any is, that nothing in the shape of a formidable invasion will be attempted. Even on the supposition of such an attempt, the greater part of our countrymen have never allowed themselves to imagine any thing beyond a battle at sea. A few of the more resolute have perhaps looked forward to a momentary and unambiguous conflict on the beach with those who had escaped from our maritime vengeance: but we cannot discover that the idea of a protracted contest in the interior has ever been admitted, or that preparations have been made in contemplation of such a possibi lity. What the consequences may be of such neglect, we have just been attempting to point out. For some of the facts which imperiously call upon us to take security against them, we refer our readers to the following passages of the work now before us. Though his threats of invafion have been fufpended, not so his naval preparations. He has not difcontinued the building of that great number of fhips of the line, the keels of which were long fince laid at Antwerp, at Breft, and in various other ports of his dominions; and the dock-yards of Venice, are now fully employed, as well as thofe of Spain and Holland, in preparing for him a regular marine. Meantime, the Boulogne flotilla has been carefully maintained upon that extenfive scale, and in that fitness for immediate fervice, to which he had raifed it before his march for the Rhine. It is, if public and general report may be credited, capable of transporting, by a fingle embarkation, 150,000 men to our fhores. Nor is that flotilla to be defpifed, as au inftrument of invafion, when in the hands of a man prodigal of the lives of his troops, and inexorably bent on the accomplishment of his purpose: more especially now, when he has gained renown enough, and ftrength enough, both at home and abroad, to be in no danger, from the difcontent that might be excited by the lofs of an army. • We had fome fecurity perhaps, till now, from the dilemma in which Napoleon was placed, by the neceffity of either risking his own perfon in the paffage, or refigning to another commander the glory of the expedition, in the event of its fuccefs. But now, he can afford to fpare, to Murat, to Maffena, Davouft, or fome other diftinguished general, the renown of conquering Great Britain; nor feel any apprehenfion that fuch a delegate will ufe the large force to be committed to him, eithet at Boulogne, or on this fide the channel, fo as to triumph with fafety. and avoid the fate of Moreau. The Ufurper will therefore most probably not expofe himself to the inconvenience of leading the army of England, nor rafhly re-engage himself to do fo; but will yield to the prayers of his anxiously affectionate fubjects, and devolve on fome favourite chief, that hazardous command. But the Boulogne flotilla will not be relied upon, as the only mean of invafion. In other ports of the channel, in the German Ocean, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic, regular and powerful armaments will be prepared, fo as to distract our attention, and divide our naval force; nor would it be poffible for us to blockade them all, A 3 through through every feafon, and with fleets and fquadrons fufficiently ftrong, if our navy were three times as large and potent as it actually is. It would be prepofterous therefore to fuppofe, that from no part of his immense maritime regions, will the enemy be able to fend expeditions to fea; and not lefs fo, to rely that his fleets and transports will all be met with by British fquadrons, before they can land troops on our fhores. Even the vigilance and energy of Nelfon, could not prevent the powerful invafion of Egypt; and if, prior to 1805, any man believed that it is impoffible for the hoftile fleets to steal from their harbours, to perform voyages, and to land forces in diftant parts, without being arrefted by British fleets in their way, he muft now be quite cured of that mistake. We have learnt, by reiterated experience within the last two years, that all this may be done, without the difcovery even of the point of deftination, till it is too late to fruftrate the plan. It would not be quite so easy, I admit, to collect and send to fea, with equal fecrecy, a fleet large enough to waft over an army adequate to the invafion of England; but fuppofing fuch fleets to be collected at more ports than one, even this might very probably be effected. It muft not, however, be concluded, that the enemy will certainly be driven to the neceffity of embarking by ftealth. A much more likely, and feafible expedient would be, the bringing together, by combined and well concerted movements, a large part of his naval force, at the deftined point of embarkation, and then failing openly for our coast, under the protection of a fleet fuch as we could not immediately collect fhips enough to intercept and defeat. It has been computed by fea-officers of reputation and judgment, that 150,000 men might be embarked at Boulogne in a fingle day; for the veffels now collected there, are fo conftructed as to take the ground without damage; and when anchored at high-water mark, on a long fandy beach which is impregnably fortified for their protection, they are left dry for hours by the cbb tide; fo that the troops may march on board by means of planks, as quickly almoft as they could file off into their barracks; and at the return of high water, be ready to put to fea. If fo, the command of the channel for eight and forty hours, might fuffice for the most formidable invafion. ' p. 109-112. And afterwards After all, have we effective foldiers, regular or irregular, fufficient, in point of numbers, to make the country perfectly fafe against a powerful invafion? The volunteers, much more than the regulars, are difperfed in every part of the island; and no great proportion of them could be convened at any given point, foon enough to ftop the progrefs of an enemy, who might land on our eastern or fouthern coaft, before he could become matter of London. Befides, the defects which I have juft been ftating, would be found peculiarly fatal, if fuch troops were to be marched from diftant parts of the island, immediately prior to their being brought into action. Of the volunteers now enrolled throughout the kingdom, a great many L many are certainly, in point of difcipline, as well as bodily qualifications, unfit for actual fervice; and a large proportion even of those who are returned as effective, will not be found fo upon trial. It is too common, I fear, to keep every member on the effective lift, who has once exercised with the corps in battalion upon an infpection or general muster; though, perhaps, he never was perfect even in his manual exercife, and has forgot the little he once learned of it. Thefe undifciplined effectives too, are, it is probable, increafing very rapidly, in almoft every corps not receiving pay, though their nominal force remains undiminished. • Without enlarging on this fubject, I will hazard an opinion that there are not 50,000 volunteers in the whole island, now ready to take the field, and fit to act against an enemy; yet, were there fix times as many, it might be difficult to draw together two armies of that amount, in time to make a firft and fecond ftand, for the existence of their country. Suppofing a battle to be loft, and London in the hands of the invaders, the fubfequent junction of volunteers, who are scattered over the whole face of the island, would be no easy work. With a most active and energetic enemy in the centre, the communications between the east and the weft, the north and the south, of the island, would not be long open. The hope therefore of further refiftance, would depend, not merely on our having enough of effective volunteers, to form a powerful referve, but on their being fufficiently numerous, to make head in different parts of the country at the fame moment, and fight their way in large bodies to a general rendezvous, though oppofed by powerful detachments. • If it be objected, that these calculations are founded on an affumption that we should be taken by surprise; I answer, that our notice of an approaching invafion would probably be extremely fhort, and quite infufficient for the purpose of embodying our volunteers throughout the ifland, prior to the actual defcent. The means of fuddenly embarking a large army at Boulogne, are continually at the enemy's command. The only requifite for invafion, therefore, which, unless he trutts to the flotilla alone, he must provide by new expedients, is a convoying fleet: and this, as has been already fhown, he may very poffibly obtain by a preconcerted junction of different fquadrons off that or fome neighbouring port. But the only probable means of fo obtaining a temporary fuperiority in the channel, are fo far from being inconfiftent with fecrecy, that they neceffarily imply that quality; nor would the opportunity, when found, admit of any delay. It feems not unlikely, therefore, that the fame day would bring us advice that the blockade of Boulogne was raised by a strong hoftile fleet, and that the troops were be ginning to embark: nor is it impoffible, that the flotilla might be already on our coaft, before the danger could be announced by Government, at any great diftance from London. What then is to be done in order to prepare effectually against the danger of such a surprife, with our prefent means of interior defence? A 4 Are "Are the volunteers to be called from their homes, and marched into diftant parts of the kingdom, there to be formed into armies, on every alarm? The repetition of fuch coftly and vexatious means of preparation, would foon exhauft both the purse and the patience of the country. Befides, as the danger muft always be imminent as long as a large army is encamped within fight of our coafts, and the moft fpecious indications of an immediate intention to embark, could be eafily made, the enemy, if he found he could reduce us to fuch coftly defenfive expedients, would take care we should have alarms enough to harass our volunteers prior to an actual attempt. It is plain, then, that forces which are to be affembled from many different diftricts of the kingdom, at the expense of every branch of civil industry, as well as of domestic comfort, muft probably be, for the most part, unembodied when the enemy is on his way to our shores. › P. 130-133. In this situation, is it possible for a moment to doubt, that our danger is great, and that our preparation is inadequate? or, is it conceivable that men should still be found, who can fancy that they act a laudable and spirited part, in discrediting the danger, and obstructing the necessary preparation? or in raising a senseless cry of disaffection or cowardice against all who have courage to look our situation in the face, and patriotism, to wish that it should be rendered more secure? It seems to be the great object of those who assume the direction of the public sentiment, to hold out the enemy as something very hateful, but by no means very formidable; and thus to inflame our animosity, without exciting our apprehensions. Now this, we conceive, is exactly the reverse of the policy which ought to be pursued. Our animosity is already more violent than is either reasonable or becoming; and our apprehensions are proved, by the imperfection of our preparation, to be far less active than they ought to be. To talk with contempt of the greatest military power that the world ever saw, is either base affectation, or mere drivelling, or insanity; and yet this is the popular tone among those who seem most inclined to drive us on to the encounter. Provided we are angry enough, and sufficiently convinced that we have to do with a despicable opponent, they seem to think it but of little consequence how we are prepared in other respects for the contest. Our want of discipline and numbers-of generals-of strong places, or plans of operation, are all overlooked; and instead of remedying them, it seems to be the prevailing policy to discountenance all who would press them on our notice, and to make up all deficiencies by more abuse of the enemy, and more high-flown compliments to our own confidence and prowess. In consequence of all this, a general feeling is propagated in the country, that no extraordinary exertions can be necessary to repel these presumptuous inyaders; and it is but too familiar and obvious a truth, that no thing but a conviction of absolute necessity will ever lead us to those exertions without which we cannot be in safety. That necessity, we think, is now come. We must be an armed nation, before we can be safe from the hostility of a nation much more numerous in arms: and, that we are not already an armed nation, is owing mainly to the pains which have been taken to disguise from us this necessity, to feed us with the vain idea that no foe will dare to assail us, and that we have nothing to do but to retort their menaces by unmanly abuse and impotent reviling. All Those who agree with us, and with the author before us, as to the miseries which this nation, beyond all others, would have to fuffer from fubjugation, will feel enough of anger and indignation at those by whom they are threatened with fuch a calamity. There can be no need, therefore, to inflame our animofity by any other confiderations. Frenchmen, as Frenchmen, were never very popular in this country; but infulting and invading Frenchmen, could never have met but with one reception. Is it not an infult, then, to the loyalty of our people, as well as to their fpirit, to fuppofe that they need the excitement of paffionate invectives, or that they will fight better, and more willingly, if they are kept in the dark as to the danger of the encounter? this is the worfe, too, because we are verily perfuaded that the vulgar railing, in which we indulge ourselves towards the enemy, is very nearly as much misplaced and unjustifiable as the accufations which they fo induftriously circulate as to us. The French are indifputably a gallant, a focial, and an ingenious people; and, except that they are at war with us, and have beaten our allies, and are pursuing measures that endanger our fecurity, it does not occur to us that they are more deferving of moral reprobation than moft other nations. Their manners are fomewhat more licentious, perhaps, than ours; and they are more boaftful and infolent than we are faid to have been in former times; but, compared with any other Continental people, we cannot help thinking they would appear to confiderable advantage; and that they would probably be reckoned, by an impartial tribunal, fully as amiable and refpectable as our good allies the Portuguese or Neapolitans-the Coffacs or Laplanders. As to their leader, it must be admitted that he has fome flaws in his character that do not perfectly become a hero. He is more irafcible and vindictive, it feems, than fome other heroes have been; but his infatiable ambition, with his difregard of the lives and comforts of others, are very much in the common heroical ftyle. We do not know that he is worfe than the common run of conquerors or arbitrary princes; and are inclined to place him, as to general character, ot far from the level of the great Frederic, or the illuftrious Catharine, |