Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern PhilosophyMartin Pickavé, Lisa Shapiro OUP Oxford, 4 okt 2012 - 285 pagina's This volume offers a much needed shift of focus in the study of emotion in the history of philosophy. Discussion has tended to focus on the moral relevance of emotions, and (except in ancient philosophy) the role of emotions in cognitive life has received little attention. Thirteen new essays investigate the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions, and open up a contemporary debate on the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason, and the way emotions figure in our own cognitive lives. A team of leading philosophers of the medieval, renaissance, and early modern periods explore these ideas from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals. |
Inhoudsopgave
Introduction | 1 |
Dispassionate Passions | 9 |
Why is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf? Medieval Debates on Animal Passions | 32 |
John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will | 53 |
Intellections and Volitions in Ockhams Nominalism | 75 |
The Case of Adam Wodeham | 94 |
SixteenthCentury Discussions of the Passions of the Will | 116 |
Renaissance Debates on Platonic Eros | 133 |
Reasons Causes and Inclinations | 156 |
Using the Passions | 176 |
Passionate Perception in Descartes and Spinoza | 193 |
Agency and Attention in Malebranches Theory of Cognition | 217 |
The Case of Pride | 234 |
255 | |
279 | |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy Martin Pickavé,Lisa Shapiro Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2012 |
Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy Martin Pickavé,Lisa Shapiro Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2012 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
according action active acts actually affects agent animal appetite appetitive acts apprehension Aquinas argues associated attention beautiful body called Cambridge capacity causal cause claim clear cognition complex concept condition considered Descartes desire determined directed discussion distinct emotions example existence experience explain external fact fear feel follows freedom give given Gregory of Rimini holds human Hume ideas imagination inclination insofar intellectual intentional involves judgments kind knowledge Malebranche means medieval mental mind moral motions motivational move nature object Ockham Oxford particular passions passive perceive perception perfection person Philosophy Platonic pleasure possible present principle providing psychology qualities question rational reason refers relation representation requires respect responses Scotus seems sensations sense sensitive appetite sensory simply sort soul Spinoza Stoic sympathy theory things thought true understanding University Press virtue volitions vols Wodeham wonder