those punishments which would have been inflicted on the accused, had the accusation been made out. I never reflect on the illustrious instance which our monarch once gave of his impartial regard to this law, without being wrapt in admiration of such exalted virtue. One of his favourites, thou knowest, attempted formerly to make him suspect the honesty of a faithful officer. The officer was imprisoned; the charge being examined, proved groundless, and the king turned his whole indignation on the perfidious informer. He wisely saw, that to have done otherwise would have been to open a door to envy, revenge, and defamation; to arm malice with the publick authority; and to deprive the throne of its most sacred character, "the protection of innocence from specious calumnies, "or lawless oppression."

C.

LETTER CXXVIII.

CLEANDER to GOBRYAS.

THOU HOU hast encouraged me, noble scribe, to transmit many papers of a political kind to the court of Persia. I will now open to thee the rise and progress of the constitution of Athens, since it is well worth thy notice. They give no account of themselves before OGYGES, and that is sufficiently romantick. They speak of his age in the highest terms of foolish admiration; and affirm, that when the rest of the world was in a state of ignorance and darkness, they were flourishing in arts and power. But after a reign of thirty-two years, a flood swept away not only their cities and historical records, but both the monarch and the people. After a long interval of time, CECROPS, with some followers, came out of Ægypt, and settled in Attica, where they united into a small community. This prince built a town, which he called after himself, CECROPIA, on the rock where the citadel now stands, and instituted four tribes. In the reign of CECROPS the second, they talk of twelve little cities, which were dispersed over the country, each of them enjoying separate privileges and immunities. Cecropia was the capital, where the king resided, to whom, in cases of difficulty or of danger, the subjects dutifully applied. I will not insist on the hardships through which THESEUS struggled in his way to the kingdom. It is well known, that after having defeated the sons of PANDION, his grandfather, who contested the sovereignty with him, and freed his country from the yoke of MINOS, he diligently watched over its interests, reformed

reformed it, and was properly the first lawgiver who appeared in it. He collected the people into one city, by which means, though he added to their strength, yet he laid a foundation for continual animosities, and gave a lurking principle of death to the constitution. For whenever the body of men that compose the state are united in one city, they must frequently be disturbed by political tempests. In such governments the pursuits of ambition engage every man, from the greatest to the meanest; and hence arises the most factious and unsteady genius of a republick. He established a common court of justice; and to shew his reverence to the gods, and especially to the deity from whose name the town was called Athens, he ordained the feast Panathenæa. To give a sanction to his conduct, THESEUS, like other legislators, consulted the oracle, and promised to lay down the regal power, reserving only the military command, and guardianship of the laws, to himself. He divided the Athenians into three ranks, of noblemen, husbandmen, and artificers. The first excelled in honour, the next in riches, and the third in number. These changes were so well received, that no further alteration was made in their affairs, till after the death of CODRUS, by the abolition of kings, who at that time retained only the titles of royalty, with no more power than THESEUS, and not so much authority. Perpetual and decennial Archons soon sunk into annual ones; and DRACO was at last nominated, not indeed to alter the general plan of the state, but to make some farther and more particular provision in matters of private right. This man, however, having little knowledge of mankind, and a very bad opinion of them, was unfit for the office; and, with an unparalleled severity, inflicted death for every offence, as well as that of murder. So that it were better to have lived in a state of nature, when the law of retaliation took place, than under the savage system of DRACO. Thou

mayest

mayst easily conjecture, GOBRYAS, no people could bear this. Within the space of a few years they invested SOLON with an unlimited power over the whole œconomy of their constitution. In the course of my dispatches I have already given thee some account how far he new modelled it. It is certain he always designed to temper the people by the nobility; and to check the petulance of those who have most interest in the state, by those who have most wisdom in it. His republican plans were somewhat interrupted by the shortlived influence of PISISTRATUS; but on the murder of HIPPARCHUS, and the flight of HIPPIAS, his sons, (the last of whom persuaded DARIUS to the destructive war against the Greeks,) CLISTHENES revived them, and added new laws, both in completion and amendment of the scheme of SOLON.

The greatest blow that ever was given to the firmness and tranquillity of the Athenian government, came from the best man who in any age has lived under it, ARISTIDES; and he was among the first who felt the consequences of it. But it was owing, not to choice, but to necessity; for the people (as I have hinted in a former letter*) grew turbulent at home, being elated with their success abroad at Platea; so he agreed to admit them to an equal capacity of bearing offices with the three rich orders of the state, who were divided by SOLON, according to the valuation of their fortunes, and had till then composed the senate of four hundred. Hence all orders, contrary to the institution of SOLON, were promiscuously blended, and the senate, not being made up of the natural aristocracy, were in name only distinct from the assembly, but were divested in fact of all separate authority. The Demagogues, who were to report matters

VOL. II.

* Letter xiii.

U

from

from the senate, proposed them, not only to the determination, but to the debate of the people, which to this day maintains two opposite parties in the city. Indeed the balance of the republick was never well fixed, since before the expedition of XERXES it was in danger of falling into an oligarchy, as it has now fallen into the hands of the multitude. Such effects are consequent on two original defects in its settlement: the first is an unequal distribution of property, whence a fluctuation of power ensues; and the other is an uncertain division of privileges between the senate and people, in the transaction of business, which (joined to the other cause) produces perpetual sedition. As these original faults in the constitution have given rise to disorders in the administration, so a very blameable fault, that took its rise in the administration, is like to bear hard on the constitution. I will explain it to thee fully. Thou knowest it is the aim of this republick, and agreeable to the principles on which it has been founded, to extend its commerce, and increase the number of its dependent states. It is in pursuance of this plan of empire, that the youth, when they enter into the service, take an oath to improve the dominions of Athens to the utmost of their abilities, "while there are vineyards and olive-trees without its "limits." How often has it sent forth colonies to build new cities, armies to subdue new countries, and brought home the corn of Ægypt, and the spices of Arabia, in the ships of its wealthy traders! Thus they have raised a name, which is immortal, and accordingly for some time placed themselves at the head of this country. But by cruelty to those who openly acknowledged their power, and arrogance over those who connived at it, they have been forced to contract their views, and, instead of endeavouring to propagate, they are now labouring to preserve their influence.

Noble