When an office of importance becomes vacant,-when a commander is to be named for a great expedition, or an ambassador for a delicate and critical mission, it is probable that more than one individual will occur to the ministry as peculiarly qualified to discharge those momentous duties, and clearly entitled to the nomination on the score of superior merit. If they were free to follow the suggestions of their own judgment, there would be no 'doubt about the result; but a ministry, in this country, is a set of persons who hold their patronage, and all their other power, in consequence of being supported in all their measures by about two thirds of the members of the legislature, and who would forfeit all this patronage and power the moment they lost that support, or were deserted, by any considerable proportion of their adherents. If it should happen, therefore, that any person of great weight and influence in that body should chuse himself to be the commander or ambassador, in the case now imagined, or should insist that the appointment should be given to some friend or connexion of his own, and that, in both cases, under the express assurance that he would withdraw with all his adherents, and unite himself with the opposition, if his application was not attended to;-it is plain that, in most cases, the minister must yield to his conditions. It may not often happen, that any one individual can command such a number of votes as to overturn an administration by his secession; but the combined interest of a very few powerful families is generally able to do this; and where they recommend any one with their united influence, the recommendation has the force of a command. It would be altogether extravagant to imagine that any ministry would endanger their own stability, or even risk the cordiality of their adherents, by rejecting such a recommendation, in behalf of a competitor who had nothing but his merit to plead for him. The only apology which could be received for their refusal would be, that a previous application had been made, with which it was still more indispensable for them to comply.

If occurrences of this nature were rare, and if the government was left in general to the free exercise of its discretion, the evil arising from such occasional interferences would scarcely require to be noticed; but to those who are at all acquainted with the practice of the constitution, it must be unnecessary to say, that this is not the case. Not only are all the great offices bespoken for the leading members of the legislature, or their immediate connexions, but all the smaller employments, down to secretaries, and clerks to secretaries, are supplied by candidates who rely upon interest, and not upon merit; and produce, as their only qualification, the recommendation of this noble lord, or that dis

poser

poser of boroughs. So far from being left to the freedom of their own choice, ministers have in general no other discretion to observe, than to disoblige the least powerful of their suitors, and to pacify those whose application is rejected to-day, with promises of better success to-morrow. The consequences of this system are obvious, and sufficiently melancholy.

In the first place, all the great and important offices of the state are virtually monopolized by a few great families. Provided there be any member of those families possessed of talents to discharge their duties in a decent and passable manner, a claim is sure to be made in their behalf; and, from the nature of the government, that claim is almost sure to be successful. The nature of the government, indeed, and the weight of the opposition by which it is always confronted, renders a certain degree of talent in those privileged candidates indispensable. In this respect we have the advantage of the continental governments. Our chief places cannot be given away. to persons utterly incapable of their duties; but still, the qualifications required by us in a candidate properly recommended, are undoubtedly very slender, and, beyond all question, much lower than might be required, and could be obtained, if the competition were free and general, and if success were the sure reward of superior qualification.

The second bad effect is, that persons whose natural genius and dispositions would ensure the very highest excellence in many important departments, are deterred from cultivating those talents, or bringing them forward into public notice, from the consciousness that they do not possess that political influence which is necessary to give them effect, or from despair of obtaining those recommendations, without which no success is to be expected. Much admirable talent is thus suppressed for want of encouragement; and minds, that might have redeemed or exalted the age or the country to which they belonged, have wasted their vigour in obscure and ignoble drudgery.

The last consequence is, that those who possess the power of nominating to high offices, being thus habitually beset with applications from quarters to which they are forced to pay attention, cease to think of any other functionaries than those who come so recommended, and make no exertion to discover or bring forward those talents, by which alone the exigencies of the country can be supplied in seasons of great difficulty.

These reasons, we think, are nearly sufficient to account for a fact, which we conceive to admit of no dispute, viz. that this country, though containing, in the mass of its population, a far greater proportion of intelligence and just principle, than any other that ever existed, has not generally conducted itself with any extraordinary

extraordinary or consummate wisdom as a government, but has often committed or persisted in the errors which a narrow and a vulgar policy had imposed upon the least enlightened of its neighbours. It is natural to think that the highest talents should be found where there is the greatest reward, and the greatest field for their exertion; and in a free country especially, it seemed neceffary to explain how a system fhould have arifen, which precludes the ftate from availing itself of the genius and the wisdom of its fubjects, and prevents the people from interfering to fave themselves by the fair application of the talents and the fagacity they poffefs.

It is easier to point out the evils of this fyftem, than the meafures by which they may be redreffed. One great object is, to multiply the points of contact between the wifdom which is fcattered among the people, and that which is actually employed in the conduct of public affairs; to enlarge the intellectual communication between the nation and its governors; and thus to enable the knowledge and the talent that are in the country to act upon the mechanifm by which its bufinefs is performed. By this means, the neceffity of employing men of talents, instead of political partifans, will become more generally apparent; the defects of the ufual candidates will be better appreciated; and many will retire, and many be driven from a competition, in which they now meet with scarcely any refiftance. To negative these established pretenfions, however, and boldly to bring in diftinguished abilities in preference to party agents, will require, in the beginning, no little ftrength both of mind and of influence in the miniftry by which it is attempted. It is obvious, indeed, that the weaker a miniftry is, the more completely it must always be held in thraldom to those by whom it is fupported; and that the greater ftrength it can acquire, the greater will be its independence, and its power of fulfilling its duty, without regarding the disappointment or refentment of individuals. The first step to this great reform, therefore, must be to form a strong ministry,-one fo firmly feated in the esteem and confidence of the country, as to be able to do what is right, without caring whom it displeases, and to attend to the business of the country, without interruption from a distrust of its own fecurity. If fuch a miniftry can once be found, nothing more will be neceffary than to give a beginning to the system of which we have been speaking. It will not afterwards be easy to revert to the infatuation of former times. Intriguers and partifans may fucceed, for a long while, in excluding men of active and commanding talents from high fituations; but they will never be able to difplace them, if they are once allowed to get footing, and to fhew experimentally the difference between them and their predeceffors.

If men could be generally perfuaded of the neceffity of the cafe, and of the efficiency of the propofed remedy, we should by no means despair of seeing it adopted, at least to such an extent as to ensure its ultimate fuccefs. Of the neceffity, we think, no man that looks at the present state of Europe, and recollects by what it has been produced, will long entertain a doubt. The fame review will fatisfy him of the efficacy of the remedy fuggefted. France has triumphed by the free and unlimited use the has made of the talents of her people; but the people of England are at this moment much more enlightened and ingenious, and capable of affording more efficient fervice to their government, than thofe of France, or of any other country. If a fimilar field was opened for competition,-if the fame high rewards were held out for excellence, and the fame facilities afforded for its publication and difplay, we are perfectly satisfied that England would in a very fhort time exhibit more splendid inftances of fuccessful genius, in every department of the public fervice, than have yet been produced among thofe who have rifen to fuch a height by their multiplication. Unless fome fuch measures be adopted, it is not easy to see how they are to be refifted.

We have dwelt too long, we are afraid, on these general confiderations; but they are too important, we conceive, to be fuppreffed upon fuch an occafion; and we have been induced to give fome latitude to the expreffion of our opinions, both because the topic has been altogether overlooked by the author of the work before us, and has not been fufficiently unfolded in any recent work that has fallen under our observation. The effential difference between a new and an old government, is the key, we are firmly perfuaded, to the whole recent and difaftrous hiftory of Europe, and fhould be our guide and point of direction in all the efforts which we are yet to make for its restoration.

The only other topic in the work before us, to which we have now leisure to attend, is that which treats of the policy of feeking peace with France, in her prefent triumphant pofition. The opinion of the author, we have already intimated, is decidedly against fuch a pacification. Ours, we will confefs, rather leans the other way; though the question appears to us to be one of the Inoft difficult and delicate, as well as the most important, to which the public attention can poffibly be directed.

The war was undertaken, we fhall admit, for the purpose of repressing the ufurpations of France, or of ameliorating its government. The refult has been, that France has fubjugated the whole Continent, from the Baltic to the Straits of Meffina; and that its government has paffed from a tumultuous democracy, into a regular, enlightened, and well-difciplined military defpotism.

Such

Such is the state of things with regard to France and her continental enemies. With regard to ourselves, we have hitherto fuffered nothing but in our tranquillity and our finances. Our navy has. been uniformly triumphant, our trade has increased, and we have conquered a great number of the foreign settlements of the enemy, without lofing any of our own; at the fame time, we are threatened with invafion, and our taxes are becoming every day more intolerably burdenfome. The problem is, whether, in these circumftances, it be wifer to make peace, or to continue the war. The folution, we have already faid, appears to us to be extremely difficult; but it will be easier if we can afcertain for what objects the war must now be carried on.

There are only four ends, we think, that can poffibly be in the view of those who are for perfifting in hoftility. The first is, to restore the Bourbons, to reduce the power of France, and to repress her within her ancient limits. The fecond is, to retrieve, at leaft to a certain extent, the loffes of our faithful allies. The third is, to maintain the conquests which we have made during the war; and the last is, to defend ourselves with greater fecu rity from the dangers with which we are menaced from the enormous power and rooted hoftility of our enemy. Of these four objects of war, the two first, we are afraid, may now fairly be given up as defperate and unattainable. The third, we conceive, is unjuftifiable and infufficient; and it is with regard to the laft only, that we are inclined to entertain any doubt or hesitation.

Every attack that has been made upon France has ended in adding to her power. The wars which her neighbours have waged against her have been the fole caufes of her greatnefs. She baffled the greatest armies, and the most extenfive leagues, while the strength of her enemies was unbroken, and her own immature. Is it to be expected, then, that the iffue of the contest fhould be different, when their refources are wafted, and hers improved,when their armies have been broken and difperfed, and hers confolidated, multiplied, and elated? The game, we fear, is decidedly loft, as to the continent of Europe; and for our allies to perfift in it, will only be to push their bad fortune. They had better take up the remaining stakes, if they can; and endeavour to acquire a little more skill and contrivance, before they chufe partners for a new party. Every new league that has been formed against France, has added a new country to her conquests. The first gave her the Low Countries and Holland; the fecond gave her Italy and part of Germany; the third laid Auftria at her feet; the fourth has annihilated Pruffia. Is it for her enemies to perfift in this fyftem? Or does any one remain fo fanguine as to think the continuance of the war more hazardous to France, than