CHAPTER II.

THE WILL: ITS EXERCISE.

1. An act of Will, directing present activity, is named a Volition, from the Latin volo, I will. Voluntas est, quæ quid cum ratione desiderat.'-Cicero, Tusc. Disput. iv. 6.

2. Volitions are distinguished from each other according to the nature of the power over which control is exercised. Thus the volition may involve personal determination in the direction of affection or desire,-of observation or reflection.

3. An exercise of pure will is unknown in consciousness. We may will to think, or to sympathize with one in suffering, or to restrain our fears, but we cannot will to will. This is a simple interpretation of the nature of Will, as indicated in the previous chapter, sec. I. A mere Will without any motive is chimerical and contradictory.'-Leibnitz, Fourth Paper, Letters of Leibnitz and Clarke, p. 93. Reid states it thus,'Every act of will must have an object. He that wills must will something.'-Active Powers, Essay II. I.; Hamilton, 531. 'Volitions never exist independently of motives.'-Upham, The Will, sec. 136, p. 213.

4. Volitions may have different degrees of volitional force, according to the measure of control exercised on an existing impulse. There may be simple consent of the Will, that is, Volition in simple accordance with an existing Impulse. And

there may be deliberate determination of the Will, that is, Volition in accordance with a distinct decision of the Intellect as to what is right or wrong in action, or,-beyond the moral sphere, as to what is prudent or advantageous. Deliberate determination may lead either to exercise of an existing impulse, or to resistance of the impulse so as to provide for its expulsion from the mind. Consent of Will may be without deliberation; Resistance by the Will never can. Diversity of degree in volitional force depends on the degree in which Intellect has regulative power in guiding our actions. 'Rational actions require preliminary effort to design the plan, or the series of efforts by which the end may be reached.'—Causation and Freedom in Willing, by Rowland G. Hazard, p. 13, London, 1869-two letters of great ability, addressed to Mr. John S. Mill, worthy of the earlier work from the same pen.

5. Volition is not uniformly the spring of our actions. There is a spontaneous, as well as a volitional, origin of activity. There are forms of activity provided for by the constitution of our nature, independently of our choice; as there are others which can be originated only by means of personal choice. That internal principles and motives operate in a uniform manner,' as Hume maintains,-Liberty and Necessity, Essays, II. 103,-is beyond doubt.

6. Volition is the origin of activity only in so far as actions are regulated by our intellectual powers. It is only the intelligent being which can contemplate, devise, and execute a form of activity purely subjective in its source. What we originate is achieved, in respect of plan, by means of thought; in respect of force, by means of will. Only such action as owes its form to intellectual as well as volitional power is properly named Self-originated. See Causation and Freedom in Willing, by Rowland G. Hazard.

7. Volition fulfils its function in other cases by the control of activity which it does not originate. The origin of activity is then spontaneous: only its continuance is under

sway of the Will. Thus the current impressions received through the senses, are not voluntary in origin, but only in continuance. So it is with the desires, affections, and emotions, in so far as they are dependent on the sensory. What I see in walking, is seen because I have an organ of vision, and also intellectual power capable of acting spontaneously in harmony with this organ. What I feel in consequence of what I see, is just as plainly spontaneous. But concentration of attention upon any one object is voluntary, as implied in the previous paragraph. In so far as a man does not originate his own activity, he is the creature of circumstances; in so far as he originates his actions, he is the master of circumstances.

8. Volition is concerned with the continuity of every action, whether Will be or be not competent to originate the action or actually involved in its origin. Or, to indicate the position as regarded from the opposite extreme, the Will is capable of terminating all normal forms of personal activity. Otherwise, action ceases to be personal, and becomes abnormal. Sensibility, contrasting with activity, follows a different law. Continued agitation of feeling, despite efforts of Will, involves nothing abnormal. As Cicero has said, 'Quæ Græci áon vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet, quam morbos.'-Tusc. Disput. IV. 5. Continuance of excitement, even when we long to escape from it, is in accordance with our nature,—is agitation, not disease.

9. In so far as the Will cannot originate all actions, and cannot altogether prevent the rise of impulses, it has only a restricted control. Within these natural limits, however, the control exercised by the Will is rational self-control, inasmuch as the exercise of intellectual power is constantly under command of the Will, for the guidance of our activity.

10. A Rational Self-control is adequate self-control of all personal activity. It is adequate in range, inasmuch as it applies to continuance of activity on the part of all our powers. It is adequate in guiding power, inasmuch as it has been

shown that Reason is competent to supply a moral law, or law of guidance sufficient for the direction of all forms of activity, and Will is capable of operating in harmony with Intellect. See above, Part 1. chap. iii. Truth superior to personality is the one requisite for harmonious self-direction of the life. Such truth, Reason is competent to recognise ; and the exercise of Reason, Will is competent to command. Any disturbance of this relation between Reason and Will is a breach of the normal condition of human nature.

11. The question as to the Freedom of the Will is obviously concerned with the laws which regulate the exercise of the faculty. But this question is so universally regarded as the chief matter of dispute affecting the Will, that it is desirable to assign to it a special chapter. Its extreme difficulty is a further reason for distinct treatment, since it is, as Hume avers, 'the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science.'-Human Understanding, sec. 8, Essays, II. 110.

12. PROBLEMS.-(1.) Trace the effects to Ethical Science arising from the identification of Reason and Will. (2.) Distinguish between knowledge voluntarily acquired, and that acquired involuntarily. (3.) Can Will originate an exercise of Affection (4.) Are there any circumstances in which love or pity may be matter of command? (5.) How can there be various degrees of force belonging to volitions? Give examples and interpret them, so as to discover the law or laws which determine volitional force. (6.) Does strength of Will vary among the individuals of the race?-Hughes, The Human Will, ch. x., London, 1867. (7.) Is Will a faculty capable of development

CHAPTER III.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

1. THE question as to the freedom of the Will, being essentially concerned with the laws regulating the exercise of this power, is exclusively a question of Psychology, to be determined by analysing the facts of consciousness. This statement settles the method to be followed, and thereby shuts off for the present the Metaphysical questions necessarily and closely connected with this subject. The area of discussion is thus narrowed to the fundamental problem. The correlative metaphysical problems are not thereby abandoned, but merely separated and delayed.

The philosophic nature of the problem is vital to the whole discussion. If it be accurately represented as a question concerned exclusively with the operations of mind, the form of the discussion at least is fixed. Hume, as a defender of Necessitarianism, with a 'reconciling project' on hand, held 'that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will.'-Human Understanding, sec. 8, Essays, II. 108. He would have us begin with 'the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter.' Kant, in his renowned defence of Freedom of Will, denounces in the