quences thereof, (for dignity, power, wealth, repute,) to get which to themselves they strive to dispossess or prevent others by this instrument of detraction. It is also rife among scholars, that is, among competitors for wit, learning, industry, and the rewards of them, reputation or preferment. From such principles and causes usually doth this practice spring.

II. It doth involve these kinds of irregularity and pravity. 1. Injustice: a detractor careth not how he dealeth with his neighbor, what wrong he doeth him. Justice obligeth to render every man his due; honor to whom honor is due,' and praise to him that deserveth praise. There can be no greater injury done a man, than to spoil his best good, his virtue; than to rob him of the best reward of his pains and cares, which is a fair reputation; (I speak of rewards which lie in the reach of men.) No man prizes any thing comparably to his honesty and honor; who therefore by any means blurreth them is most injurious. 'Wo unto them-who take the righteousness of the righteous from him:' Isa. v. 23.

Injurious indeed he is not only to the virtuous person, but to virtue itself; for commendation is a debt we owe to it whereever it is found; which conduceth to its encouragement and advancement; and to wrong goodness itself is the most heinous injustice.

2. Uncharitableness: it is evident that the detractor doth not love his neighbor; for charity maketh the best of every thing: charity believeth every thing, hopeth every thing' to the advantage of its object; charity delighteth to see the beloved to prosper and florish; and will therefore contribute its endeavor to the procuring it to do so the detractor therefore (who would defile the best, and display the worst in his neighbor) can have no charity; he indeed manifesteth the greatest hatred, seeing he striveth to do the greatest mischief, to cause the greatest vexation to his neighbor, in bereaving him of his most precious and dear enjoyments.

3. Impiety: he that loveth and reverenceth God, will acknowlege and approve his goodness, in bestowing excellent gifts and graces to his brethren; when such appear, he will be afraid to disavow or disgrace them, that he may not rob God himself of the glory thence due to his favor and mercy,

or through his neighbor's side wound the divine benignity: he will be ready to bless and praise God for all such emanations of his goodness; as those did in the gospel, who, beholding our Saviour's miraculous works of grace, did glorify God, who had given such gifts unto men; but the detractor careth not for that; he feareth not to bereave God of the honor of dispensing good gifts, that his brother may not have the honor of receiving them; he will rather deny God to be good, than allow a man to be so by his grace and blessing: so is he no less a detractor from God, than from his neighbor.

Hence, of all offences, detraction certainly must be most odious to God. He is the God of truth, and therefore detesteth lying, of which detraction ever, especially in moral esteem, hath a spice: he is the God of justice, and therefore especially doth abhor wronging the best persons and actions: he is the God of love, and therefore cannot but loathe this capital violation of charity: he is jealous of his glory, and cannot therefore endure it to be abused by slurring his good gifts and graces; he cannot but hate that offence, which approacheth to that most heinous and unpardonable sin, that consisteth in defaming the excellent works performed by divine power and goodness, ascribing them to bad causes.

4. Detraction involveth degenerous baseness, meanness of spirit, and want of good manners. All men affect to seem generous, and will say they scorn to be base; but generosity is in nothing more seen, than in a candid estimation of other men's virtues and good qualities: to this generosity of nature, generosity of education, generosity of principles and judgment, do all conspiringly dispose: it is the noblest kind of courtesy, to tender and further the reputation of others; to be liberal in bestowing commendation on deserving persons; it obligeth men more than any other benefit can do, procuring them commonly real advantage, always cheering and satisfying their mind; for in nothing more do they please themselves, than in reaping this fruit of their good intention and honest industry, the approbation of worthy men; it is therefore a most gentile thing thus to oblige men. But, on the other side, nothing more plainly argueth a degenerate and ignoble heart, ill-breeding and ill-formed manners, a sorry mind and poor judgment, than

to disesteem or disparage worth and virtue in others: it is the most savage rudeness, the most sordid illiberality, the most ugly clownishness that can be; of all men therefore it most doth misbecome those who pretend to be gentlemen.

5. In consequence to these things, detraction includeth folly; for every unjust, every uncharitable, every impious, every base person is, as such, a fool: none of those qualities are consistent with wisdom; but the folly of it will particularly appear, together with its pravity, by the bad and hurtful effects which it produceth, both in regard to others, and to him that practiseth it; some of which are these:

III. 1. The practice thereof is a great discouragement and obstruction to the common practice of goodness: for many, seeing the best men thus disparaged, and the best actions vilified, are disheartened and deterred from practising virtue, especially in a conspicuous and eminent degree. Why, will many a man say, shall I be strictly good, seeing goodness is so liable to be misused, seeing thereby I shall provoke the detracting tongue, seeing my reward shall be to have a severe inquisition pass on me, to have my life defaced, and my name bespattered? Had not I better be contented with a mediocrity and obscurity of goodness, than by a glaring lustre thereof to draw the envious eye, and kindle raging obloquy on me? Thus men of a weaker spirit, or a bashful temper (who are not stiff and resolute in their way, who have not the heart or the face to bear up against rude assaults of their reputation) will be scared and daunted by detraction; so as consequently to be induced,

placare invidiam virtute relicta.*

And when thus the credit of virtue is blasted in its practisers, many will be diverted from it; so will it grow out of request, and the world will be corrupted by these agents of the evil one.'

It were indeed on this consideration advisable and just, not to seem ever to detract; even not then when we are well assured that by speaking ill we shall not really do it; if we should discover any man to seem worthy, or to be so reputed,

* Hor.

whom yet we discern, by standing in a nearer light, not to be truly such, having had opportunity to know his bad qualities, bad purposes, or bad deeds; yet wisdom would commonly dictate, and goodness dispose not to mar his repute. If we should observe, without danger of mistake, any plausible action to be performed out of bad inclinations, principles, or designs; yet ordinarily in discretion and honesty we should let it pass with such commendation as its appearance may procure, rather than to slur it by venting our disadvantageous apprehensions about it for it is no great harm that any man should enjoy undeserved commendation, or that a counterfeit worth should find a dissembled respect; it is but being over-just, which if it be ever a fault, can hardly be so in this case, wherein we do not expend any cost, or suffer any damage: but it may do mischief to blemish an appearance of virtue; it may be a wrong thereto to deface its very image; the very disclosing hypocrisy doth inflict a wound on goodness, and exposeth it to scandal; for bad men thence will be prone to infer that all virtue proceedeth from the like bad principles: so the disgrace cast on that which is spurious will redound to the prejudice of that which is most genuine and if it be good to forbear detracting from that which is certainly false, much more is it so in regard to that which is possibly true; and far more still is it so in respect to that which is clear and sure.

2. Hence detraction is very noxious and baneful to all society; for all society is maintained in welfare by encouragement of honesty and industry; the which, when disparagement is cast on them, will be in danger to languish and decay: whence a detractor is the worst member that can be of a society; he is a very moth, a very canker therein.

3. Detraction worketh real damage and mischief to our neighbor; it bereaveth him of that goodly reputation which is the proper reward of virtue, and a main support to the practice of it; it often really obstructeth and disappointeth his undertakings, estranging those from him, or setting them against him, who do credulously entertain it.

4. The detractor abuseth those into whose ears he instilleth his poisonous suggestions, engaging them to partake in the injuries done to worth and virtue; causing them to entertain

unjust and uncharitable conceits, to practise unseemly and unworthy behavior toward good men.

5. The detractor produceth great inconveniences and mischiefs to himself.

He raiseth against himself fierce animosity and wrath: for men that are conscious to themselves of their own honest meaning and blameless proceedings, cannot endure to be abused by unjust disparagement; hence are they stirred to boil with passion, and to discharge revenge on the detractor.

He exposeth himself to general hatred; all good men loathe him as a base and mischievous person, and a particular enemy of theirs, always ready to wrong them; every man is apt to say, he that doth thus abuse another will be ready to serve me in like manner if I chance to come in his way, vilifying the best thing I can do: even the worst men will dislike him; for even such affect to do somewhat laudable or plausible, and would be glad to enjoy approbation for it; and cannot therefore brook those who lie in wait to rob them of the fruit of their good endeavors: so do all men worthily detest and shun the detractor, as a common enemy to goodness first, and then unto men. Farther,

6. The detractor yieldeth occasion to others, and a kind of right to return the same measure on him. If he hath in him a show of any thing laudable, men will not allow him any commendation from it: for why, conceive they, shall he receive that which he will not suffer others to enjoy? How can any man admit him to have any real worth or virtue in himself who doth not like it or treat it well in another? Hence, if a detractor hath any good in him, he much injureth himself, depriving himself of all the respect belonging thereto.

7. Again the detractor, esteeming things according to moral possibility, will assuredly be defeated in his aims; his detraction in the close will avail nothing, but to bring trouble and shame on himself: for God hath a particular care over innocence and goodness, so as not to let them finally to suffer the ' good man's righteousness he will bring forth as the light, and his judgment as the noon day.' Wise men easily will discern the foul play, and will scorn it; good men ever will be ready to clear and vindicate the truth; worth, however clouded for a