been always admitted that personal experience is thus far determined for us. But these internal incentives' are awakened not by any physical energy which objects exert over us, but by natural sensibility, connected with observation. It is granted, then, that we have an example of necessity, not even of volition (certainly not of free-will) in the rise of motives. Whether it be possible by voluntary determination to provide for the awakening of natural or acquired dispositions, need not at present detain us.

8. The Necessitarian theory explains the continuance and influence of motives in consciousness by the constitution and acquired tendencies of the mind within which they arise. Mr. Mill refers to 'education and other moral and physical influences.' Edwards points to the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means.' -Pt. 1. sec. ii. Here too is matter of agreement, but here also the point of divergence is reached. It is granted that what a man is by nature, he is by necessity, that is, without personal choice. And as men differ somewhat in constitution, it is granted that, independently of personal choice, there may be some diversity in the natural force of dispositions, as they come into play. Thus far it is held on both sides, that there is determination without choice. Beyond this, the controversy begins. Libertarians distinguish between a man's nature and his character, maintaining that the one is made for him, and the other he makes for himself. This, however, may be passed, while we consider the point of more immediate importance here, viz., the laws which determine the progressive strength of motives. Libertarians admit the accuracy of the Necessitarian theory, in so far as it points to a man's nature and acquired tendencies as contributing towards an explanation of the strength of a motive. But they affirm that, after making full allowance for the outward circumstances, for the nature of the man, and for his acquired tendencies, the answer is incom

plete. They urge, that the influence of observation or attention, so essential to our experience, is omitted; and that the solution of the question as to the strength of any motive, whether great or small, depends largely on the account given of personal observation. In absence of any philosophy of this, Libertarians affirm that the solution of the problem as to the laws which determine the development of motive force, stands unfinished in the scheme of Necessitarianism. Edwards arranged admirably the points of consideration, when he indicated these three,-'the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed; the nature and circumstances of the mind that views; and the degree and manner of its view.' But the last named is very imperfectly examined; see Freedom of Will, 1. ii. 2. The incompleteness of its treatment is apparent in these statements of the general result,-The Will always is as the greatest apparent good is,' and 'the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.' Still more perplexing is the statement of Hobbes,-'Will is the last appetite in deliberating.'-Leviath. 1. vi., Works, vol. III. p. 49. The term 'Deliberation' is, however, used in a very wide sense; see p. 48. A psychological investigation of the part which the understanding performs in connexion with the increase of motive force in the mind, is, in the view of Libertarians, an obvious want in the opposite scheme.

9. Necessitarianism encounters difficulties, arising from its own nature, in attempting to construct a harmonious theory of moral government, and to interpret the inoral sentiments common to men. With a statement of each of these difficulties, I conclude the subject of the Will.

10. Necessitarianism has difficulty in accounting for the consciousness of Moral Responsibility, and for the justice of personal liability to punishment. The following is an outline of Mr. Mill's view of the subject:-' Responsibility means Punishment. When we are said to have the feeling of being morally responsible for our actions, the idea of being punished

for them is uppermost in the speaker's mind.' This may mean expectation of punishment, or 'knowing that we shall deserve' it. The former, as expectation of responsibility, is not consciousness of it. That which may be deemed to require the free-will hypothesis is 'the belief that we ought to be' accountable; that we are justly accountable; that guilt deserves punishment. It is here that issue is joined between the two opinions.'—Exam. p. 571. 'On the theory of Necessity (we are told), a man cannot help acting as he does, and it cannot be just that he should be punished for what he cannot help. Not if the expectation of punishment enables him to help it, and is the only means by which he can be enabled to help it?'-Exam. 575. 'There are two ends which, on the Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment: the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others.' -Ib. 576.

11. A philosophy of the moral sentiments, including selfapprobation and self-condemnation, shame and remorse, is peculiarly difficult under the necessitarian hypothesis. Remorse may be taken as the example. Priestley treats of it thus,-'A man, when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his past conduct, may fancy that if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere deception, and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all the circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same views of things as he had then, and exclusive of all others which he has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted otherwise than he did.'-Illust. of Phil. Necessity, p. 99; see also Belsham's Elements, p. 406. It is at least an awkward escape from a theoretic difficulty to maintain that the whole human race is deceived. The philosophic question is this,— What power belongs to us as intellectual beings? Have we such power, that a man can attain to accurate views of the móral quality of an action before he perform it, as well as

after the action is done? The negative cannot be maintained on a Utilitarian theory of morals, any more than on an Intuitional theory.

12. PROBLEMS.-(1.) On the theory that knowledge of causality is only knowledge of sequence, can an appeal be consistently made to the law of causality itself, as sufficient warrant for a theory as to the origin of a new form of existence? (2.) Granting moral distinctions as common to Intuitionalism and Utilitarianism, can these afford any rule of conduct in harmony with a Necessitarian theory of volition? (3.) Are Rewards and Punishments means of government, employed to determine the strongest motive; or are they the consequences which naturally and justly follow voluntary conformity to moral law, or violation of it? (4.) On the basis of the necessitarian theory, work out an explanation of the common opinion, as expressed by Mr. Mill, That whoever cultivates a disposition to wrong, places his mind out of sympathy with the rest of his fellow-creatures.'-Exam. 572. (5.) If men are governed by contrivances for awakening the strongest motive, how has it come to pass that rewards are less employed for this end than punishments -The Battle of the Two Philosophies, p. 49. (6.) In view of the need for protecting common rights, what is the difference between these two cases: It is just to punish so far as is necessary for this purpose, as it is just to put a wild beast to death (without unnecessary suffering) for the same object'?-Exum. 578.

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PART IV.

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

1. BESIDES the Affections and Emotions already described in PART II., there are other dispositions of mind, which have as their objects, moral actions considered in themselves, or persons regarded as agents acting within the moral sphere. These are properly named 'Moral Sentiments,' and are experienced only through means of the exercise of our moral nature, distinguishing between right and wrong.

2. These Sentiments afford illustrations of the common law of mind, that all exercise of the intelligent nature is accompanied by an experience of sensibility. Intelligence directed on moral distinctions, is thus attended by a particular order of sensibility.

3. The moral sentiments differ in their psychological character, according as the judgment on which they attend, applies merely to an action in itself considered, or to the agent whose action is observed, or to self as the agent. These sentiments may thus wear the character of mere feeling, or of affection, or of emotion. The name 'moral sentiments,' therefore, is not to be regarded as indicating exact similarity of psychological character in the dispositions grouped under it, though they agree in these two characteristics, that they are of the nature of sentiment or feeling in contrast with intelligence; and that they attend upon moral judgments. They