5. A Judgment of expediency, regarded merely as a proposition, has no moral quality; but, when accepted as an impulse to action, stimulating the desire of personal advantage, it immediately comes under the dominion of moral law. Thus a judgment of expediency may assume the form of an impulse to neglect or to transgress moral law, in which case it is itself wrong, and the consequent action must wear a similar character. 6. A moral judgment, regarded merely as a proposition affirming the application of moral law, has in itself no moral quality; but, regarded as an impulse capable of awakening reverence for the law, and devotion to the Lawgiver, it is not only morally right, but is the only Impulse which, from its very nature, is necessarily right, requiring reference to nothing beyond itself for its warrant. In order, however, that a judgment may legitimately be credited with this warrant, it must be recognised as involving an application of pure moral law. See p. 28, sec. 12. 7. By reason of the sovereignty of Moral Law, and the distinctive character of the Moral Judgment as an impulse to action, all other impulses are morally subordinate to the Moral Judgment, which alone among the impulses has uniform, unquestionable title to sway the conduct. 8. The Natural Desires and Affections, as Natural Impulses, are dependent upon a moral judgment for the determination of the moral quality of their exercise, in respect of the circumstances and degree in which they influence our conduct. 9. Amongst the subordinate Natural Impulses, Affections occupy a position superior to desires, when both are regarded from a moral point of view. This Ethical superiority rests primarily on a natural superiority, but ultimately on the fact that moral principle demands self-denial in submission to its authority, which imposes more restraint upon desires than upon affections. In practice, Self-denial is only the negative result attending on the acknowledgment of the supremacy of moral law. It is restraint in one direction, consequent upon activity demanded in another. 10. PROBLEMS.-(1.) Is Hate not by its nature malevolent? (2.) If Hate is not in itself malevolent, by what addition is it turned into a malicious force? (3.) Granting that Desire is inferior to affection, if a desire be a natural attendant on an affection, does the former in that case take equal ethical rank with the latter? CHAPTER III. RESTRAINTS UPON ACTION. 1. DIVERSITY of character among our natural impulses, in itself implies restraint upon some of the number, in order to action of others. The most obvious examples are found in the contrary affections-Love and Hate, Reverence and Pity. A further restraint is involved in the subordination of impulses to moral law. 2. Besides the restraint upon activity, arising (1.) from the natural laws of exercise, and (2.) from the application of moral law, there are certain natural forces whose primary, though not exclusive, function it is to restrain from action. These are Emotions, of which the chief are Wonder, Grief, and Fear. 3. Emotion is agitation of feeling, attended by more or less physical disturbance, and always implies a sense of weakness. The Emotions, in common with the Impulses, imply movement of our inner nature; but Desires and Affections are movements towards their objects. Emotions are movements from their objects. 4. Their restraining power is experienced with great diversity of degree, and at their height they attain an overwhelming force, paralysing the other energies. 5. Emotions, like desires, are concerned with Self, and L are marks of the weakness of our nature. But they differ completely in function, the Desires craving satisfaction, the Emotions shunning injury. 6. The Emotions are in close relation with Intelligence. Fear, the lowest of them all, may be experienced in some form by every sentient creature, but in its higher forms it is dependent on the exercise of intelligence. If the lower animals are often subjects of fear from which man is delivered by his intelligence, it is no less true that the animals escape many forms of fear to which men are liable. 7. Emotions in their rise are naturally independent of the Will, and in their exercise may reach a paroxysm, ungovernable by the Will. In all their ordinary exercise, however, they are subject to the laws of self-government. In harmony with the common laws of activity, the measure of control possible under excitement may be increased. 8. Wonder, in filling the mind, throws an arrest for a time upon the voluntary direction of activity; Grief dulls the mind, abating proportionately its interest in things around; Fear is capable of putting a restraint upon powers, both of intelligence and of action. 9. Besides their inherently restraining power, Emotions are naturally fitted for amalgamation with the Impulses. When acting in combination with an Impulse, the Emotion which restrains in one direction, lends its force to intensify the power of impulse urging in another direction. This law of combination holds good, however, only when the Emotion is experienced in moderate degree. As it rises towards full energy it absorbs consciousness, and the possibility of amalgamation with an Impulse ceases. Fear, when moderate in degree, will give force to the desire of safety; Wonder will quicken curiosity; Grief will stimulate reflectiveness. But as Emotion rises in intensity, the stimulating force gradually abates. At the maximum of force, Fear paralyses, Wonder stupifies, Grief deepens into the listlessness of despair. 10. PROBLEMS.-(1.) Is Wonder greatest in mind when it is the child of ignorance or of knowledge? (2.) Can the Emotions be proved to afford evidence of the greatness of our nature, while they are at the same time essentially con nected with its weakness? (3.) How does the emotion of Fear stand related to the affection of Reverence? (4.) Is Grief capable of proving in any way an elevating power, though its immediate effect is depressing? |