the rest of the world. The natural basis of trade is rivalship of quality and price; or, which is the same thing, of skill and industry. Every attempt to force trade by operation of law, that is, by compelling persons to buy goods at one market, which they can obtain cheaper and better from another, is sure to be either eluded by the quick-sightedness and incessant activity of private interest, or to be frustrated by retaliation. One half of the commercial laws of many states are calculated merely to counteract the restrictions which have been imposed by other states. Perhaps the only way in which the interposition of law is salutary in trade, is in the prevention of frauds. Next to the indispensable requisites of internal peace and security, the chief advantage which can be derived to population from the interference of law, appears to me to consist in the encouragement of agriculture. This, at least, is the direct way of increasing the number of the people: every other mode being effectual only by its influence upon this. Now the principal expedient by which such a purpose can be promoted, is to adjust the laws of property, as nearly as possible, to the two following rules: first, "to give to the occupier all the power over the soil, which is necessary for its perfect cultivation;"-secondly, "to assign the whole profit of every improvement to the persons by whose activity it is carried on." What we call property in land, as hath been observed above, is power over it. Now it is indifferent to the public in whose hands this power resides, if it be rightly used; it matters not to whom the land belongs, if it be well cultivated. When we lament that great estates are often united in the same hand, or complain that one man possesses what would be sufficient for a thousand, we suffer ourselves to be misled by words. The owner of ten thousand pounds a-year, consumes little more of the produce of the soil than the owner of ten pounds a-year. If the cultivation be equal, the estate in the hands of one great lord, affords subsistence and employment to the same number of persons as it would do if it were divided amongst a hundred proprietors. In like manner we ought to judge of the effect upon the public interest, which may arise from lands being holden by the king, or by the subject; by private persons, or by corporations; by laymen, or ecclesiastics; in fee, or for life; by virtue of office, or in right of inheritance. I do not mean that these varieties make no difference, but I mean that all the difference they do make respects the cultivation of the lands which are so holden. and general law of enfranchisement, partition, and enclosure; which, though compulsory upon the lord, or the rest of the tenants, whilst it has in view the melioration of the soil, and tenders an equitable compensation for every right that it takes away, is neither more arbitrary, nor more dangerous to the stability of property, than that which is done in the construction of roads, bridges, embankments, navigable canals, and indeed in almost every pub lic work, in which private owners of land are obliged to accept that price for their property which an indifferent jury may award. It may here, however, be proper to observe, that although the enclosure of wastes and pastures be generally beneficial to population, yet the enclosure of lands in tillage, in order to convert them into pastures, is as generally hurtful. But, secondly, agriculture is discouraged by every constitution of landed property which lets in those, who have no concern in the improvement, to a participation of the profit. This objection is applicable to all such customs of manors as subject the proprietor, upon the death of the lord or tenant, or the alienation of the estate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land. But of all institutions which are in this way adverse to cultivation and improvement, none is so noxious as that of tithes. A claimant here enters into the produce, who contributed no assistance whatever to the production. When years, perhaps, of care and toil have matured an improvement; when the husbandman sees new crops ripening to his skill and industry; the moment he is ready to put his sickle to the grain, he finds himself compelled to divide his harvest with a stranger. Tithes are a tax not only upon industry, but upon that industry which feeds mankind; upon that species of exertion which it is the aim of all wise laws to cherish and promote; and to uphold and excite which, composes, as we have seen, the main benefit that the community receives from the whole system of trade, and the success of commerce. And, together with the more general inconveniency that attends the exaction of tithes, there is this additional evil, in the mode at least according to which they are collected at present, that they operate as a bounty upon pasturage. The burthen of the tax falls with its chief, if not with its whole weight, upon tillage; that is to say, upon that precise mode of cultivation, which, as hath been shown above, it is the business of the state to relieve and remunerate, in preference to every other. No measure of such extensive concern appears to me so practicable, nor any single alteration so beneficial, as the conversion of tithes into corn-rents. CHAPTER XII. This There exist in this country, conditions of tenure which condemn the land itself to perpetual sterility. Of this kind is the right of common, which pre-commutation, I am convinced, might be so adjusted cludes each proprietor from the improvement, or as to secure to the tithe-holder a complete and even the convenient occupation, of his estate, with- perpetual equivalent for his interest, and to leave out (what seldom can be obtained) the consent of to industry its full operation, and entire reward. many others. This tenure is also usually embarrassed by the interference of manorial claims, under which it often happens that the surface belongs to one owner, and the soil to another; so that neither owner can stir a clod without the concurrence of his partner in the property. In many manors, the tenant is restrained from granting leases beyond a short term of years; which renders every plan of solid improvement impracticable. In these cases, the owner wants, what the first rule of rational policy requires, "sufficient power over the soil for its perfect cultivation." This power ought to be extended to him by some easy Of War, and of Military Establishments. BECAUSE the Christian Scriptures describe wars as what they are, as crimes or judgments, some have been led to believe that it is unlawful for a Christian to bear arms. But it should be remembered that it may be necessary for individuals to unite their force, and for this end to resign themselves to the direction of a common will; and yet it may be true that that will is often actuated by upon its ultimate utility; that this utility, having criminal motives, and often determined to destruc- a finite and determinate value, situations may be tive purposes. Hence, although the origin of wars feigned, and consequently may possibly arise, in be ascribed, in Scripture, to the operation of law which the general tendency is outweighed by the less and malignant passion;* and though war it- enormity of the particular mischief: but she reself be enumerated among the sorest calamities calls, at the same time, to the consideration of the with which a land can be visited, the profession inquirer, the almost inestimable importance, as of of a soldier is nowhere forbidden or condemned. other general rules of relative justice, so especially When the soldiers demanded of John the Baptist of national and personal fidelity; the unseen, if what they should do, he said unto them, "Do vio- not unbounded, extent of the mischief which must lence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and follow from the want of it; the danger of leaving be content with your wages." In which answer it to the sufferer to decide upon the comparison we do not find that, in order to prepare themselves of particular and general consequences; and the for the reception of the kingdom of God, it was still greater danger of such decisions being drawn required of soldiers to relinquish their profession, into future precedents. If treaties, for instance, but only that they should beware of the vices of be no longer binding than whilst they are convewhich that profession was accused. The precept nient, or until the inconveniency ascend to a which follows, "Be content with your wages,' certain point, (which point must be fixed by the supposed them to continue in their situation. It judgment, or rather by the feelings, of the comwas of a-Roman centurion that Christ pronouneed plaining party;) or if such an opinion, after being that memorable eulogy, "I have not found so great authorised by a few examples, come at length to faith, no, not in Israel." The first Gentile con- prevail; one and almost the only method of avertverts who was received into the Christian church, ing or closing the calamities of war, of either preand to whom the Gospel was imparted by the im- venting or putting a stop to the destruction of mediate and especial direction of Heaven, held mankind, is lost to the world for ever. We do the same station: and in the history of this trans- not say that no evil can exceed this, nor any posaction we discover not the smallest intimation, sible advantage compensate it; but we say that a that Cornelius, upon becoming a Christian, quit-loss, which affects all, will scarcely be made up ted the service of the Roman legion; that his pro-to the common stock of human happiness by any fession was objected to, or his continuance in it considered as in any wise inconsistent with his new character. In applying the principles of morality to the affairs of nations, the difficulty which meets us, arises from hence, “that the particular consequence sometimes appears to exceed the value of the general rule." In this circumstance is founded the only distinction that exists between the case of independent states, and of independent individuals. In the transactions of private persons, no advantage that results from the breach of a general law of justice, can compensate to the public for the violation of the law; in the concerns of empire, this may sometimes be doubted. Thus, that the faith of promises ought to be maintained, as far as is lawful, and as far as was intended by the parties, whatever inconveniency either of them may suffer by his fidelity, in the intercourse of private life, is seldom disputed; because it is evident to almost every man who reflects upon the subject, that the common happiness gains more by the preservation of the rule, than it could do by the removal of the inconveniency. But when the adherence to a public treaty would enslave a whole people; would block up seas, rivers, or harbours; depopulate cities; condemn fertile regions to eternal desolation; cut off a country from its sources of provision, or deprive it of those commercial advantages to which its climate, produce, or situation naturally entitle it: the magnitude of the particular evil induces us to call in question the obligation of the general rule. Moral Philosophy furnishes no precise solution to these doubts. She cannot pronounce that any rule of morality is so rigid as to bend to no exceptions; nor, on the other hand, can she comprise these exceptions within any previous description. She confesses that the obligation of every law depends James iv. 1. Luke iii. 14. § Acts. x. 1. benefit that can be procured to a single nation, which, however respectable when compared with any other single nation, bears an inconsiderable proportion to the whole. These, however, are the principles upon which the calculation is to be formed. It is enough, in this place, to remark the cause which produces the hesitation that we sometimes feel, in applying rules of personal probity to the conduct of nations. As between individuals it is found impossible to ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility, not only because such reference is oftentimes too remote for the direction of private consciences, but because a multitude of cases arise in which it is indifferent to the general interest by what rule men act, though it be absolutely neces sary that they act by some constant and known rule or other and as, for these reasons, certain positive constitutions are wont to be established in every society, which, when established, become as obligatory as the original principles of natural justice themselves; so, likewise, it is between independent communities. Together with those maxims of universal equity which are common to states and to individuals, and by which the rights and conduct of the one as well as the other, ought to be adjusted, when they fall within the scope and application of such maxims; there exists also amongst sovereigns a system of artificial jurisprudence, under the name of the law of nations. In this code are found the rules which determine the right to vacant or newly discovered countries; those which relate to the protection of fugitives, the privileges of ambassadors, the condition and duties of neutrality, the immunities of neutral ships, ports, and coasts, the distance from shore to which these immunities extend, the distinction between free and contraband goods, and a variety of subjects of the same kind. Concerning which examples, and indeed the principal part of what is called the jus gentium, it may be observed, that the rules derive their moral force, (by which I mean the regard that ought to be paid to them by federacy of states, be strong enough to overwhelm the rest. The objects of just war, are, precaution, defence, or reparation. In a larger sense, every just war is a defensive war, inasmuch as every just war supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared. of territory, or of trade; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation. There are two lessons of rational and sober policy, which, if it were possible to inculcate them into the councils of princes, would exclude many of the motives of war, and allay that restless ambition which is constantly stirring up one part of mankind against another. the consciences of sovereigns,) not from their internal reasonableness or justice, for many of them are perfectly arbitrary, nor yet from the authority by which they were established, for the greater part have grown insensibly into usage, without any public compact, formal acknowledgment, or even known original; but simply from the fact of The insufficient causes or unjustifiable motheir being established, and the general duty of tives of war, are the family alliances, the personal conforming to established rules upon questions, friendships, or the personal quarrels, of princes; and between parties, where nothing but positive the internal disputes which are carried on in other regulations can prevent disputes, and where dis-nations; the justice of other wars; the extension putes are followed by such destructive consequences. The first of the instances which we have just now enumerated, may be selected for the illustration of this remark. The nations of Europe consider the sovereignty of newly-discovered countries as belonging to the prince or state whose subject makes the discovery and in pursuance of this rule, it is usual for a navigator, who falls upon an unknown shore, to take possession of it, in The first of these lessons admonishes princes the name of his sovereign at home, by erecting to "place their glory and their emulation, not in his standard, or displaying his flag upon a desert extent of territory, but in raising the greatest coast. Now nothing can be more fanciful, or less quantity of happiness out of a given territory.". substantiated by any considerations of reason or The enlargement of territory by conquest is not justice, than the right which such discovery, or only not a just object of war, but in the greater part the transient occupation and idle ceremony that of the instances in which it is attempted, not even accompany it, confer upon the country of the dis- desirable. It is certainly not desirable where it coverer. Nor can any stipulation be produced, adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or by which the rest of the world have bound them- the security, of the conquerors. What comselves to submit to this pretension. Yet when we monly is gained to a nation, by the annexing of reflect that the claims to newly-discovered coun- new dependencies, or the subjugation of other tries can hardly be settled, between the different countries to its dominion, but a wider frontier to nations which frequent them, without some posi- defend; more interfering claims to vindicate; tive rule or other; that such claims, if left un- more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions, to settled, would prove sources of ruinous and fatal encounter; a greater force to keep up by sea and contentions; that the rule already proposed, how-land; more services to provide for, and more ever arbitrary, possesses one principal quality of a establishments to pay? And, in order to draw rule, determination and certainty: above all, from these acquisitions something that may make that it is acquiesced in, and that no one has power up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to to substitute another, however he might con- be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and trive a better, in its place: when we reflect upon watched, at an expense which costs half their these properties of the rule, or rather upon these produce. Thus the provinces are oppressed, in consequences of rejecting its authority, we are led order to pay for being ill-governed; and the orito ascribe to it the virtue and obligation of a pre-ginal state is exhausted in maintaining a feeble cept of natural justice, because we perceive in it authority over discontented subjects. No assignthat which is the foundation of justice itself, able portion of country is benefited by the change; public importance and utility. And a prince who and if the sovereign appear to himself to be enshould dispute this rule, for the want of regularity riched or strengthened, when every part of his in its formation, or of intelligible justice in its dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, principle, and by such disputes should disturb the it is probable that he is deceived by apppearances. tranquillity of nations, and at the same time lay Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is the foundation of future disturbances, would be magnified by those exploits; the glory which is little less criminal than he who breaks the public purchased, and the ambition which is gratified, by peace, by a violation of engagements to which he the distress of one country without adding to the had himself consented, or by an attack upon those happiness of another, which at the same time national rights which are founded immediately in enslaves the new and impoverishes the ancient the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of part of the empire, by whatever names it may be equity. The same thing may be repeated of the known or flattered, ought to be an object of unirules which the law of nations prescribes in the versal execration; and oftentimes not more so to other instances that were mentioned, namely, that the vanquished, than to the very people whose the obscurity of their origin, or the arbitrariness of armies or whose treasures have achieved the their principle, subtracts nothing from the respect victory. that is due to them, when once established. War may be considered with a view to its causes and its conduct. The justifying causes of war, are, deliberate invasions of right, and the necessity of maintaining such a balance of power amongst neighbouring nations, as that no single state, or con There are, indeed, two cases in which the extension of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The first is, where an empire thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which divide it from the rest of the world. Thus we account the British Channel the natural boundary which separates the nations of England and France; and if France possessed any countries on this, or England any cities or provinces on that, side of the sea, recovery of such towns and districts suit of honour, when set loose from the admonitions of prudence, becomes in kings a wild and romantic passion: eager to engage, and gathering fury in its progress, it is checked by no difficulties, repelled by no dangers; it forgets or despises those considerations of safety, ease, wealth, and plenty, which, in the eye of true public wisdom, compose the objects to which the renown of arms, the fame of victory, are only instrumental and subordinate. The pursuit of interest, on the other hand, is a sober prínciple; computes costs and consequences; is cautious of entering into war; stops in time: when regulated by those universal maxims of relative justice which belong to the affairs of communities as well as of private persons, it is the right principle for nations to proceed by: even when it trespasses upon these regulations, it is much less dangerous, because much more temperate than the other. to what may be called their natural sovereign, though it may not be a just reason for commencing war, would be a proper use to make of victory, The other case is, where neighbouring states, being severally too small and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that surround them, can only be safe by a strict and constant junction of their strength: here conquest will affect the purposes of confederation and alliance; and the union which it produces is often more close and permanent than that which results from voluntary association. Thus, if the heptarchy had continued in England, the different kingdoms of it might have separately fallen a prey to foreign invasion: and although the interest and danger of one part of the island were in truth common to every other part, it might have been difficult to have circulated this persuasion amongst independent nations, or to have united them in any regular or steady opposition II. The conduct of war.-If the cause and end to their continental enemies, had not the valour of war be justifiable'; all the means that appear and fortune of an enterprising prince incorporated necessary to the end, are justifiable also. This the whole into a single monarchy. Here, the con-is the principle which defends those extremities quered gained as much by the revolution, as the conquerors. In like manner, and for the same reason, when the two royal families of Spain were met together in one race of princes, and the several provinces of France had devolved into the possession of a single sovereign, it became unsafe for the inhabitants of Great Britain any longer to remain under separate governments. The union of England and Scotland, which transformed two quarrelsome neighbours into one powerful empire, and which was first brought about by the course of succession, and afterwards completed by amicable convention, would have been a fortunate conclusion of hostilities, had it been effected by the operations of war.-These two cases being admitted, namely, the obtaining of natural bounda-weakening his strength, or in any manner tending ries and barriers, and the including under the same government those who have a common danger and a common enemy to guard against; I know not whether a third can be thought of, in which the extension of empire by conquest is useful even to the conquerors. to which the violence of war usually proceeds: for since war is a contest by force between parties who acknowledge no common superior, and since it includes not in its idea the supposition of any convention which should place limits to the operations of force, it has naturally no boundary but that in which force terminates,-the destruction of the life against which the force is directed. Let it be observed, however, that the license of war authorises no acts of hostility but what are necessary or conducive to the end and object of the war. Gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from this plea: of which kind is every cruelty and every insult that serves only to exasperate the sufferings, or to incense the hatred, of an enemy, without to procure his submission; such as the slaughter of captives, the subjecting of them to indignities or torture, the violation of women, the profanation of temples, the demolition of public buildings, libraries, statues, and in general the destruction or defacing of works that conduce nothing to annoyance or defence. These enormities are prohibited not only by the practice of civilized nations, but by the law of nature itself; as having no proper tendency to accelerate the termination, or accomplish the object of the war; and as containing that which in peace and war is equally unjustifiable,— ultimate and gratuitous mischief. The second rule of prudence which ought to be recommended to those who conduct the affairs of nations, is, "never to pursue national honour as distinct from national interest." This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honour of a nation for the sake of its interest. The spirit and courage of a people are supported by flattering their pride. Concessions which betray There are other restrictions imposed upon the too much of fear or weakness, though they relate conduct of war, not by the law of nature primarily, to points of mere ceremony, invite demands and but by the laws of war, first, and by the law of attacks of more serious importance. Our rule nature as seconding and ratifying the laws of war. allows all this; and only directs that, when points The laws of war are part of the law of nations; of honour become subjects of contention between and founded, as to their authority, upon the same sovereigns, or are likely to be made the occasion of principle with the rest of that code, namely, upon war, they be estimated with a reference to utility, the fact of their being established, no matter when and not by themselves. "The dignity of his crown, or by whom; upon the expectation of their being the honour of his flag, the glory of his arms," in mutually observed, in consequence of that estathe mouth of a prince, are stately and imposing|blishment; and upon the general utility which terms; but the ideas they inspire, are insatiable. results from such observance. The binding force It may be always glorious to conquer, whatever of these rules is the greater, because the regard be the justice of the war, or the price of the vic- that is paid to them must be universal or none. tory. The dignity of a sovereign may not permit The breach of the rule can only be punished by the him to recede from claims of homage and respect, subversion of the rule itself: on which account, the at whatever expense of national peace and happi- whole mischief that ensues from the laws of those ness they are to be maintained; however unjust salutary restrictions which such rules prescribe, is they may have been in their original, or in their justly chargeable upon the first aggressor. To continuance however useless to the possessor, or this consideration may be referred the duty of remortifying and vexatious to other states. The pur-fraining in war from poison and from assassina excess of numbers, and a ready supply of recruits may sustain a defensive or a flying war against regular troops: it is also true that any service, which keeps soldiers for a while together, and inures them by little and little to the habits of war and the dangers of action, transforms them in efmay be necessary for almost a whole nation to go out to war to repel an invader; beside that a people so unprepared must always have the seat, and with it the miseries, of war at home, being utterly incapable of carrying their operations into a foreign country. tion. If the law of nature simply be consulted, it may be difficult to distinguish between these and other methods of destruction, which are practised without scruple by nations at war. If it be lawful to kill an enemy at all, it seems lawful to do so by one mode of death as well as by another; by a dose of poison, as by the point of a sword;fect into a standing army. But upon this plan it by the hand of an assassin, as by the attack of an army: for if it be said that one species of assault leaves to an enemy the power of defending itself against it, and that the other two does not; it may be answered, that we possess at least the same right to cut off an enemy's defence, that we have to seek his destruction. In this manner might the question be debated, if there existed no rule or law of armies, it follows, not only that it is unsafe for a From the acknowledged superiority of standing war upon the subject. But when we observe that nation to disband its regular troops, whilst neighsuch practices are at present excluded by the usage bouring kingdoms retain theirs; but also that and opinions of civilized nations; that the first re-regular troops provide for the public service at the course to them would be followed by instant re-least possible expense. I suppose a certain quantaliation; that the mutual license which such tity of military strength to be necessary, and I say attempts must introduce, would fill both sides with that a standing army costs the community less the misery of continual dread and suspicion, with- than any other establishment which presents out adding to the strength or success of either; to an enemy the same force. The constant that when the example came to be more generally drudgery of low employments is not only incomimitated, which it soon would be, after the senti-patible with any great degree of perfection or exment that condemns it had been once broken in upon, it would greatly aggravate the horrors and calamities of war, yet procure no superiority to any of the nations engaged in it; when we view these effects, we join in the public reprobation of such fatal expedients, as of the admission amongst mankind of new and enormous evils without necessity or advantage.-The law of nature, we see at length, forbids these innovations, as so many transgressions of a beneficial general rule actually subsisting. pertness in the profession of a soldier, but the profession of a soldier almost always unfits men for the business of regular occupations. Of three inhabitants of a village, it is better that one should addict himself entirely to arms, and the other two stay constantly at home to cultivate the ground, than that all three should mix the avocations of a camp, with the business of husbandry. By the former arrangement, the country gains one complete soldier, and two industrious husbandmen; The license of war then acknowledges two limi-who are at the same time three idle and profligate from the latter it receives three raw militia-men, tations: it authorises no hostilities which have not an apparent tendency to effectuate the object of the war; it respects those positive laws which the custom of nations hath sanctified, and which whilst they are mutually conformed to, mitigate the calamities of war, without weakening its operations, or diminishing the power or safety of belligerent states. peasants. It should be considered also, that the emergencies of war wait not for seasons. Where there is no standing army ready for immediate service, it may be necessary to call the reaper from the fields in harvest, or the ploughman in seed time; and the provision of a whole year may perish by the interruption of one month's labour. A standing army, therefore, is not only a more effectual, but a cheaper, method of providing for the public safety, than any other, because it adds takes less from that which composes the wealth of more than any other to the common strength, and a nation,-its stock of productive industry. Long and various experience seems to have convinced the nations of Europe, that nothing but a standing army can oppose a standing army, where the numbers on each side bear any mode-ing armies and militias, which deserves a more atThere is yet another distinction between standrate proportion to one another. The first stand- tentive consideration than any that has been ing army that appeared in Europe after the fall of mentioned. When the state relies, for its defence, the Roman legion, was that which was erected in upon a militia, it is necessary that arms be put France, by Charles VII. about the middle of the into the hands of the people at large. The mififteenth century: and that the institution hath litia itself must be numerous, in proportion to the since become general, can only be attributed to the want or inferiority of its discipline, and the imbesuperiority and success which are every where obcilities or defects of its constitution. Moreover, as served to attend it. The truth is, the closeness, such a militia must be supplied by rotation, allotregularity, and quickness, of their movements; the ment, or some mode of succession whereby they unreserved, instantaneous, and almost mechanical, who have served a certain time are replaced by obedience to orders; the sense of personal honour, fresh drafts from the country; a much greater and the familiarity with danger, which belong to number will be instructed in the use of arms, and a disciplined, veteran, and embodied soldiery, give will have been occasionally embodied together, such firmness and intrepidity to their approach, than are actually employed, or than are supposed such weight and execution to their attack, as are to be wanted, at the same time. Now what not to be withstood by loose ranks of occasional and effects upon the civil condition of the country may newly-levied troops, who are liable by their inex-be looked for from this general diffusion of the perience to disorder and confusion, and in whom fear is constantly augmented by novelty and surprise. It is possible that a militia, with a great military character, becomes an inquiry of great |