it is not; for, in so far as it is, it does not first begin; but in so far as it is not, neither does it then begin.'-Ib. The movements of Becoming involve passing-into-being and passing-out-of-being-Entstehen und Vergehen, p. 108,-the disappearance of Being in Nothing and of Nothing in Being, and the result is determinate Being, or being existing in a definite place or state, p. 112. The determinate existence, or Being possessed of quality, is by its determinateness distinguished from some other. This is the interpretation of quality or determinateness, It is something over against another, it is changeable and finite,'-veränderlich und endlich. The determinate Being is finite; it is a something contrasted with another something; each has another opposite to it, p. 122. This introduces the distinction of existence in itself, Ansichseyn; and existence-for-another, Seyn-fur-Anderes, p. 124. This existence-in-itself is the thing-in-itself, Ding-an-sich; but an answer to the question, what requires that determinations be assigned to being, is an impossibility, p. 127. The thingin-itself is the same as that Absolute of which one knows nothing, but that in it all is one. We very well know what these things-in-themselves are; they are as such nothing else than truthless, empty abstractions,' p. 127. But the finite, with its relation of inner and outer, is the ending, perishing, or passing away; and if it merely pass away, it goes back to abstract nothing, and we make no progress, p. 139. But in passing away, it is affirmative of the Infinite, a union with which is impossible. The Finite stands perpetually over against the Infinite,' p. 140. The limited is the bounded or bound. In this appears the ought-to, the necessity to pass over into something else. Something is raised above its limitation, and yet this ought-to has its limit, p. 142. The finite in passing away is not passed away, it has become another finite, and that becomes another, and so on to infinity, p. 147. This, as affirmative being, must have its other, or contrary, that is the Infinite, which in this aspect is only the negative

of the finite, p. 148. But, as standing opposite each other, the Infinite is restricted by the finite, is in reality only another finite, p. 154. The finite passes over to the Infinite, and the Infinite passes over again into the finite for its realization. The finite and infinite thus relatively contain each other, and it is in the absorption of both that we attain the true Infinite, the unity of finite and Infinite, p. 157.

For Hegel's Philosophy, see Schwegler's Hist.; Ueberweg's Hist.; Translation of first part of Hegel's Logic, in Dr. Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel, beginning vol. 1. 319, and Lectures on Jurisprudence, by same author.

This system may first be regarded as representative of a course of abstraction. In this light, every one will allow, that Being or Existence is the ultimate abstraction, and that from this ultimatum we may synthetically return to the complex order of things with which we are familiar. But that this can produce a theory of existence is not evident. It is a development of abstract thought, not a theory of existence; and to argue from thought to existence is incompetent.-V. p. 116118.

Viewing the whole as a philosophic system, the following considerations are adverse to its logical competency. Its first requisite is moment or movement, which it assumes, but does not account for. And as movement cannot come from indeterminate being, nor from nothing, its presence is an inconsistency, unless it be merely mental movement which is intended, in which case the claim of the theory to be received as a theory of existence is abandoned. The line of progress from a negative to a positive is incompetent. At every stage in advance there is a violation of logical rule, by the assumption of more in the conclusion than is involved in the premisses. It is admitted that the finite must have a beginning, and yet no explanation of such beginning is afforded, since the question of causality is ignored. Determinate being is placed before the Infinite, and leads to it. If this mean only that the

mind seeks the explanation of the finite in the Infinite Hegelianism has made a wide detour, with weary zigzag, to reach a position which may be taken at once. The whole question of the origin of existence lies outside the Hegelian Logic. Consciousness and thought are assumed and employed, yet not made account of: and all the while Hegel's offer is this,-Given the single contradictory Being and Nothing, and I shall create, not the universe merelv, but even the Infinite.

CHAPTER IV.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE NATURE.

1. BELIEF in the Divine existence implies knowledge of the Divine nature. This follows from the place which faith holds among our cognitive powers. To classify belief otherwise would be an inconsistency. Sir W. Hamilton and Cousin agree in this, though differing so widely as to knowledge of the Infinite.-Hamilton's Metaph. II. 15, and 350; Cousin's Hist. of Mod. Philos. 1. 79. That a knowledge of the Deity belongs to man has been the general testimony of philosophic thought, from Socrates and Plato down through the Patristic period, even while it was held that none of the categories apply to God, as by Clement of Alexandria.-Strom. v., and Augustine, De Vera Religione, and De Trin. v. 2. And this knowledge of God has been maintained along with those acknowledgments of his incomprehensibility, of which Sir W. Hamilton has given examples in his philosophical testimonies to 'learned ignorance.'-Discussions, p. 634, and Mansel in his Bampton Lect., Pref. to 5th ed. p. xx. The saying of Clemens Alexandrinus may be taken as axiomatic: "Neither is there knowledge without faith, nor faith without knowledge.' So Cousin: To believe is to know and comprehend in some degree.'-Hist. 1. 79. Hamilton, on the contrary, held that the Infinite is an object of belief, but not of knowledge.'—

Letter to me in reply to first ed. of Philos. of the Infinite, given in the third ed. p. 497, and Metaph. II. 530. On this subject, see Prof. Fraser's Essays in Philos. p. 201, and Rational Psychology; Young's Province of Reason; and Prof. Noah Porter's Human Intellect, p. 645.

2. The knowledge of the Divine nature is not merely negative knowledge. As the reality of the Divine existence is not a conclusion reached by logical process, it is impossible to interpret the acknowledgment of a Supreme or Infinite Being, as if it were mere assent to an abstract proposition, or submission to the conditions of thought. Indeed, negation of one thing is possible only by affirmation of another, and consciousness bears witness to no such exercise as may with propriety be named 'negative thinking,' resulting in 'a negative notion.' Sir W. Hamilton's distinction between a positive and negative notion is given in the Logic, I. 102, and is defended in his Letter, Philos. of Inf. p. 500, or Metaph. II. 534; and supported by Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 48. This doctrine I have criticised at length, Philos. of the Inf. 3d ed., beginning at p. 272. See Cousin, Hist. of Mod. Philos. 1. 86, and M'Cosh, Intuitions, 230.

3. Belief in an Infinite Being involves such knowledge of his nature as enables us to distinguish his existence from all existence besides. Belief is the assent of the mind to a truth, while the reality so acknowledged is not matter of observation. See Mansel's Philos. of the Conditioned, p. 129, and appendix to Philos. of Infin. 3d ed. p. 503. Thus, facts which we accept on the testimony of others, propositions to which we assent without being able to complete their verification, and such a transcendent fact as the Divine existence, are matters of faith. But faith is the exercise of an intelligent nature, apart from which it is impossible. Assent cannot be given except on condition of an apprehension of truth, sufficient to distinguish it from all other known truth. Since, then, a belief in the Divine existence belongs to us, this