except that which was most easily produced. And are, at present, derived to us through this importthis, in fact, describes the condition of the mass of ant medium. Not only would the tranquillity of the community in all countries; a condition una-social life be put in peril by the want of a motive voidably, as i should seem, resulting from the pro- to attach men to their private concerns: but the vision which is made in the human, in common satisfaction which all men receive from success in with all animal constitutions, for the perpetuity their respective occupations, which collectively and multiplication of the species. constitutes the great mass of human comfort, would be done away in its very principle.

It need not however dishearten any endeavours for the public service, to know that population naturally treads upon the heels of improvement. If the condition of a people be meliorated, the consequence will be either that the mean happiness will be increased, or a greater number partake of it: or, which is most likely to happen, that both effects will take place together. There may be limits fixed by nature to both, but they are limits not yet attained, nor even approached, in any country of the world.

And when we speak of limits at all, we have respect only to provisions for animal wants. There are sources, and means, and auxiliaries, and augmentations, of human happiness, communicable without restriction of numbers; as capable of being possessed by a thousand persons as by one. Such are those, which flow from a mild, contrasted with a tyrannic government, whether civil or domestic; those which spring from religion; those which grow out of a sense of security; those which depend upon habits of virtue, sobriety. moderation, order; those, lastly, which are found in the possession of well-directed tastes and desires, compared with the dominion of tormenting, pernicious, contradictory, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable passions.

The distinctions of civil life are apt enough to be regarded as evils, by those who sit under them; but, in my opinion, with very little reason.

With respect to station, as it is distinguished from riches, whether it confer authority over others, or be invested with honours which apply solely to sentiment and imagination, the truth is, that what is gained by rising through the ranks of life, is not more than sufficient to draw forth the exertions of those who are engaged in the pursuits which lead to advancement, and which, in general, are such as ought to be encouraged. Distinctions of this sort are subjects much more of competition than of enjoyment: and in that competition their use consists. It is not, as hath been rightly observed, by what the lord mayor feels in his coach, but by what the apprentice feels who gazes at him, that the public is served.

As we approach the summits of human greatness, the comparison of good and evil, with respect to personal comfort, becomes still more problematical; even allowing to ambition all its pleasures. The poet asks, “What is grandeur, what is power:" The philosopher answers, "Constraint and plague: et in maximâ quâque fortuna minimum licere." One very common error misleads the opinion of mankind on this head, viz. that, universally, authority is pleasant, submission painful. In the general course of human affairs, the very reverse of this is nearer to the truth. Command is anxiety, obedience ease.

Artificial distinctions sometimes promote real In the first place, the advantages which the equality. Whether they be hereditary, or be the higher conditions of life are supposed to confer, homage paid to office, or the respect attached by bear no proportion in value to the advantages public opinion to particular professions, they serve which are bestowed by nature. The gifts of na- to confront that grand unavoidable distinction ture always surpass the gifts of fortune. How which arises from property, and which is most much, for example, is activity better than attend- overbearing where there is no other. It is of the ance; beauty than dress: appetite, digestion, and nature of property, not only to be irregularly distranquil bowels, than all the studies of cookery,tributed, but to run into large masses. Public or than the most costly compilation of forced or far-fetched dainties!

laws should be so constructed as to favour its diffusion as much as they can. But all that can be Nature has a strong tendency to equalization. done by laws, consistently with that degree of goHabit, the instrument of nature, is a great level-vernment of his property which ought to be left ler; the familiarity which it induces, taking off to the subject, will not be sufficient to counteract the edge both of our pleasures and our sufferings. this tendency. There must always therefore be Indulgences which are habitual, keep us in ease, the difference between rich and poor: and this and cannot be carried much farther. So that, difference will be the more grinding, when no prewith respect to the gratifications of which the tension is allowed to be set up against it. senses are capable, the difference is by no means proportionable to the apparatus. Nay, so far as superfluity generates fastidiousness, the difference is on the wrong side.

nied by privileges injurious or oppressive to the rest of the community, are such, as may, even by the most depressed ranks, be endured with very little prejudice to their comfort.

So that the evils, if evils they must be called, which spring either from the necessary subordinations of civil life, or from the distinctions which have, naturally, though not necessarily, grown up It is not necessary to contend, that the advan-in most societies, so long as they are unaccompatages derived from wealth are none, (under due regulations they are certainly considerable,) but that they are not greater than they ought to be. Money is the sweetener of human toil; the substitute for coercion; the reconciler of labour with liberty. It is, moreover, the stimulant of enterprize in all projects and undertakings, as well as of diligence in the most beneficial arts and employ-rebellions against just authority; by wars; by naments. Now did affluence, when possessed, contribute nothing to the happiness, or nothing beyond the mere supply of necessaries; and the secret should come to be discovered; we might be in danger of losing great part of the uses, which

The mischiefs of which mankind are the occasion to one another, by their private wickedness and cruelties, by tyrannical exercises of power; by

tional jealousies and competitions operating to the destruction of third countries; or by other instances of misconduct either in individuals or societies, are all to be resolved into the character of man as a free agent. Free agency in its very essence con

direction, and with the speed, in which and with which, they were in fact begun and performed, the meeting could not be avoided. There was not, therefore, the less necessity in it for its being by chance. Again, the rencounter might be most unfortunate, though the errands, upon which each party set out upon his journey, were the most innocent or the most laudable. The bye

of the proper purpose, for the sake of which the train, from the operation of which these consequences ensued, was put in motion. Although no cause act without a good purpose; accidental consequences, like these, may be either good or bad.

tains liability to abuse. Yet, if you deprive man | of his free agency, you subvert his nature. You may have order from him and regularity, as you may from the tides or the trade-winds, but you put an end to his moral character, to virtue, to merit, to accountableness, to the use indeed of reason. To which must be added the observation, that even the bad qualities of mankind have an origin in their good ones. The case is this: Hu-effect may be unfavourable, without impeachment man passions are either necessary to human welfare, or capable of being made, and, in a great majority of instances, in fact made, conducive to its happiness. These passions are strong and general; and, perhaps, would not answer their purpose unless they were so. But strength and generality, when it is expedient that particular II. The appearance of chance will always bear circumstances should be respected, become, if left a proportion to the ignorance of the observer. to themselves, excess and misdirection. From The cast of a die as regularly follows the laws of which excess and misdirection, the vices of man-motion, as the going of a watch; yet, because we kind (the causes, no doubt, of much misery) appear to spring. This account, whilst it shows us the principle of vice, shows us, at the same time, the province of reason and of self-government: the want also of every support which can be procured to either from the aids of religion; and it shows this, without having recourse to any native, gratuitous malignity, in the human constitution. Mr. Hume, in his posthumous dialogues, asserts, indeed, of idleness, or aversion to labour, (which he states to lie at the root of a considerable part of the evils which mankind suffer,) that it is simply and merely bad. But how does he distinguish idleness from the love of ease? or is he sure, that the love of ease in individuals is not the chief foundation of social tranquillity? It will be found, I believe, to be true, that in every community there is a large class of its members, whose idleness is the best quality about them, being the corrective of other bad ones. If it were possible, in every instance, to give a right determination to industry, we could never have too much of it. But this is not possible, if men are to be free. And without this, nothing would be so dangerous, as an incessant, universal, indefatigable activity. In the civil world, as well as in the material, it is the vis inertia which keeps things in their places.

NATURAL THEOLOGY has ever been pressed with this question: Why, under the regency of the supreme and benevolent Will, should there be in the world, so much, as there is, of the appearance of chance?

The question in its whole compass lies beyond our reach: but there are not wanting, as in the origin of evil, answers which seem to have considerable weight in particular cases, and also to embrace a considerable number of cases.

can trace the operation of those laws through the works and movements of the watch, and cannot trace them in the shaking and throwing of the die (though the laws be the same, and prevail equally in both cases,) we call the turning up of the number of the die chance, the pointing of the index of the watch, machinery, order, or by some name which excludes chance. It is the same in those events which depend upon the will of a free and rational agent. The verdict of a jury, the sentence of a judge, the resolution of an assembly, the issue of a contested election, will have more or less of the appearance of chance, might be more or less the subject of a wager, according as we were less or more acquainted with the reasons which influenced the deliberation. The difference resides in the information of the observer, and not in the thing itself; which, in all the cases proposed, proceeds from intelligence, from mind, from counsel, from design.

Now when this one cause of the appearance of chance, viz. the ignorance of the observer, comes to be applied to the operations of the Deity, it is easy to foresee how fruitful it must prove of difficulties and of seeming confusion. It is only to think of the Deity, to perceive what variety of objects, what distance of time, what extent of space and action, his counsels may, or rather must, comprehend. Can it be wondered at, that, of the purposes which dwell in such a mind as this, so small a part should be known to us? It is only necessary, therefore, to bear in our thought, that in proportion to the inadequateness of our information, will be the quantity, in the world, of apparent chance.

III. In a great variety of cases, and of cases comprehending numerous subdivisions, it appears, for many reasons, to be better that events rise up by chance, or more properly speaking with the appearance of chance, than according to any obI. There must be chance in the midst of design: servable rule whatever. This is not seldom the by which we mean, that events which are not de-case even in human arrangements. Each person's signed, necessarily arise from the pursuit of events place and precedency, in a public meeting, may be which are designed. One man travelling to York, determined by lot. Work and labour may be almeets another man travelling to London. Their lotted. Tasks and burdens may be allotted. meeting is by chance, is accidental, and so would be called and reckoned, though the journeys which produced the meeting were, both of them, Partibus æquabat justis, aut sorte trahebat. undertaken with design and from deliberation. Military service and station may be allotted. The The meeting, though accidental, was nevertheless distribution of provision may be made by lot, as it hypothetically necessary (which is the only sort of is in a sailor's mess; in some cases also, the disnecessity that is intelligible :) for if the two jour-tribution of favours may be made by lot. In all neys were commenced at the time, pursued in the these cases, it seems to be acknowledged, that there

-Operumque laborem

482

are advantages in permitting events to chance,
superior to those, which would or could arise
from regulation. In all these cases also, though
events rise up in the way of chance, it is by ap-
pointment that they do so.

In other events, and such as are independent of
human will, the reasons for this preference of un-
certainty to rule, appear to be still stronger. For
example: it seems to be expedient that the period
of human life should be uncertain. Did mortality
follow any fixed rule, it would produce a security
in those that were at a distance from it, which
would lead to the greatest disorders; and a horror
in those who approached it, similar to that which
a condemned prisoner feels on the night before his
execution. But, that death be uncertain, the
young must sometimes die as well as the old. Also
were deaths never sudden, they who are in health
would be too confident of life.
the active, who want most to be warned and
The strong and
checked, would live without apprehension or re-
straint. On the other hand, were sudden deaths
very frequent, the sense of constant jeopardy
would interfere too much with the degree of ease
and enjoyment intended for us; and human life
be too precarious for the business and interests
which belong to it. There could not be depend-
ance either upon our own lives, or the lives of
those with whom we were connected, sufficient
to carry on the regular offices of human society.
The manner, therefore, in which death is made
to occur, conduces to the purposes of admonition,
without overthrowing the necessary stability of
human affairs.

Disease being the forerunner of death, there is the same reason for its attacks coming upon us under the appearance of chance, as there is for uncertainty in the time of death itself.

place from the beginning of life, must, er hypo-
thesi, be previous to the merit or demerit of the
persons upon whom it falls, can it be better dis-
posed of than by chance? Parentage is that sort
which in general fixes each man's place in civil
of chance: yet it is the commanding circumstance
life, along with every thing which appertains to
its distinctions. It may be the result of a benefi-
cial rule, that the fortunes or honours of the father
devolve upon the son; and, as it should seem, of a
still more necessary rule, that the low or laborious
condition of the parent be communicated to his
family; but with respect to the successor himself,
it is the drawing of a ticket in a lottery. Inequali
ties, therefore, of fortune, at least the greatest part
of them, viz. those which attend us from our birth,
and depend upon our birth, may be left, as they
are left, to chance, without any just cause for
events.
questioning the regency of a supreme Disposer of

sity of the case they must be gifts, but even the
But not only the donation, when by the neces
acquirability of civil advantages, ought, perhaps,
in a considerable degree, to lie at the mercy of
chance. Some would have all the virtuous rich,
or, at least, removed from the evils of poverty,
without perceiving, I suppose, the consequence,
that all the poor must be wicked. And how such
a society could be kept in subjection to govern-
ment has not been shown: for the poor, that is,
they who seek their subsistence by constant ma-
nual labour, must still form the mass of the com-
munity; otherwise the necessary labour of life
done, which the wants of mankind in a state of
could not be carried on; the work would not be
civilization, and still more in a state of refinement,
require to be done.

The seasons are a mixture of regularity and social life call not only for an original diversity of It appears to be also true, that the exigencies of chance. They are regular enough to authorize external circumstances, but for a mixture of dif expectation, whilst their being, in a considerable ferent faculties, tastes, and tempers. Activity and degree, irregular, induces, on the part of the cul- contemplation, restlessness and quiet, courage and tivators of the soil, a necessity for personal attend- timidity, ambition and contentedness, not to say ance, for activity, vigilance, precaution. It is even indolence and dulness, are wanted in the this necessity which creates farmers; which world, all conduce to the well going on of human divides the profit of the soil between the owner affairs, just as the rudder, the sails, and the baland the occupier; which by requiring expedients, last, of a ship, all perform their part in the naviby increasing employment, and by rewarding ex-gation. Now, since these characters require for penditure, promotes agricultural arts, and agricultural life, of all modes of life, the best, being the most conducive to health, to virtue, to enjoyment. I believe it to be found in fact, that where the soil is the most fruitful, and the seasons the most constant, there the condition of the cultivators of the earth is most depressed. Uncertainty, therefore, has its use even to those who sometimes complain of it the most. Seasons of scarcity themselves are not without their advantages. They call forth new exertions; they set contrivance and ingenuity at work; they give birth to improvements in agriculture and economy; they promote the investigation and management of public resources.

Again; there are strong intelligible reasons, why there should exist in human society great disparity of wealth and station; not only as these things are acquired in different degrees, but at the first setting out of life. In order, for instance, to answer the various demands of civil life, there ought to be amongst the members of every civil society a diversity of education, which can only belong to an original diversity of circumstances. As this sort of disparity, which ought to take

their foundation different original talents, different
dispositions, perhaps also different bodily consti-
tutions; and since, likewise, it is apparently ex-
pedient, that they be promiscuously scattered
amongst the different classes of society: can the
distribution of talents, dispositions, and the con-
stitutions upon which they depend, be better made
than by chance?

stancy and sensible interposition; every degree of
The opposites of apparent chance, are con-
secret direction being consistent with it. Now, of
constancy, or of fixed and known rules, we have
seen in some cases the inapplicability: and incon-
application in other cases.
veniencies which we do not see, might attend their

to remark, that a Providence, always and certain-
Of sensible interposition, we may be permitted
ly distinguishable, would be neither more nor less
than miracles rendered frequent and common. It
is difficult to judge of the state into which this
would throw us. It is enough to say, that it would
cast us upon a quite different dispensation from
that under which we live. It would be a total
and radical change. And the change would deeply

affect, or perhaps subvert, the whole conduct of human affairs. I can readily believe, that, other circumstances being adapted to it, such a state might be better than our present state. It may be the state of other beings; it may be ours hereafter. But the question with which we are now concerned is, how far it would be consistent with our condition, supposing it in other respects to remain as it is? And in this question there seem to be reasons of great moment on the negative side. For instance: so long as bodily labour continues, on so many accounts, to be necessary for the bulk of mankind, any dependency upon supernatural aid, by unfixing those motives which promote exertion, or by relaxing those habits which engender patient industry, might introduce negligence, inactivity, and disorder, into the most useful occupations of human life; and thereby deteriorate the condition of human life itself.

As moral agents, we should experience a still greater alteration; of which more will be said un-habit of thought which these observations excite, der the next article.

know that it would be necessary to look for any other account of it, than what, if it may be called an account, is contained in the answer, that events rise up by chance. But since the contrivances of nature decidedly evince intention; and since the course of the world and the contrivances of nature have the same author; we are, by the force of this connexion, led to believe, that the appearance, under which events take place, is reconcilable with the supposition of design on the part of the Deity. It is enough that they be reconcilable with this supposition; and it is undoubtedly true, that they may be reconcilable, though we cannot reconcile them. The mind, however, which contemplates the works of nature, and, in those works, sees so much of means directed to ends, of beneficial effects brought about by wise expedients, of concerted trains of causes terminating in the happiest results; so much, in a word, of counsel, intention, and benevolence; a mind, I say, drawn into the can hardly turn its view to the condition of our Although therefore the Deity, who possesses own species, without endeavouring to suggest to the power of winding and turning, as he pleases, itself some purpose, some design, for which the the course of causes which issue from himself, do state in which we are placed is fitted, and which in fact interpose to alter or intercept effects, which it is made to serve. Now we assert the most prowithout such interposition would have taken place; bable supposition to be, that it is a state of moral yet it is by no means incredible, that his provi- probation; and that many things in it suit with dence, which always rests upon final good, may this hypothesis, which suit no other. It is not a have made a reserve with respect to the manifest- state of unmixed happiness, or of happiness simation of his interference, a part of the very plan ply: it is not a state of designed misery, or of which he has appointed for our terrestrial exist- misery simply: it is not a state of retribution: it ence, and a part conformable with, or, in some is not a state of punishment. It suits with none sort, required by, other parts of the same plan. It of these suppositions. It accords much better with is at any rate evident, that a large and ample pro- the idea of its being a condition calculated for the vince remains for the exercise of Providence, production, exercise, and improvement of moral without its being naturally perceptible by us; be-qualities, with a view to a future state, in which cause obscurity, when applied to the interruption of laws, bears a necessary proportion to the imperfection of our knowledge when applied to the laws themselves, or rather to the effects which these laws, under their various and incalculable combinations, would of their own accord produce. And if it be said, that the doctrine of Divine Provi-gion ought to form no objection, if it shall turn dence, by reason of the ambiguity under which its out to be the case, that the more religious our exertions present themselves, can be attended views are, the more probability they contain. The with no practical influence upon our conduct; degree of beneficence, of benevolent intention, and that, although we believe ever so firmly that there of power, exercised in the construction of sensitive is a Providence, we must prepare, and provide, beings, goes strongly in favour, not only of a creand act, as if there were none: I answer, that this ative, but of a continuing care, that is, of a ruling is admitted; and that we farther allege, that so to Providence. The degree of chance which appears prepare, and so to provide, is consistent with the to prevail in the world, requires to be reconciled most perfect assurance of the reality of a Provi- with this hypothesis. Now it is one thing to dence: and not only so, but that it is probably, one maintain the doctrine of Providence along with advantage of the present state of our information, that of a future state, and another thing without that our provisions and preparations are not dis-it. In my opinion the two doctrines must stand turbed by it. Or if it be still asked, of what use at all then is the doctrine, if it neither alter our measures nor regulate our conduct? I answer again, that it is of the greatest use, but that it is a doctrine of sentiment and piety, not (immediately at least) of action or conduct; that it applies to the consolation of men's minds, to their devotions, to the excitement of gratitude, the support of patience, the keeping alive and the strengthening of every motive for endeavouring to please our Maker; and that these are great uses.

OF ALL VIEWS under which human life has ever been considered, the most reasonable in my judgment is that, which regards it as a state of probation. If the course of the world was separated from the contrivances of nature, I do not

these qualities, after being so produced, exercised, and improved, may, by a new and more favouring constitution of things, receive their reward, or become their own. If it be said, that this is to enter upon a religious rather than a philosophical consideration; I answer, that the name of Reli

or fall together. For although more of this apparent chance may perhaps, upon other principles, be accounted for, than is generally supposed, yet a future state alone rectifies all disorders: and if it can be shown, that the appearance of disorder is consistent with the uses of life as a preparatory state, or that in some respects it promotes these uses, then, so far as this hypothesis may be accepted, the ground of the difficulty is done away.

In the wide scale of human condition there is not perhaps one of its manifold diversities, which does not bear upon the design here suggested. Virtue is infinitely various. There is no situation in which a rational being is placed, from that of the best instructed Christian, down to the condition of the rudest barbarian, which affords

man world, is distributed amongst the individuals of the species. "This life being a state of probation, it is immaterial," says Rousseau, "what kind of trials we experience in it, provided they produce their effects." Of two agents who stand indifferent to the moral Governor of the universe, one may be exercised by riches, the other by poverty. The treatment of these two shall appear to be very opposite, whilst in truth it is the same: for though, in many respects, there be great disparity between the conditions assigned, in one main article there may be none, viz. in that they are alike trials; have both their duties and temptations, not less arduous or less dangerous in one case than the other; so that if the final award follow the character, the original distribution of the circumstances under which that chanot only of justice but of equality. What hinders, therefore, but that mankind may draw lots for their condition? They take their portion of faculties and opportunities, as any unknown cause, or concourse of causes, or as causes acting for other purposes, may happen to set them out; but the event is governed by that which depends upon themselves, the application of what they have received. In dividing the talents, no rule was observed; none was necessary: in rewarding the use of them, that of the most correct justice. The chief difference at last appears to be that the right use of more talents, i. e. of a greater trust, will be more highly rewarded, than the right use of fewer talents, i. e. of a less trust. And since, for other purposes, it is expedient that there be an inequality of concredited talents here, as well, probably, as an inequality of conditions hereafter, though all remuneratory; can any rule, adapted to that inequality, be more agreeable, even to our apprehensions of distributive justice, than this is?

not room for moral agency; for the acquisition, exercise, and display of voluntary qualities, good and bad. Health and sickness, enjoyment and suffering, riches and poverty, knowledge and ignorance, power and subjection, liberty and bondage, civilization and barbarity, have all their offices and duties, all serve for the formation of character; for when we speak of a state of trial, it must be remembered, that characters are not only tried, or proved, or detected, but that they are generated also, and formed, by circumstances. The best dispositions may subsist under the most depressed, the most afflicted fortunes. A WestIndian slave, who, amidst his wrongs, retains his benevolence, I, for my part, look upon as amongst the foremost of human candidates for the rewards of virtue. The kind master of such a slave, that is, he who, in the exercise of an inordinate autho-racter is formed, may be defended upon principles rity, postpones, in any degree, his own interest to his slave's comfort, is likewise a meritorious character; but still he is inferior to his slave. All however which I contend for, is, that these destinies, opposite as they may be in every other view, are both trials; and equally such. The observation may be applied to every other condition; to the whole range of the scale, not excepting even its lowest extremity. Savages appear to us all alike; but it is owing to the distance at which we view savage life that we perceive in it no discrimination of character. I make no doubt, but that moral qualities, both good and bad, are called into action as much, and that they subsist in as great variety, in these inartificial societies, as they are, or do, in polished life. Certain at least it is, that the good and ill treatment which each individual meets with, depends more upon the choice and voluntary conduct of those about him, than it does or ought to do, under regular civil institutions, and the coercion of public laws. So again, to turn our eyes to the other end of the scale; namely, that part of it which is occupied by mankind enjoying the benefits of learning, to gether with the lights of revelation; there also, the advantage is all along probationary. Christianity itself, I mean the revelation of Christianity, is not only a blessing, but a trial. It is one of the diversified means by which the character is exercised and they who require of Christianity, that the revelation of it should be universal, may possibly be found to require, that one species of probation should be adopted, if not to the exclusion of others, at least to the narrowing of that variety which the wisdom of the Deity hath appointed to this part of his moral economy.*

Now if this supposition be well founded; that is, if it be true, that our ultimate, or our most permanent happiness, will depend, not upon the temporary condition into which we are cast, but upon our behaviour in it; then is it a much more fit subject of chance than we usually allow or apprehend it to be, in what manner the variety of external circumstances, which subsist in the hu

* The reader will observe, that I speak of the revela tion of Christianity as distinct from Christianity itself. The dispensation may already be universal. That part of mankind which never heard of Christ's name, may nevertheless be redeemed, that is, be placed in a better condition, with respect to their future state, by his intervention; may be the objects of his benignity and intercession, as well as of the propitiatory virtue of his passion. But this is not "natural theology;" therefore I will not dwell longer upon it.

We have said, that the appearance of casualty, which attends the occurrences and events of life, not only does not interfere with its uses, as a state of probation, but that it promotes these uses.

Passive virtues, of all others the severest and the most sublime; of all others, perhaps, the most acceptable to the Deity; would, it is evident, be excluded from a constitution, in which happiness and misery regularly followed virtue and vice. Patience and composure under distress, affliction, and pain; a steadfast keeping up of our confidence in God, and of our reliance upon his final goodness, at the time when every thing present is adverse and discouraging; and (what is no less difficult to retain) a cordial desire for the happiness of others, even when we are deprived of our own: these dispositions, which constitute, perhaps, the perfection of our moral nature, would not have found their proper office and object in a state of avowed retribution; and in which, consequently, endurance of evil would be only submission to punishment.

Again: one man's sufferings may be another man's trial. The family of a sick parent is a school of filial piety. The charities of domestic life, and not only these, but all the social virtues, are called out by distress. But then, misery, to be the proper object of mitigation, or of that be nevolence which endeavours to relieve, must be really or apparently casual. It is upon such sufferings alone that benevolence can operate. For were there no evils in the world but what were punishments, properly and intelligibly such, be