when the word bound is used simply, it more generally refers to Duty than to Obligation. 88. Duty has no correlative, as Obligation has the correlative Right. What it is our Duty to do, we must do because it is right, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by our discharge of our Duties, as having a Moral Claim upon us. A distressed man has a Moral Claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our Duty to relieve him. 89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms Perfect Obligation and Imperfect. Obligation for Obligation and Duty respectively and the terms Perfect Right and Imperfect Right, for Right and Moral Claim respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our Duties arose from the Rights of others; and as if Duties were only legal Obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force. We must treat of Rights before we treat of Duties; for as we have said (78), the terms which express Rights are necessarily employed in laying down Moral Rules. We must establish the Rights, and the Laws of Property, before we can lay down the Moral Rules, Do not steal, or Do not covet another man's property. 90. Hence before we treat of the Doctrine of Duties, which is Morality, we must treat of the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations. There is no term in the English language which denotes the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations. In Latin, French and German, the same term which denotes a Right denotes also the Doctrine of Rights. Thus we say Jus meum, and Studium Juris: mon Droit and l'étude du Droit: mein Recht, and die Kentniss des Rechts. In English, we say my Right, their Rights, but we do not use the term in the other sense. stead of this, we employ various phrases: thus Jus In Natura has sometimes been translated The Law of Nature; sometimes, The Rights of Nature, Natural Rights, Natural Justice. But no one of these phrases fully expresses the Doctrine of Rights: for Rights are not Law only, nor Justice only; (meaning by Law the Law of Society, and by Justice, that which is right) they are both Law and Justice; Law because Justice; Justice expressed in Law. Hence, when we have occasion to speak of the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations in a single word, we shall borrow the Latin term Jus: and by the adjective jural, we shall denote that which has reference to the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations; as by the adjective moral we denote that which has reference to the Doctrince of Duties. We have already in the English language several derivatives from the term Jus in the technical sense which we adopt: as Jurist, Jurisprudence, Jurisdiction; so that the word need not sound strange in our ears. Jus is the study of the Jurist. The term Jurisprudence has sometimes been applied by English writers to describe the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations in general but the corresponding Latin term is often written in separate words Juris Prudentia, a knowledge of Jus. It seems unreasonable and inconvenient to make the English name of this Doctrine so much more complex than its names in other languages. The word Jus is also implied in the word Injury. The words just and Justice are connected with the same root; but by these, we express moral, not merely jural, notions. : 91. Rights, and the difference of right and wrong, being once brought into view, there are many terms both moral and jural, which can be explained by reference to those fundamental notions. Duties, are Actions, or Courses of Action, considered as being right. Virtues are the Habits of Mind by which we perform Duties. And Virtue, used generally, includes all special Virtues; as Duty includes all special Duties. Virtue and Duty are the objects of our Moral Sentiments (55). We approve Duty, but we esteem and admire and love Virtue. Virtue is the natural object of Love, and is in this view called Goodness. Actions which are opposite to right are Violations of Duties, Transgressions, Offences. As transgressions of Law, they are Crimes. They are of various degrees of Guilt. Some are atrocious or heinous Crimes: others are slighter Offences, more excusable and pardonable. The transgression of a Duty, considered as a Habit, is a Vice and Vice in general includes all special Vices. : The sentiment of disapproval of Offences or Vices admits of various modifications. Some vices are hateful, some, despicable: some render the perpetrator odious, some make him contemptible. things we more lightly blame, others we more strongly condemn, or look upon with detestation and horror. Some 92. The sentiments with which we regard Virtue and Vice, Virtues and Vices, Acts of Duty and Violations of Duty, are applied to the internal acts which determine the external action. Thus we speak of a good intention, a laudable purpose, a vicious thought. These Sentiments are extended also to the persons who perform the acts, external or internal. Men, as well as actions, are called on the one hand good, virtuous, praiseworthy, admirable, excellent; on the other hand bad, vicious, blameable, abominable, wicked. When men's actions are right, both they and their actions are moral; if the contrary, immoral. Virtues and Vices have been spoken of as Habits: but they may also be considered as the results of the Dispositions and Characters of men. Considered as a Disposition, Vice is Depravity, or Wickedness. 93. The consideration of Virtue and Vice, with reference to Religion, will come before us in a succeeding part of this work. But we may here remark, that Virtue, which is conformable to the Supreme Law of our Nature, is the Will of God, the Author of our Nature. Hence, the Law of Duty is the Command of God. Transgressions of Duty, considered as Offences against God, are Sins. God upholds the Law of Duty by Rewards and Punishments, which are assigned to the Souls of men. 94. Rights, as we have said (71), are established in Society by the Law; that is, in such Society by the Law of that Society. When this Law is not merely a Rule, tacitly understood and naturally growing into being, but expressly declared and really enforced, it is termed Positive Law, in distinction from Natural Law, or the Law of Nature*. Society when it thus declares and enforces Laws, acts as a State; not merely as an assemblage of individuals, but as a Collective Agent. A State has an organization by which it acts. It has a Government, Tribunals, stated modes of action. It has Governors, Magistrates, Judges, Executive Officers, and all requisite provisions for the Administration of the Law. When need arises in consequence of men's actions, and transactions one with another, a man charged with a crime is apprehended; or of two persons who allege conflicting Rights, one institutes a Suit against the other. The case is brought before a Court or Tribunal, in which the Judge takes cognizance of such matters; and is tried. Evidence is adduced. Witnesses are heard. The accused man is found guilty; or is acquitted, if it do not appear that he is guilty. Between the two contending parties Judgment is * It will afterwards appear that no Body of Definite Laws can be proved to be the Laws of Nature. given. The Sentence of the Court is carried into effect. And thus, Rights are realized, and Remedies are provided for Wrongs. CHAPTER V. IMMUTABLE MORALITY AND MUTABLE LAW. 95. It has been stated (78) that Moral Rules must be expressed by reference to Men's Rights; and thus they necessarily depend upon Rights actually existing. Further, it has been stated (94) that Men's Actual Rights are determined by Positive Law; Men's Rights in each Community are determined by the Positive Law of that Community. But the Laws of different Communities are different; and the determination of Men's Rights by various States are various. Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, are regulated by very different Rules in one State and in another. Private War, Slavery, Polygamy, Concubinage, have been permitted by the Laws of some States; and many other practices which are forbidden by our Laws. And it seems to follow from this, that Morality, which depends on the Laws, must prescribe different Rules, in the States in which such practices are permitted, and in those in which they are forbidden. But on the other hand, we have shown (66) that Moral Rules exist necessarily; that they are necessary to the action of man as man; and that they result necessarily from the possession of Reason. From this it seems to follow, that Moral Rules must be necessary truths, flowing from the moral nature of man; and that therefore, like other necessary truths, they must be universal and unchangeable. |