prejudices, nor flattering popular notions, nor ex- |
cusing established practices, but calculated, in the
matter of its instruction, truly to promote human
happiness, and in the form in which it was con-
veyed, to produce impression and effect; a morality,
which, let it have proceeded from any person
whatever, would have been satisfactory evidence
of his good sense and integrity, of the soundness
of his understanding and the probity of his designs;
a morality, in every view of it, much more perfect
than could have been expected from the natural
circumstances and character of the person who
delivered it; a morality, in a word, which is, and
hath been, most beneficial to mankind.

very forcibly, will be found, I think, upon reflection, to reside more in our habits of apprehension, than in the subject; and that the giving way to it, when we have any reasonable grounds for the contrary, is rather an indulging of the imagination, than any thing else. Abstractedly considered, that is, considered without relation to the difference which habit, and merely habit, produces in our faculties and modes of apprehension, I do not see any thing more in the resurrection of a dead man, than in the conception of a child; except it be this, that the one comes into his world with a system of prior consciousnesses about him, which the other does not: and no person will say, that he knows enough of either subject to perceive, that this circumstance makes such a difference in the two cases, that the one should be easy, and the other impossible; the one natural, the other not so. To the first man, the succession of the species would be as incomprehensible, as the resurrection of the dead is to us.

Upon the greatest, therefore, of all possible occasions, and for a purpose of inestimable value, it pleased the Deity to vouchsafe a miraculous attestation. Having done this for the institution, when this alone could fix its authority, or give to it a beginning, he committed its future progress to the natural means of human communication, and to the influence of those causes by which human Thought is different from motion, perception conduct and human affairs are governed. The from impact: the individuality of a mind is hardly seed, being sown, was left to vegetate; the leaven, consistent with the divisibility of an extended being inserted, was left to ferment; and both ac- substance; or its volition, that is, its power of cording to the laws of nature: laws, nevertheless, originating motion, with the inertness which disposed and controlled by that Providence which cleaves to every portion of matter which our obconducts the affairs of the universe, though by an servation or our experiments can reach. These influence inscrutable, and generally undistinguish-distinctions lead us to an immaterial principle: able by us. And in this Christianity is analogous to most other provisions for happiness. The provision is made; and, being made, is left to act according to laws, which, forming a part of a more general system, regulate this particular subject, in common with many others.

at least, they do this; they so negative the mechanical properties of matter, in the constitution of a sentient, still more of a rational being, that no argument drawn from these properties, can be of any great weight in opposition to other reasons, when the question respects the changes of which such a nature is capable, or the manner in which these changes are effected. Whatever thought be, or whatever it depend upon, the regular experience of sleep makes one thing concerning it certain, that it can be completely suspended, and completely restored.

Let the constant recurrence to our observation of contrivance, design, and wisdom, in the works of nature, once fix upon our minds the belief of a God, and after that all is easy. In the counsels of a being possessed of the power and disposition which the Creator of the universe must possess, it is not improbable that there should be a future If any one find it too great a strain upon his state; it is not improbable that we should be ac- thoughts, to admit the notion of a substance quainted with it. A future state rectifies every strictly immaterial, that is, from which extension thing: because, if moral agents be made, in the and solidity are excluded, he can find no difficulty last event, happy or miserable, according to their in allowing that a particle as small as a particle conduct in the stations and under the circum- of light, minuter than all conceivable dimensions, stances in which they are placed, it seems not may just as easily be the depositary, the organ, very material by the operation of what causes, and the vehicle, of consciousness, as the congeaccording to what rules, or even, if you please to ries of animal substance which forms a human call it so, by what chance or caprice, these stations body, or the human brain; that, being so, it may are assigned, or these circumstances determined. transfer a proper identity to whatever shall hereThis hypothesis, therefore, solves all that objec-after be united to it; may be safe amidst the detion to the divine care and goodness, which the struction of its integuments; may connect the promiscuous distribution of good and evil (I do natural with the spiritual, the corruptible with not mean in the doubtful advantages of riches the glorified body. If it be said, that the mode and grandeur, but in the unquestionably import- and means of all this is imperceptible by our ant distinctions of health and sickness, strength senses, it is only what is true of the most importand infirmity, bodily ease and pain, mental ala-ant agencies and operations. The great powers crity and depression) is apt on so many occasions to create. This one truth changes the nature of things; gives order to confusion; makes the moral world of a piece with the natural.

Nevertheless, a higher degree of assurance than that to which it is possible to advance this, or any argument drawn from the light of nature, was necessary, especially to overcome the shock which the imagination and the senses receive from the effects and the appearances of death, and the obstruction which thence arises to the expectation of either a continued or a future existence. This difficulty, although of a nature, no doubt, to act

of nature are all invisible. Gravitation, electricity, magnetism, though constantly present, and constantly exerting their influence; though within us, near us, and about us; though diffused throughout all space, overspreading the surface, or penetrating the contexture, of all bodies with which we are acquainted, depend upon substances and actions which are totally concealed from our senses. The Supreme Intelligence is so himself.

But whether these or any other attempts to satisfy the imagination, bear any resemblance to the truth, or whether the imagination, which, as I have said before, is a mere slave of habit, can be

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

TO THE HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REV. SHUTE BARRINGTON, L.L.D. LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

MY LORD,-The following Work was undertaken at your Lordship's recommendation, and, amongst other motives, for the purpose of making the most acceptable return that I could, for a great and important benefit conferred upon me.

It may be unnecessary, yet not perhaps quite impertinent, to state to your Lordship, and to the reader, the several inducements that have led me once more to the press. The favour of my first and ever-honoured Patron had put me in possession of so liberal a provision in the Church, as abundantly to satisfy my wants, and much to exceed my pretensions. Your Lordship's munifi. cence, in conjunction with that of some other excellent Prelates, who regarded my services with the partiality with which your Lordship was pleased to consider them, hath since placed me in ecclesiastical situations, more than adequate to every object of reasonable ambition. In the mean time, a weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, deprived me of the power of discharging the duties of my station in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of those duties, or to my most anxious wishes concerning them. My inability for the public functions of my profession, amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study that I could repair my deficiencies in the church: it was only through the press that I could speak. These circumstances entitled your Lordship in particular to call upon me for the only species of exertion of which I was capable, and disposed me without hesitation to obey the call in the best manner that I could. In the choice of a subject, I had no place left for doubt: in saying which, I do not so much refer, either to the supreme importance of the subject, or to any scepticism concerning it with which the present times are charged, as I do to its connexion with the subjects treated of in my former publications. The following discussion alone was wanted to make up my works into a system : in which works, such as they are, the public have now before them, the evidences of Natural Religion, the evidences of Revealed Religion, and an account of the duties that result from both. It is of small importance that they have been written in an order the very reverse of that in which they ought to be read. I commend, therefore, the present volume to your Lordship's protection, not only as, in all probability, my last labour, but as the completion of a regular and comprehensive design.

Hitherto, my Lord, I have been speaking of myself, and not of my Patron. Your Lordship wants not the testimony of a Dedication; nor any testimony from me: I consult therefore the im. pulse of my own mind alone when I declare, that in no respect has my intercourse with your Lordship been more gratifying to me, than in the opportunities which it has afforded me, of observ ing your earnest, active, and unwearied solicitude, for the advancement of substantial Christianity; a solicitude, nevertheless, accompanied with that candour of mind, which suffers no subordinate differences of opinion, when there is a coincidence in the main intention and object, to produce any alienation of esteem, or diminution of favour. It is fortunate for a country, and honourable to its government, when qualities and dispositions like these are placed in high and influencing stations. Such is the sincere judgment which I have formed of your Lordship's character, and of its public value : my personal obligations I can never forget. Under a due sense of both these consi derations, I beg leave to subscribe myself, with great respect and gratitude, MY LORD, your Lordship's faithful and most devoted servant, WILLIAM PALEY.

Bishop-Wearmouth, July, 1802.

CHAPTER I.

State of the Argument.

IN crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone

came to be there: I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But sup pose I had found a watch upon the ground, and

it should be inquired how the watch happened to be
in that place; I should hardly think of the answer
which had before given, that for any thing I
knew, the watch might have always been there.
Yet why should not this answer serve for the
watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as
admissable in the second case as in the first? For
this reason, and for no other, viz. that when we
come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we
could not discover in the stone) that its several
parts are framed and put together for a purpose,
e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to
produce motion, and that motion so regulated as
to point out the hour of the day; that, if the dif-
ferent parts had been differently shaped from what
they are, of a different size from what they are, or
placed after any other manner, or in any other
order, than that in which they are placed, either no
motion at all would have been carried on in the
machine, or none which would have answered the
use that is now served by it. To reckon up a
few of the plainest of these parts, and of their of
fices, all tending to one result:-We see a cylin-
drical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which,
by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the
box. We next observe a flexible chain (artifi-
cially wrought for the sake of flexure,) communi-
cating the action of the spring from the box to the
fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the
teeth of which catch in, and apply to each other,
conducting the motion from the fusee to the
balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and
at the same time, by the size and shape of those
wheels so regulating that motion, as to terminate
in causing an index, by an equable and measured
progression, to pass over a given space in a given
time. We take notice that the wheels are made
of brass in order to keep them from rust; the
springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic;
that over the face of the watch there is placed a
glass, a material employed in no other part of the
work, but in the room of which, if there had been
any other than a transparent substance, the hour
could not be seen without opening the case. This
mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an
examination of the instrument, and perhaps some
previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and
understand it; but being once, as we have said, ob-
served and understood,) the inference, we think, is
inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker;
that there must have existed, at some time, and at
some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who
formed it for the purpose which we find it actual-well as a different structure.
ly to answer; who comprehended its construction,
and designed its use.

the inference, whether the question arise con-
cerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of
a different species, or an agent possessing in some
respects a different nature.

Il. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect, or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case; if by the loss, or disorder, or decay, of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared, without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode,

according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or indeed as "the law of nature," in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair, is neither more nor less than this; by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced, viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less ne

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knows nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adapta-cessary, for any share which the water has in grindtion of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

CHAPTER II.

State of the Argument continued.

SUPPOSE, in the next place, that the person who found the watch, should, after some time, discover that, in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself (the thing is conceivable); that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a dis[covery to have upon his former conclusion.

ing the corn; yet is this share the same as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore,

III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question, by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation I. The first effect would be to increase his ad- to a purpose, without that which could intend a miration of the contrivance, and his conviction of purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether their office in accomplishing that end, without the he regarded the object of the contrivance, the dis-end ever having been contemplated, or the means tinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism, by which it was carried on, he would perceive, in this new observation, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done,-for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it; still more strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this farther property, the crown and perfection of all the rest.

II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in some sense, the maker of the watch which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second: in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order,

accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it;-could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their severaĺ motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before.

IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, i. e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back, ever so far, brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither