CHAPTER IV.

NECESSITARIANISM.

1. THE Necessitarian doctrine, in denying freedom of will, does not altogether refuse a place to freedom. But the only liberty which it acknowledges is liberty of acting as we will, denominated freedom from constraint or coaction. 'I say that a thing is free which exists and acts by the sole necessity of its nature.' Spinoza, Letter 62, Life, Corresp. and Ethics, by R. Willis, M.D., p. 393. By liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the Will.'-Hume, Essays, II. 110. By freedom or liberty in an agent is meant, being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect, as he wills. -Edwards, The Will, Part 1. sec. 5.

2. Such liberty being attributed to man, the upholders of the scheme have a double objection to the name Necessitarianism, as descriptive of their theory, first, because it seems to convey that they have no place for liberty, and, secondly, because it seems to imply that they really hold that men are constrained in their actions; both of which they deny. Thus Mr. Mill, as an upholder of the theory, speaks of it as 'the falsely-called Doctrine of Necessity,'-preferring the fairer name of Determinism,' and says, that the word Necessity 'in this application, signifies only invariability.'-Exam. p. 552

Determinism is an unsuitable word, because on both sides a doctrine of determination of will is held, the dispute being between self-determination, and motive-determination.

And still more to complicate matters, there is a sense in which libertarians may say, that volitions are determined by motives; see preceding chapter, sec. 10. The doctrine itself Mr. Mill states

thus,- A volition is a moral effect, which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomena moral or physical; and I condemn accordingly the word Necessity as applied to either case. All I know is that it always does.'-Ib. p. 562. These modifications, then, being obviously accurate in themselves, are to be carefully regarded in criticising the theory.

3. The distinctive features of Necessitarianism or Determinism are, negatively, the denial of freedom in willing to act; and positively, the presentation of a theory of Will, professedly adequate to account for all the facts of consciousness which bear upon the direction of human conduct.

4. The Necessitarian theory, on its negative or critical side, rests upon an application of the law of causality. It urges that every event follows a cause: that this holds true in the sphere of mind as well as of matter; and so applies to volitions as well as sensations. At this point there is no divergence of opinion. Indeed, most libertarians go further than necessitarians here, and do not halt, like Mr. Mill, at the statement that the effect 'certainly and invariably' does follow its cause, but advance to the position that it must do so. Liberty of indifference and liberty of caprice are repudiated, and are not to be set to the account of libertarianism, any more than a doctrine of constraint is to be charged against necessitarianism. These are the extremes, taken in the heat of conflict, to be abandoned in calmer mood. That every volition must have a cause, is a necessity freely admitted.

To Hume it is granted, according to his demand, that a cause has a necessary connexion with its effect.'-Essays 11. 111. This does not, however, touch the question in dispute.

Spinoza was a necessitarian in logical consistency, as the author of a dialectic which rests on the existence of only one substance. In his view, 'men deceive themselves when they suppose they are free,' and this because, though conscious of their own acts, they are ignorant of the causes by which these acts are determined.-Ethics, Part II. prop. 35.

5. The Necessitarian theory not only insists upon the application of the law of causality within the region of mind, as to which all are agreed, but further insists upon an interpretation of the law in accordance with the analogy of the physical world. Looking from the effect backwards to the cause, it maintains that the law of causality warrants the affirmation, not only that an adequate cause has acted, but also how it has acted. Looking from the cause forward to the effect, it maintains, on warrant of the law of causality, not only that the cause has produced the effect, but that it was necessitated to produce that effect. But this is something more than an application of the law of causality. With the law, it carries an interpretation founded on knowledge gathered in a particular sphere. It is an argument from matter to mind, and as such needs to be vindicated on the basis of facts, not merely proclaimed on the authority of a general law.

No mere statement of the law is sufficient to establish the theory, and obviate the need for an appeal to the facts of consciousness. To say that the same cause acting in the same circumstances will produce the same effect, is a most accurate statement, but is of no value in the attempt to prove that matter and mind, in so far as they do act, must act in a manner exactly analogous. The statement concerns only the amount of force or power in the cause, and not the mode in which the cause operates. It is merely that the same produces the same, which ultimately is nothing more

than this, that the same is the same. To say of two forces that they will cause the same velocity or produce the same amount of heat, is only equivalent to saying that the two forces are the same. This is shown to be the case, equally when the measurement is applied to the cause, and to the effect. The same sympathy will lead to the same help; the same selfishness will lead to the same neglect. No doubt. The same is the same, whether you measure from the one end or from the other. But the whole matter in dispute lies beyond this. The theory must, therefore, be tested by an examination of the facts of consciousness, with the view of ascertaining the laws of exercise applying to mental causes or forces. And when we thus pass from the physical to the mental, we at once recognise a complete difference in the laws of exercise governing the forees of the two spheres. There is so much which is common to both. Effects certainly and invariably' follow their causes in both spheres. In both, causes are as invariable in their nature, and as certain in their results. But there is an essential difference between the mental and the physical. Circumstances do not so 'certainly and invariably' determine causes in the mental, as in the physical sphere. Or, to put it in another and more positive form, there is in the mental world an adjustment of forces, which is not found in the material world, except when man interposes to make the adjustment. This difference is so broadly marked, that there is in the sphere of mind at once less certainty, and more certainty as to results. There is less certainty, so far as circumstances contribute to the result; and more certainty, so far as the nature of the operating force is concerned. Physical action (so called) depends mainly upon attendant conditions ; mental action depends mainly on internal nature. As to oircumstances or attendant conditions, it is more certain that friction will produce fire, than that provocation will produce anger. On the other hand, considering the nature of the efficient cause, it is less certain that steam will produce loco

motion, than that volition will produce action. Thus, in the mental world, if you take such forces as love, pity, and reverence, a single distinct and uniform effect 'certainly and invariably' follows from the action of each of the three; but their exercise depends upon something more than the circumstances fitted to call them forth, and still more obvious is it that such circumstances afford no exact criterion of the measure in which these forces operate in mind. These are facts which go to show that causality in mind is not exactly analogous with causality in matter.

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6. Passing now the controversial use of the law of Causality made by necessitarianism, we come to its constructive use, in forming a theory alleged to afford an adequate explanation of the facts of consciousness, so far as these are concerned with personal action. In this part, the theory deals specially with the laws regulating the exercise of natural and acquired motives, as carrying a complete explanation of volitions. Necessitarians affirm as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes. These moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of causes, those of them which are mental being consequences of education, and of other moral and physical influences.'Mr. Mill, Exam. p. 561. In following through this theory of volitions, there is no need for raising the question as to the possibility of the development of our natural powers, already discussed in Part I. Div. ii.

7. The Necessitarian theory accounts for the rise of distinct motives in consciousness, by affirming that there are 'outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action.' This is ground common to both theories. It has