CHAPTER III. CONSCIENCE. (UTILITARIAN THEORY.) 1. THE Utilitarian Theory, in making the criterion of right consist in a tendency to promote happiness, does not admit the need for a Moral faculty, as a power by which moral distinctions are recognised. The element of knowledge being allowed to fall out, the aim has been to account for the authority usually attributed to Conscience. It is admitted that a peculiar sacredness is commonly attached to moral distinctions, and a theory of the development of Conscience is constructed with the view of explaining this fact. Generally, under this theory, Conscience is represented as a form of Feeling, involving reverence for moral distinctions, and impelling to their observance. Sometimes Conscience has been regarded rather as a restraining force, involving 'a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.' On account of the view thus taken of the functions of this power, it is commonly named by Utilitarians, The Moral Sense.' This name has thus an entirely different meaning from that intended by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, with whom Moral Sense was a power of Perception. 2. A theory of Conscience, in harmony with a development theory of Mind, has been propounded by Hartley, Observations, 1. iv. 6.; and by Mr. James Mill, Fragment on Mackintosh (anonymous, 1835), p. 259; but most fully and definitely by Professor Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 283, and Mental and Moral Science, ETHICS, chap. III. The theory in its latest form is most deserving of attention. 3. Professor Bain's Theory of Conscience is the following: -'Conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us.' The proof of this is found, 'in observing the growth of Conscience from childhood upwards,' and 'its character and working generally.' 'The first lesson that a child learns as a moral agent is obedience. . . . The child's susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring about this obedience, and a mental association is rapidly formed between disobedience and apprehended pain, more or less magnified by fear. The feeling of encountering certain pain' (both physical and moral) is the first motive power of an ethical kind that can be traced in the mental system of childhood.' . . . 'A sentiment of love or respect towards the person of the superior infuses a different species of dread,' which is sometimes a more powerful deterring impulse than the other.' .... 'When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added, and the Conscience is then a triple compound, and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear.'-Emotions and Will, pp. 283-6. 4. The philosophic thought of Germany has for the most part been separated from the Sensational or Development Theory. Some few of the more recent writers, however, have embraced it. Of these, Schopenhauer may be taken as an example. He was born in Danzig, and was Professor of Philosophy (Privatdocent) in Berlin, and afterwards in Frankfurt-on-the-Maine, where he died in 1860. After saying that many would be surprised if they knew of what their Conscience is composed, he suggests that the elements may be computed thus-' one fifth, fear of man; one fifth, superstition; one fifth, prejudice; one fifth, vanity; one fifth, custom.'-Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1st ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1841, p. 196, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1860. 5. Such descriptions as those of the two preceding paragraphs may be allowed to contain a considerable measure of truth, the first bearing on associations commonly attendant on the moral training of early life, and the second on the heterogeneous combination of motives which often sway men, when they profess to have the approval of Conscience for their conduct. But both fail to provide a theory of Conscience, as a power authoritative for self-guidance, and even supreme in authority, as Conscience is generally allowed to be. Either there must be a power discovering a sovereign law of conduct; or, the reality of Conscience must be denied. 6. Schopenhauer gives only a gathering of unreasonable and unworthy motives which may operate within the mind of one who fancies himself doing right. That such a combination may exist, under shelter of an appeal to Conscience, and with some degree of support from the moral sentiments, will be generally admitted. But when Schopenhauer grants that men thus swayed would be surprised were the true analysis of their motives presented to them, he practically admits that no one could imagine such a state of mind entitled to be regarded as a genuine exercise of Conscience. 7. Professor Bain's treatment of the question is altogether more interesting, as more obviously facing the difficulties connected with development of a power such as Conscience. The solution proposed has, moreover, the advantage of logical consistency with the phase of Utilitarianism adopted, according to which utility enforced by punishment is the test of morality. On the other hand, it suffers from being manifestly out of harmony with the broader and more attractive basis, according to which the tendency to produce happiness is the ground of moral excellence in human conduct. Professor Bain gains the element of authority, but only by the surrender of a large part of the territory of morals. Still more to its disadvantage is the consideration, that an internal authority which is only an imitation of external government, has not the evidence of its truth in its own nature, but depends upon the sufficiency of the warrant for the external authority to which it appeals. 8. As a history of early experience, the theory in its first part accounts only for training in obedience, as an enforced necessity. It points only to the use which parents can make of certain 'primitive impulses of the mind,' such as fear, love, and prudence, in order to secure obedience. But it ignores the fact, that at a very early stage children distinguish as to rightness and wrongness in the commands issued. There are some commands which children resent as unjust, and which they are forced to obey only at the cost of injury to their nature. If this discrimination be possible on the part of children, it is clear that something more is required for their training than force and fear. 9. The full strain falls upon the third stage in the alleged development of Conscience, when the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them.' What Professor Bain has said in reference to an a priori theory, holds with equal force here,—' There can be no such thing as a standard overriding the judgment of every separate intelligence.'Emotions, p. 262. Human thought cannot be kept in continual subjection to authority. To accept as right what we have been always commanded, or accustomed to do, is continued childhood. Every separate intelligence must find sufficient reason for accounting certain actions right, and others wrong. This cannot be found either in the authority of parents or in past practice. It must be recognised by personal intelligence, on evidence either of fact or principle. It is certainly true, as Dr. Bain says, that, 'wherever an agreement is come to by a large or ascendant party, there is a natural But so tendency to compel the rest to fall in with that.' much the more obvious is it, that every man must seek a standard satisfying to his own Reason, and act upon that. This Dr. Bain practically admits in the quotation last given, and Mr. Mill has powerfully argued for such unrestrained freedom of thought, in his work on Liberty. Such a standard, if found, may lead to a doctrine of righteous disobedience to external authority, and a reversal of earlier practice. 10. The theory must fall back on utility as the basis of personal assent to moral distinctions, and in doing so it owns the failure of its attempt to develop Conscience by means of authority. Either 'every separate intelligence' must find for itself a law of nature, marking off some actions as right, others as wrong, or it must continue under the trammels of authority. If the former, the failure is admitted; if the latter, the escape is not effected. Professor Bain admits that 'the grand difficulty' is to account for 'the self-formed or independent conscience,' 'where the individual is a law to himself.' 'But,' he adds, 'there is nothing very formidable in this apparent contradiction,' 'when the young mind is sufficiently advanced to be able to appreciate the motives, the utilities, or the sentiment that led to their imposition-the character of the conscience is entirely transformed; the motive power issues from a different quarter of the mental framework. Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power.'Emotions, p. 288. The difficulty here seems much more formidable than Professor Bain allows. The situation of the theory is briefly this,-Utility is the basis of moral distinctions; but some limit must be assigned to the principle, for we do not make everything a moral rule that we consider useful. Utility made compulsory is the standard of morality; Morality is thus an institution of society; Conscience is an imitation of the Government of society; Conscience is first fear of authority, and then respect for it; but, ' even in the most unanimous notions of mankind, there can be |