not brought upon himself, whether it be of public advantage to admit such application, whether it be not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether the money can be well spared, or might not be better applied; when these considerations are put together, it may appear very doubtful, whether we ought or ought not to give any thing. But when we reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tenderness of mind; that it is a quality, cherished by indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition; when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner's; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.

advertency; of a prompt obedience to the judgment occurring, or of yielding to the first impulse of passion; of extending our views to the future, or of resting upon the present; of apprehending, methodising, reasoning; of indolence and dilatoriness; of vanity, self-conceit, melancholy, partiality; of fretfulness, suspicion, captiousness; censoriousness; of pride, ambition, covetousness; of overreaching, intriguing, projecting; in a word, there is not a quality or function, either of body or mind, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature.

II. The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation.

This has been made an objection to Christianity; but without reason. For as all revelation, however imparted originally, must be transmitted by A man of confirmed good habits, will act in the ordinary vehicle of language, it behoves those the same manner without any consideration at all. who make the objection, to show that any form of This may serve for one instance; another is the words could be devised, that might express this following:-A man has been brought up from his quantity; or that it is possible to constitute a infancy with a dread of lying. An occasion pre- standard of moral attainments, accommodated to sents itself where, at the expense of a little vera- the almost infinite diversity which subsists in the city, he may divert his company, set off his own capacities and opportunities of different men. wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage It seems most agreeable to our conceptions of the partiality of all about him. This is not a justice, and is consonant enough to the language small temptation. And when he looks at the of scripture,* to suppose, that there are prepared other side of the question, he sees no mischief that for us rewards and punishments, of all possible can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any degrees, from the most exalted happiness down to man's reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to extreme misery; so that "our labour is never in any man's interest. Were there nothing further vain;" whatever advancement we make in virtue, to be considered, it would be difficult to show why we procure a proportionable accession of future a man under such circumstances might not in-happiness; as, on the other hand, every accumudulge his humour. But when he reflects that his lation of vice is the "treasuring up so much wrath scruples about lying have hitherto preserved him against the day of wrath." It has been said, that free from this vice; that occasions like the present it can never be a just economy of Providence, to will return, where the inducement may be equally admit one part of mankind into heaven, and constrong, but the indulgence much less innocent; demn the other to hell; since there must be very that his scruples will wear away by a few trans- little to choose, between the worst man who is gressions, and leave him subject to one of the received into heaven, and the best who is excluded. meanest and most pernicious of all bad habits,-a | And how know we, it might be answered, but that habit of lying, whenever it will serve his turn: there may be as little to choose in the conditions? when all this, I say, is considered, a wise man will Without entering into a detail of Scripture forego the present, or a much greater pleasure, morality, which would anticipate our subject, the rather than lay the foundation of a character so following general positions may be advanced, I vicious and contemptible. think, with safety.

There needs no other proof of this, than the consideration, that a brute would be as proper an object of reward as such a man, and that, if the case were so, the penal sanctions of religion could

From what has been said, may be explained 1. That a state of happiness is not to be expectalso the nature of habitual virtue. By the defi-ed by those who are conscious of no moral or nition of virtue, placed at the beginning of this religious rule: I mean those who cannot with chapter, it appears, that the good of mankind is truth say, that they have been prompted to one the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlast-action, or withholden from one gratification, by ing happiness the motive and end, of all virtue. any regard to virtue or religion, either immediate Yet, in fact, a man shall perform many an act of or habitual. virtue without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thought. How is this to be understood? In the same manner as that a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious, at every turn, of a particular regard to his master's will, or of an express attention to his master's interest: indeed, your best old servants are of this sort: but then he must have served for a length of time under the actual direction of these motives, to bring it to this in which service, his merit and virtue consist.

He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also spar ingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully;" 2 Cor. ix. 6.-" And that servant which did according to his will, shall be beaten with many knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither stripes; but he that knew not, shall be beaten with few stripes." Luke xii. 47, 48-"Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong There are habits, not only of drinking, swear-reward;" to wit, intimating that there is in reserve a to Christ; verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his ing, and lying, and of some other things, which proportionable reward for even the smallest act of are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and virtue. Mark ix. 41.-See also the parable of the pounds, called so: but of every modification of action, Luke xix. 16, &c.; where he whose pound had gained speech, and thought. Man is a bundle of habits. pound had gained five pounds, was placed over five ten pounds, was placed over ten cities; and he whose There are habits of industry, attention, vigilance, cities.

have no place. For, whom would you punish, if | peared doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject,

tended to sins deliberately, habitually, and ob- The question Why am I obliged to keep my stinately persisted in.

What we mean to say when a man is obliged to and that the obligation to practise virtue, to do

I will not undertake to say that the words obligation and obliged are used uniformly in this sense, or always with this distinction: nor is it possible to tie down popular phrases to any constant signification: but wherever the motive is They who would establish a system of morality, violent enough, and coupled with the idea of com-independent of a future state, must look out for mand, authority, law, or the will of a superior, some different idea of moral obligation; unless there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be they can show that virtue conducts the possessor obliged. to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.

nature. The second question comprises the pro-held forth in the Gospel will actually come to pass,

vince of morality. Both questions are too much for one work. The affirmative therefore of the first, although we confess that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric rests, must in this treatise be taken for granted.

CHAPTER IV.

The will of God.

As the will of God is our rule; to inquire what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in any instance, is, in effect, to inquire what is the will of God in that instance? which consequently becomes the whole business of morality.

Now there are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point:

I. By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture.

II. By what we can discover of his designs and disposition from his works; or, as we usually call it, the light of nature.

And here we may observe the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the same,-to discover the will of God,—and, provided we do but discover it, it matters nothing by what means.

An ambassador, judging by what he knows of his sovereign's disposition, and arguing from what he has observed of his conduct, or is acquainted with of his designs, may take his measures in many cases with safety, and presume with great probability how his master would have him act on most occasions that arise: but if he have his commission and instructions in his pocket, it would be strange not to look into them. He will be directed by both rules: when his instructions are clear and positive, there is an end to all further deliberation (unless indeed he suspect their authenticity) where his instructions are silent or dubious, he will endeavour to supply or explain them by what he has been able to collect from other quarters of his master's general inclination or intentions.

they must be considered. Such as reject the Christian Religion, are to make the best shift they can to build up a system, and lay the foundation of morality without it. But it appears to me a great inconsistency in those who receive Christianity, and expect something to come of it, to endeavour to keep all such expectations out of sight in their reasonings concerning human duty.

The method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into "the tendency of the action to promote or diminish the general happiness." This rule proceeds upon the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and, consequently, that those actions, which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable to him; and the contrary.

As this presumption is the foundation of our whole system, it becomes necessary to explain the reasons upon which it rests.

CHAPTER V.

The Divine Benevolence.

WHEN God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both.

If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment: or by placing us amidst objects so ill-suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted, bitter; every thing we saw, loathsome; every thing we touched, a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.

If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these (and still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.

The same argument may be proposed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves design: and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then, is

Mr. Hume, in his fourth Appendix to his Principles of Morals, has been pleased to complain of the modern scheme of uniting Ethics with the Christian Theology. They who find themselves disposed to join in this complaint, will do well to observe what Mr. Hume himself has been able to make of morality without this union. And for that purpose, let them read the second part of the ninth section of the above Essay; which part contains the practical application of the whole treatise, a treatise which Mr. Hume declares to be "incomparably the best he ever wrote." When they have read it over, let them consider, whether any motives there proposed are likely to be found sufficient to withhold men from the gratification of lust, revenge, envy, ambition, avarice; or to pre-incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable vent the existence of these passions. Unless they rise up from this celebrated essay with stronger impressions upon their minds than it ever left upon mine, they will acknowledge the necessity of additional sanctions. But the necessity of these sanctions is not now the question. If they be in fact established, if the rewards and punishments

from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of the sickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though, from the construction of the instrument, and the

manner of using it, this mischief often happens. | is the utility of any moral rule alone, which conBut if you had occasion to describe instruments of stitutes the obligation of it. torture or execution, This engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here, pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said; This is to irritate, this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout: if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most that he can say is, that it is useless: no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment. Since then God hath called forth his consummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been constituted with this design at first; so long as this constitution is upholden by him, we must in reason suppose the same design to continue.

But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress, all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to despatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neighbourhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen distressed families, than by continuing locked up in a miser's chest. It may be useful to get possession of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in parliament, by bribery or false swearing: as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our private station. What then shall we say? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility. It is not necessary to do either.

The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

To see this point perfectly, it must be observed, that the bad consequences of actions, are twofold,

The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect, upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I seem, for my own part, to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children, than in any thing in the world. The pleasures of grown persons may be reckoned partly of their own pro-particular and general. curing; especially if there has been any industry, or contrivance, or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like music, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provision is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport, affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it.

But the example, which strikes each man most strongly, is the true example for him: and hardly two minds hit upon the same; which shows the abundance of such examples about us.

We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness."

CHAPTER VI.
Utility.

So then actions are to be estimated by their tendency*. Whatever is expedient, is right. It

Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his design. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be

The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions.

The general bad consequence is, the violation of some necessary or useful general rule.

Thus, the particular bad consequences of the assassination above described, is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man, as to a good one, or more so; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occasion to his family, friends, and dependants.

The general bad consequence is the violation of this necessary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes but by public authority.

Although, therefore, such an action have no particular bad consequences, or greater particular good consequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general consequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil. And the same of the other two instances, and of a million more which might be mentioned.

But as this solution supposes, that the moral government of the world must proceed by general rules, it remains that we show the necessity of this.

CHAPTER VII.

The necessity of general rules.

You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a difference between them. Consequently, the same sort of actions must be esteemed virtuous for that reason? we inquire into his design, whether his liberality sprang from charity or from ostentation? It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract,