supported by the splendour of his fortune, or the interest of his friends, is advanced, by her sole credit and contrivance, to the highest offices and honours in the state. Adieu.

G.

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LETTER CXXVII.

CLEANDER to GOBRYAS. From Athens.

SEND thee, noble scribe, what thou wilt permit me to call a very valuable present; because I am sure thy wisdom will esteem it such. It is no less than a transcript of the laws of SOLON. They have been so universally celebrated over Europe, that not many years ago a certain city on the banks of the Tiber, scarcely known in these polished parts of the world, sent solemn deputies to Athens, who were indulged in copying them, and carried home the precious charge in triumph to their countrymen. This distinction was justly due to their pre-eminence over those of all other states; nor can any thing raise in thee an higher veneration for them, except thou listenest to what the Athenians themselves pretend, that the world owes to Attica the invention of laws. So absurd an assertion is equally ridiculous with that concerning their own original from the soil they dwell upon, as it supposes that legal justice and subordination were not dictated to all men by the common voice of nature and condition of society. Both traditions arose from the same principle of vanity, perhaps too in the same barbarous age of superstition; and operate in the same manner on a credulous and proud people. This, however, is an idle speculation, and affects not the merit of the Athenian pandect; for I am convinced, a better than theirs was never formed, for the propagation of personal virtue, and the

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the establishment of a popular religion; nor can any more effectually promote the various, yet connected interests of liberty and commerce, those main pillars of national felicity. One piece of policy will please thee, among many instances which thou wilt observe of it in their statutes; I mean the brevity prevailing in the forms of drawing them, and the forbearing to recite the motives that produced each of them. The former leaves no room for evasion or obscurity; the latter prevents litigiousness, because every reason expressed by the legislator is the foundation of many suits, and all men choose to obey the laws upon their own reasons.

If any institution seems blameable, it is that which makes ingratitude a legal crime. I know it has afforded a fair field of panegyrick to the flatterers of Athens, as well for its singularity, as the sanction it receives from private conscience; but to me it has always appeared either wholly unnecessary, or attended with inconveniences. It is unnecessary, because we must acknowledge it enough (if we consider it) that the generality of legislators endeavour to restrain us from violations of right; and as to every thing that concerns the duties of humanity, send every man to his own breast for information. He who is acquainted with those actions which procure reputation or disgrace, knows the natural infamy accompanying the ungrateful. He knows, that such an one must feel the pangs of remorse, and the vapours of solitude; he knows too, that such characters are rarely found; for if Providence has made not only our reason, but our weaknesses, prompt us in many cases to a beneficence almost disinterested, then certainly much more to gratitude.

These indeed are the natural sanctions of this amiable virtue, and, one would think, of sufficient force to secure us from any violations of it. But should it be suggested, that such violations occur some

times in society, I grant that they sometimes occur, and, I believe, could maintain, that they are provided against incidentally by the laws of all states; for they are often so interwoven with crimes of injustice, as at once to aggravate both the crime and the penalty. So far then, in every country, as they are understood to be aggravations of injustice, they are the objects of the magistrate's care. As to acts of unmixed and downright ingratitude, they seldom happen; and whenever they do, must be left for punishment to the hatred of mankind, the reproofs of reason, the torments of conscience, and the sanctions of religion. The civil magistrate ought not to interpose; because while they do not immediately affect the peace or rights of society, his interposition would bring on a thousand inconveniences. No court of judicature can with such propriety define the proportion of one benefit to another, as they can compare the nature of contested claims. Those proportions would be rated differently in the forum of justice and the forum of conscience; for if justice restores to every man no more than his due, and gratitude often exceeds the real value of a favour, in the return it makes for it; then, upon the principles of justice, no magistrate could oblige me to overpay a benefit, though upon the principles of gratitude I should think myself frequently obliged to do so. And if it be said, that in cases which relate to either, the magistrate must decide according to the rules of each; yet the intention of the legislator most certainly was, that points of gratitude should be determined according to the rules of justice; since, on the contrary supposition, the doing a slight favour to another might be used as an artful way of extorting a return for it, much greater than its value. So that if the magistrate is willing to avoid various ill consequences, which would flow from a different method of determination, he must consider cases of gratitude in the light of pecuniary debts. For which reason the jurisdiction of the magistrate, as to such

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such cases, must operate imperfectly. The proceedings of the forum of conscience and of justice most evidently interfere, and no attempt should be made to unite them. The principles of justice would be forgot, if those of gratitude were always observed; and the very nature of gratitude would be destroyed, if weighed by the rules, as its grace would be lost, if it were enforced by the penalties, of justice. Such a law then sounds prettily in the words, yet, when examined, is nothing but sound. It tends to make the intercourse of benefits among friends as mercenary, as the exchange of commodities in the dealings of merchants. It sets men on their guard against each other; and gives them a reserve in accepting kindnesses, lest they should be called upon by law to return them; and therefore undermines the principle it was intended to support. Excellent minister, thou wilt forgive the peculiarity of my sentiments; I know they are inconsistent with a law established in Persia, and a law in Ægypt; but, if I mistake not, they are deducible both from the reasonings of speculative philosophers, and the practice of wise legislators.

The Athenians are commendable for not confining the judges in their determinations to the strict letter of the law. In all states the extremities of too much law, and too little, are to be equally avoided. Discretion and fixed law should be mingled together; the former to provide against particular cases that may arise, and could not be foreseen; the latter to be a general rule of action: the one may moderate or add to the rigour of the law the other prevents ignorance, disobedience, fickleness in the people; in the judges, it prevents favour, hatred, or corruption. For, in order to deter the magistrate from bending the law in such a way as to break it, I am content the magistrate should be in the power of the law, while a discretionary power is vested in the magistrate. And should it be

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objected,

objected, that the situation of the magistrate would be dangerous and precarious, if he were liable to be called to an account for the exercise of this discretionary power, it may well be answered, that it is fit the state should have an eye over his actions, and that an appeal should lie from his tribunal to the dernier resort. If it appears in some cases that his judgments are wrong, and that nevertheless he gave them according to conscience and his opinion, the judgment may be reversed, without any infamy attending the judge. But if it appears that he has been biassed by evil motives to give even a right determination, then he deserves to be punished with severity. Such salutary provisions as these, against the licentiousness of a bad magistrate, can never become restraints on the freedom of a good one. In Persia, as all subordinate judicatures are derived from the sovereign, so they are under his immediate inspection; for he communicates his authority, without quitting the throne, or sharing it with any one. And certainly the wisdom and power of a great prince must be much more awful to a magistrate, than the divided councils of a popular assembly. How moving is that lesson of integrity to the passion of fear, which may be learnt from the exemplary punishment inflicted by CAMBYSES corrupt judge! He ordered his body to be flayed after his death, and that the seat in the court where he presided, and where his son succeeded him, should be covered with the skin. Thus the very chair became a constant monitor of duty to the magistrate.

on a

The laws of Persia, noble GOBRYAS, excel those of Athens in one point, which is esteemed the perfection, and almost the definition of a free government; "that they indulge the greatest liberty of

accusing, with the least of calumniating." For in Athens, if an accusation is found to be false and malicious, the accuser is only fined in a certain sum of money; whereas in Persia he suffers all those