundamental assumptions of Mill lie side by side, not only unreconciled, but also, seemingly, without a thought on the part of Mill that a reconciliation was required. True, the most valuable part of Mill's contribution to human knowledge consists in those elements which he did not receive from his predecessors. But his contribution would have been more valuable had he set himself to revise his fundamental assumptions, and had he made them consistent with themselves, and with the results to which he had come in the course of his investigations. We should like to dwell on the successive chapters of the volume. It would be of interest to dwell on the exposition and criticism of Mill's Hedonism, on his relation to Positivism, on his doctrine of Determinism, and of Freedom, on his Ethical Hedonism, on his view of the Worth of Conduct, and finally on the account given here of Mill's view of Nature and Spirit. But we have nearly reached our limits. We must call attention to the chapter on "The Worth of Conduct." It is an important bit of work. Dr Douglas gathers into one all that Mill has written on Conduct, sets forth Mill's view with precision, indicates its merits and defects, and shows how great is the advance made by Mill on the work of previous thinkers of the same school. We may quote the passage descriptive of the qualification of Hedonism made by Mill: "In regarding the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' as the end which should determine conduct he makes the moral good of the individual agent consist not in the enjoyment but in the production of pleasure; and, however much he may be disposed to believe in the actual coincidence of private and general happiness, he does not hesitate, in case of conflict, to make the common good the criterion of conduct. This, however, is to make the moral good of the individual consist, not in a state of feeling, but in a kind of activity or personal character. Similarly, the distinction among pleasures depends upon their relation to the objective life of character; and by this distinction, and by the nonhedonistic preference of higher to lower pleasures, the good, whether of single individuals or of the greatest number, is made to consist not in pleasure or satisfaction but in qualities of personal life. This conception of the moral end derives no support from the doctrine that only pleasure is desired; it may rather be said to be inconsistent with that doctrine, and to depend for its legitimacy upon a less abstract notion of desire. The far-reaching qualification of hedonism, which is conveyed in making the moral end for individuals a common good, and in establishing qualitative differences among pleasures, is fatal also to that logical use of the hedonistic principle, as a moral calculus, which largely determined Mill's belief in its scientific value. If moral good depends upon character, and if their relation to character determines the worth of pleasures themselves, then the detail of the moral life cannot be regulated by mere calculation of pleasant feelings in the abstract." JAMES IVERACH. Leib und Seele bei Fechner und Lotze. Von Dr Theodor Simon. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Edinburgh and London: Williams & Norgate. 8vo, pp. 118. Price, M.2.40. THIS book is a clear and able treatment of the relation of body and soul, as that relation has been set forth by Fechner and Lotze. We have first a statement of the question in the introductory part, then an exposition of the solution of the problem as set forth by Lotze and by Fechner. The exposition is remarkably full and clear, and it is a great gain to have so good an account of the systems of these thinkers in so short a space. Dr Simon then points out what elements they have in common. Both believe in the unity of the Ground of the world, both are believers in God, and both believe that the "Real is the Spiritual." Dr Simon gives us an account of the differences between them. (1) From the point of view of Anatomy aud Physiology, (a) as regards the seat of the soul, (b) as regards the union of the activities of the soul with the body. (2) From the point of view of Metaphysics. He shows us how Fechner and Lotze conceive (1) of the Unity of the soul over against the manifoldness of space, (2) of the Unity of the soul in the interchange of time. It is a most clear and interesting discussion, based in a thorough knowledge of the numerous writings of these distinguished men? We have, finally, a chapter which shows that Dr Simon can not only clearly summarize the methods and results of other thinkers, but he can maintain his independence, think for himself, criticise, and work his way to a clear apprehension of the problems and their solution. There is a vast amount of thought and learning in this little book. JAMES IVERACH. The Messiah of the Gospels. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of York. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Post 8vo, pp. xv. 337. THIS work is the second of a series of three volumes on the Messianic Ideal, projected by the author, of which the first, on Messianic Prophecy, appeared in 1886. While having for its main theme the Messiah of the Gospels, it sketches in an introductory chapter the Messianic idea in pre-Christian Judaism, which is gathered chiefly from three sources: the Book of Enoch, the Psalter of Solomon, and the Hellenistic Book of Wisdom. Before coming to his main topic, the author deals in a second chapter with what he calls the Messianic idea of the Forerunners of Jesus, including under that head not only John the Baptist, but the persons brought on the scene in the two first chapters of Luke: Zacharias, Elizabeth, Mary, Simeon, and apparently even the angels spoken of in the story; for their messages of annunciation are given along with the songs of Zacharias, Mary and Simeon as part of the relative material. It is noticeable that the Annunciations, as well as the Benedictus, Magnificat, and Nunc Dimittis, are all alike regarded as poems. With reference to all Dr Briggs remarks: "These songs, which have been selected for use in the Gospel of Luke, doubtless represent reflection upon these events by Christian poets who put in the mouths of the angels the mothers and the fathers, the poems which they composed." The remark may seem to imperil the historicity of the story, but the writer adds: "The inspired author of the Gospel vouches for their propriety and for their essential conformity to truth and fact." In each case the gist of the song is given, then a kind of poetic version, then a comment. This method-gist, text, comment is followed throughout the book. Dr Briggs finds in the songs of the Forerunners a Christology earlier and less developed than those of the Gospel of John, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Epistle to the Colossians; not going beyond the Paulinism of the Epistles to the Corinthians, and implying nothing more than the sending or birth taught by the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans. The Messianic conceptions of the Gospels are ascertained by a separate study of each gospel, after which the total idea thus gathered is compared with Old Testament predictions in order to ascertain how far they correspond. Mark, as the simplest and earliest, is taken up first. All the passages bearing on the subject are carefully gone over, quoted and commented on-some of the most important of the comments taking the form of footnotes. Among the latter is a lengthy notice of the opinions of Jülicher and Spitta on the question whether Jesus can be said to have instituted the sacrament of the Supper as an ordinance to be observed continuously. The author seems inclined to relegate the "institution" proper to the post-resurrection period, and to suppose that "the risen Lord commanded the perpetual observance of the holy supper just as he gave the apostles their commission to preach and baptize." He follows up the discussion of the Messianic texts in Mark by a chapter on "the Apocalypse of Jesus," contained in Mark xiii. and parallels. This chapter contains copious references to the literature of this difficult subject, and endeavours to grapple with the knotty questions involved. How far successfully is a point on which opinion will differ. For myself I cannot say that the treatment is altogether convincing or satisfactory. Dr Briggs thinks it clear that in Mark xiii. 5-8, referring to false Messiahs, Jesus has chiefly in mind his apovoia and not the destruction of the city and temple. This is by no means clear to me. "Apocalypse" arose out of the conversation about the destruction of the temple, and it is most natural to suppose that the main subject of discourse was the approaching crisis of the Jewish people, not the "Second Coming or the end of the world. The In a work on the Messianic element in the Gospels many points of doubtful interpretation inevitably come up, and it is no valid objection to a book that it contains exegetical views to which one feels inclined to demur. In any views of this sort expressed by Dr Briggs, he follows good authorities, such as Weiss, Wendt, or Beyschlag. One may be inclined to think that he follows authorities too much, and does not sufficiently exercise his own judgment. Be that as it may, there is one department in which Dr Briggs owns no master, but follows his own course. He seems disposed to find poetry everywhere, often where most have found only plain prose ; e.g., in the directions given by the Lord Jesus to his disciples in connection with the Galilæan mission. He even uses the hypothesis of poetic form as a canon in criticism. He remarks, e.g., on the words "save a staff only," Mark vi. 8: "This clause is doubtless original. Matthew x. 10 gives a reverse statement. In Luke v. 3 the staff is prohibited and begins the list of prohibited objects. The statement of Mark comes from the original Mark; those of Vol. V.-No. 3. Q |