Scotch School followed, attacking the Sceptical Philosophy, and seeking to reconstruct the science of Mind on some better basis than that of Locke. But REID spoke hesitatingly of the knowledge of mind. He said, 'The attributes of mind, and particularly its operations, we know clearly, but of the thing itself we have only an obscure notion.'—Intellectual · Powers (1785), Essay v. c. 2. STEWART followed more decidedly on the negative side, saying of mind, that 'we are not immediately conscious of its existence.'-Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. I. (1792), Intro. Part I. In these statements, both authors were hampered by discussions as to the Essence of Mind. The French School, which sprung almost wholly from the Scotch School, became much more clear on the immediate consciousness of mind. ROYER-COLLARD led the van, in the Lectures delivered in Paris in 1811, published by Jouffroy in his edition of Reid's Works, vols. iv. and v. MAINE DE BIRAN, an independent thinker, made it his chief concern to maintain our consciousness of mind as a cause or active force.-Examin des Leçons de Philosophie de M. Laromiguière (1809), Euvres Philosophiques, edited by Cousin, 1841. After him, COUSIN himself followed on the same side, Cours de Philosophie, Leçons v. vI., Wight's translation; History of Modern Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1852, vol. i. p. 88 and p. 109; and also Leçons sur la Philosophie de Kant, Leçon VIII., Henderson's translation, The Philosophy of Kant, London, 1854, p. 193. THÉODORE JOUFFROY, Prof. of Mor. Phil. at Paris, took the same ground, in his Introduction to Stewart's Outlines. This introduction is translated by George Ripley of Boston, U.S., and is the first of the Philosophical Essays by M. Théo. Jouffroy, Edinburgh, 1839 (Clark's series), see p. 11 and p. 56. The French movement is ably traced in Morell's History of Modern Philosophy. The German School, in its reaction against Hume, took a different course under guidance of the master spirit, KANT. In the development of a transcendental philo

sophy, Kant held that the Ego or Self is known in every conscious state; but such knowledge he considered a knowledge of mind only as phenomenon, giving nothing permanent. He even goes so far as to say that the Ego or Self as thus known 'is but the consciousness of my thought.' But the mind itself, the thing in itself (Ding-an-sich), as a permanent thing, is reached only by transcendental conception. This is the Mind as Noumenon, separated from every element of experience. The cogito, ergo sum,—I think, therefore I am,-of Des Cartes, gives only an empirical psychology, whereas beyond that we must seek a rational psychology. I think is, therefore, the only text of rational psychology, from which it must develop its whole system.' This double view of Self as phenomenon and as noumenon is so important that I subjoin detailed references :-Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, note, Werke, Rosencranz, Th. II. Supplement ii. p. 685. A very important passage withdrawn from the latest editions, given by Rosencranz as Supplement xi., Th. II. 716. Another withdrawn passage, given by Rosencranz as Supplement xiv., Th. II. 730, and Supplement xxi., Th. II. 774. And Des Zweiten Buchs der Transcendentalen Dialektik, Erstes Haupstück. Mr. Meiklejohn in his translation has wisely embraced all the passages in the text, admitting of the references being given to the pages, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. xl. Introd., pp. 41, 81, 86, 95, 168, and 237. The progression of thought was by a transition to higher abstraction, with exception of a decided protest from JACOBI (1743-1819), 'The Faith-Philosopher,' as Ueberweg calls him, Geschichte, Th. III. 206. The theory of Jacobi is best gathered from his work, David Hume, über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, 1787. The elder FICHTE (J. G.) followed Kant with an Idealism, which made the Ego or I everything; but with him the Ego or I is not the individual, but universal reason. Thus the problem of Personality was abandoned for higher speculative efforts separated from the facts of consciousness. Fichte's

Wissenschaftslehre, 1794; in the following year, SCHELLING took the same line, in his work entitled Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, oder über das Unbedingte im Menschlichen Wissen, 1795. With both of these philosophers the End was not Kant's noumenon, or Pure Self, but The Absolute or The Unconditioned, Das Unbedingte. HEGEL went to the opposite extreme, to seek a beginning in the universal, and thus we have the last use of Being and Determinate Being, Seyn and Da-seyn, Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812. With Hegel, Philosophy takes its rise at the utmost remove from facts; at the extreme opposite from Kant's commencement in the Kritik d. R. V., 'all our knowledge begins with experience.' From that extreme, however, Hegel comes, through evolution of thought, to self-consciousness. Later German thinking has returned upon Psychology. J. F. HERBART (1776-1841) insists that Philosophy must begin with the facts of consciousness. He gives primary importance to the Ich, I, 'with which word the proper self-consciousness of every one is indicated to himself;' and this Ich, I, 'exists, that is, is present, not merely in Itself, but also with the Not-I,—Nicht-Ich.' -Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1813, sec. 124, Werke, by Hartenstein, I. 198. F. E. BENEKE (1798-1854) followed in the same line, insisting upon self-knowledge in self-consciousness, Erkentnisslehre, 1820. See also, the younger FICHTE (Immanuel Hermann), who regards each Personality as an eternal entity, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen, 1833, and Zur Seelenfrage, eine philosophische Confession,-Of the Problem of the Soul, A Philosophical Confession, -1859, translated by Morell under the title, Contributions to Mental Philosophy, London, 1860; and ADOLF TRENDELENBURG, Logische Untersuchungen, 1840. For the earlier stages of German thought, see Schwegler's History of Philosophy, translated by Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, with notes of the translator; for the later stages, see Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Theological and Philosophical Library, New

York and London, edited by Professors Henry B. Smith and Schaff.

The philosophy which acknowledges immediate consciousness of Self, has been ably vindicated by Hamilton, Metaph. 1.; very admirably by Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, in which prominence is given to this as fundamental; by MANSEL, Prolegomena Logica, p. 137; and Metaphysics, p. 180; and in President M'COSн's Exam. of Mill's Philosophy, p. 80. Dr. SHADWORTH HODGSON, Time and Space, London, 1865, raises 'the question how consciousness is related to, or distinguished from, Self-consciousness,' and affirms that self-consciousness is a later attainment, by reflection.-P. 168.

CHAPTER II.

KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

(UTILITARIAN THEORY.)

1. THE Development theory, which seeks first to rise from Sensation to Intelligence, endeavours next, with the aid of Intelligence, to reach a knowledge of moral distinctions. The power to observe and reason about our Sensations being granted, the development theory undertakes to distinguish between right and wrong in action.

2. As the foundation of the intellectual theory is laid in Sensation, the foundation of the moral theory is laid in the pleasurable and painful experience characteristic of our Feelings. The Ethical Theory may be summarized thus: 'Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.'-Mill's Utilitarianism, p. 9. In view of this, the theory is named 'The Happiness Theory,'-Eudæmonism (from evdaμovía, happiness), Hedonism (dový, pleasure). Of the two designations, the former indicates a view of happiness higher than the latter. Bentham thinks that the word happiness is not always appropriate,' because 'it represents pleasure in too elevated a shape.'-Deontology, 1. 78.

In accordance with the Sensational basis, we must look first at pleasure and pain as opposites, then at different kinds of pleasure and pain, then at the reasons for seeking pleasure