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quite the same as those for an aeroplane. Under normal weather conditions an area 50 per cent. larger than the airship is sufficient; but the spot chosen must be accessible for motor transport, and shelter from the prevailing winds is essential for safety, unless a mooring mast is available. The selection of ground suitable for the flying of man-lifting kites is often difficult. The site must be free from obstacles and have a clear space 600 to 1000 yards in length for safe hauling-in. It is possible to haul down in a smaller space, but this involves considerable preparation.

The various points bearing on the utility of aircraft in reconnaissance have been dwelt on, because reconnaissance is, at present, pre-eminently their rôle. Indications are, however, not lacking that they are destined to play another and equally important rôle in warfare. Fighting aircraft must now be considered. The problems inherent in the question of aerial warfare are numerous and complex. They may perhaps be best considered under two heads, first, aerial warfare proper, that is the action of aircraft against aircraft in the air; and, second, the action of aircraft against troops, transport, bases, etc., on the ground.

With regard to the first, there are no data upon which to base conclusions. Inferences can only be drawn from the apparent battle-value of the various types. Airships are armed with small quick-firing guns, machine-guns, automatic rifles and bombs; and the same type of armament may also be used in aeroplanes. As already mentioned, the airship when opposed to aeroplanes will probably have the advantage of fire superiority owing to its heavier armament and comparatively large 'platform stability,' but on the other hand its envelope affords a large and extremely vulnerable target. Owing to its ability to ascend vertically and swiftly, it will, during the first phases of the combat, be able to obtain and maintain position,' but eventually its slower-climbing assailants will be able to rise above it. In this case, if the airship has no gun mounted on the top, its whole armament will be defiladed by its envelope. In a running fight, however, advantage will, to some extent, be with the airship owing to its superiority in air-duration.

It does not seem probable that pitched battles will take place between fleets of such aeroplanes as now exist. Their radius of action is limited, and they cannot keep the air indefinitely while waiting for their scouts to bring back information as to the enemy's whereabouts. Owing to lack of facilities for inter-communication, cohesion in an aeroplane fleet would be difficult to maintain, and manoeuvre under a single commander would be impossible. It is probable therefore, that after the first onset the battle will resolve itself into a series of combats between small units or single machines. Airships undoubtedly possess an advantage in the fact that their wireless installation facilitates control, and hence concerted action. It seems probable that they will endeavour to fight in flotillas or fleets, to ensure mutual support and utilise their superior gun-power.

With regard to the second head, that of aircraft acting against troops on the ground, the data, though of a negative character, and referring only to bombdropping, are interesting. Bombs were dropped from aircraft both in the Balkans and in Tripoli. The actual results in both cases were negligible. For instance, a Bulgarian aeroplane is reported to have dropped thirty bombs into Adrianople in one day, and the resulting casualties were only six. Bomb-dropping will, of course, be more effective from airships than from aeroplanes, but the speed of both renders it very difficult to hit any object aimed at from a safe height. Though the obstacles are being gradually overcome, troops on the ground are still little vulnerable to aircraft attack. The probable result of aircraft attack is, then, as yet chiefly moral. When the various types of fighting aircraft are evolved and their armaments and methods of attack perfected, the results will be very real. Aircraft will then carry the attack into the strategical zone, and perhaps beyond it. Troops in mass, on the march, in camp and in bivouac, ammunition and supply parks, arsenals, dockyards, naval and aircraft bases,these will be some of the targets selected.

The duties of aircraft in future campaigns will be numerous and widely divergent in character, and, as already indicated, various classes of machine will be required for their performance. We may soon have

to consider such problems as the types of craft best suited for work with the Cavalry, with Headquarters of the Army, and with Flanking Divisions; the type best adapted to the requirements of a battle squadron, of a low-flying armoured destroyer, of a scout flotilla, and possibly of transport convoy and repair craft. The forerunners of these fighting aircraft are already with us; weight-lifting aeroplanes and giant airships are flying to-day. Large as these machines may now appear, they will certainly be dwarfed by the aircraft of the future, for many desirable features are enhanced with increase of size.

That

The evolution of the most suitable types of aircraft is the phase in the struggle for air supremacy upon which we are now entering. In the matter of design and construction of aeroplanes, in personnel and in organisation, Great Britain undoubtedly leads. lead can only be maintained by sustained and strenuous effort. There can be no question that, both from the military and the commercial point of view, aerial supremacy is within our reach. Will she but make the effort, England may be mistress of the air as she is of the seas. The provision of numbers must be faced. Vast issues are at stake; and it is surely unthinkable that the opportunity will be lost. In the sphere of aeronautics it is more difficult than in others to regain ground. The time is at hand when even feverish effort will not avail, but to-day we may take the lead with comparative ease, and once gained it should not be difficult to retain. The expenditure entailed would be very slight in comparison to the sums spent on those other types of national insurance, the Army and Navy. The entire vote for the Air Service for the current year would not purchase a single Dreadnought, yet there can be no doubt that the expenditure represents a better insurance return. From the point of view of national safety, a paramount air service is the most economical form of national insurance.

F. H. SYKES.

Art. 14.-THE HOME RULE CRISIS.

1. Correspondence relating to recent events in the Irish Command. (Cd 7318.)

2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 1914.

3. Reports of Speeches by Ministers and Opposition Leaders, Jan.-April, 1914.

THE possibility of finding a way out of the Home Rule crisis by a national settlement was discussed in the January number of this Review. The conclusion then arrived at was that such a settlement could only be attained if the leaders of both parties could muster the courage to make an entirely fresh start, to summon a national convention selected on non-party lines, and to submit to that convention for discussion and decision not only the question of the creation of some system of provincial government in the United Kingdom, but also that of the reconstitution and reorganisation of our whole legislative machinery. It was felt that no attempt at a settlement could be really successful which ignored the intimate interaction of the Parliament Act upon the Home Rule situation. Even more strongly expressed was the conviction that the attempt to find a settlement in a compromise on some portion of the Home Rule Bill, and in particular with regard to the position of Ulster, was predestined to failure from the outset, and, even if temporarily successful, could afford no cure for the evils of the body politic and no guarantee against the speedy recurrence of the crisis. The discussion of the exclusion of Ulster, in any shape or form, was earnestly deprecated, not only as unsatisfactory in itself, but as furnishing the worst hope of peace, if the party leaders were really anxious for peace, and not merely manoeuvring for position and looking for opportunities to advertise their own extreme moderation and the unreasonableness and obstinacy of their opponents.

The course of events in the last three months has fully justified the apprehensions then expressed. The method of settlement on national lines and over the whole field of controversy seems to have been ruled out from the first by the Government, as inconsistent with its avowed resolve to place the present Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book under the Parliament Act. The

exclusion of Ulster has been the one subject of negotiation. And the only result, so far, of three months of private and public bargaining and disputation, is a complete deadlock over a proposal which is wholly unacceptable to Ulster and thoroughly distasteful to the Irish Nationalists, and which, if accepted, would mean years of administrative chaos in Ireland and of political chaos in the United Kingdom. And while the outstanding difference between the two parties over this proposal would seem, at the first glance, to be reduced to a very narrow margin, there has been not the slightest real approximation in the point of view, and the gulf remains as deep as ever.

Meanwhile the development of the crisis towards its culmination has been full of significant features and of dramatic interludes. The actual course of the 'conversations' which took place between the Prime Minister and Mr Bonar Law and Sir E. Carson during December and January last remains a secret. But the fact that they had not succeeded in coming to any agreement was a matter of general knowledge long before it was officially proclaimed in the King's Speech on February 10. That document referred to the crisis in terms of unprecedented seriousness and anxiety:

In a matter in which the hopes and the fears of so many of My subjects are keenly concerned, and which, unless handled now with foresight, judgment, and in the spirit of mutual concession, threatens grave future difficulties, it is My most earnest wish that the good will and co-operation of men of all parties and creeds may heal dissension and lay the foundation of a lasting settlement.'

Language such as this might well have preluded a generous offer to deal with the whole problem on national and non-party lines. But, judging from the subsequent conduct of the Government, it is difficult to see with what object it was introduced into the King's Speech, except that of creating a conciliatory atmosphere in which it might be easier for the Government to gain time while in effect pushing ahead with its programme. Mr Asquith, in the debate on the Address, after allusions which indicated, with studied vagueness, that the exclusion of Ulster in some form or other might be in

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